Transcendental propositions as indispensable conditions of our self-understanding as human beings a brief commentary on Hanna's Kant
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2017 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Kant e-prints (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/index.php/kant-e-prints/article/view/660 |
Resumo: | In this critical review of Robert Hanna's ingenious book (2006), I aim to support Hanna’s main insightful reading of Kant, namely what he calls "a priori truth with a human face," without appealing to Kant's divide between a priori and a posteriori and analytic and synthetic truths. My suggestion is that transcendental propositions are necessary neither in the usual epistemological sense that analytic propositions are, let alone in the metaphysical sense that some empirical propositions are. Instead, they are necessary in the theoretical domain in the weak alternative sense that they make possible the empirical recognition of appearances as an object as an indispensable condition of our self-consciousness experience, and they are a priori in the practical domain in the sense that their truth is vital for our self-comprehension as human beings. |
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Transcendental propositions as indispensable conditions of our self-understanding as human beings a brief commentary on Hanna's Kantself-consciousness experienceepistemologicalself-comprehensionIn this critical review of Robert Hanna's ingenious book (2006), I aim to support Hanna’s main insightful reading of Kant, namely what he calls "a priori truth with a human face," without appealing to Kant's divide between a priori and a posteriori and analytic and synthetic truths. My suggestion is that transcendental propositions are necessary neither in the usual epistemological sense that analytic propositions are, let alone in the metaphysical sense that some empirical propositions are. Instead, they are necessary in the theoretical domain in the weak alternative sense that they make possible the empirical recognition of appearances as an object as an indispensable condition of our self-consciousness experience, and they are a priori in the practical domain in the sense that their truth is vital for our self-comprehension as human beings.Centre for Logic, Epistemology, and the History of Science (CLE)2017-03-10info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/index.php/kant-e-prints/article/view/660Kant e-prints; v. 11 n. 1 (2016); 58-69Kant e-Prints; Vol. 11 No. 1 (2016); 58-691677-163Xreponame:Kant e-prints (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:Unicampporhttps://www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/index.php/kant-e-prints/article/view/660/537Copyright (c) 2017 Kant e-Printsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessHorácio de Sá Pereira, Roberto2021-10-17T20:55:25Zoai:www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/:article/660Revistahttps://www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/index.php/kant-e-prints/PUBhttps://www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/index.php/kant-e-prints/oaiclekant@unicamp.br||danielomarperez@hotmail.com||daniel.omar.perez@pq.cnpq.br1677-163X1677-163Xopendoar:2021-10-17T20:55:25Kant e-prints (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Transcendental propositions as indispensable conditions of our self-understanding as human beings a brief commentary on Hanna's Kant |
title |
Transcendental propositions as indispensable conditions of our self-understanding as human beings a brief commentary on Hanna's Kant |
spellingShingle |
Transcendental propositions as indispensable conditions of our self-understanding as human beings a brief commentary on Hanna's Kant Horácio de Sá Pereira, Roberto self-consciousness experience epistemological self-comprehension |
title_short |
Transcendental propositions as indispensable conditions of our self-understanding as human beings a brief commentary on Hanna's Kant |
title_full |
Transcendental propositions as indispensable conditions of our self-understanding as human beings a brief commentary on Hanna's Kant |
title_fullStr |
Transcendental propositions as indispensable conditions of our self-understanding as human beings a brief commentary on Hanna's Kant |
title_full_unstemmed |
Transcendental propositions as indispensable conditions of our self-understanding as human beings a brief commentary on Hanna's Kant |
title_sort |
Transcendental propositions as indispensable conditions of our self-understanding as human beings a brief commentary on Hanna's Kant |
author |
Horácio de Sá Pereira, Roberto |
author_facet |
Horácio de Sá Pereira, Roberto |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Horácio de Sá Pereira, Roberto |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
self-consciousness experience epistemological self-comprehension |
topic |
self-consciousness experience epistemological self-comprehension |
description |
In this critical review of Robert Hanna's ingenious book (2006), I aim to support Hanna’s main insightful reading of Kant, namely what he calls "a priori truth with a human face," without appealing to Kant's divide between a priori and a posteriori and analytic and synthetic truths. My suggestion is that transcendental propositions are necessary neither in the usual epistemological sense that analytic propositions are, let alone in the metaphysical sense that some empirical propositions are. Instead, they are necessary in the theoretical domain in the weak alternative sense that they make possible the empirical recognition of appearances as an object as an indispensable condition of our self-consciousness experience, and they are a priori in the practical domain in the sense that their truth is vital for our self-comprehension as human beings. |
publishDate |
2017 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2017-03-10 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/index.php/kant-e-prints/article/view/660 |
url |
https://www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/index.php/kant-e-prints/article/view/660 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/index.php/kant-e-prints/article/view/660/537 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2017 Kant e-Prints info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2017 Kant e-Prints |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Centre for Logic, Epistemology, and the History of Science (CLE) |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Centre for Logic, Epistemology, and the History of Science (CLE) |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Kant e-prints; v. 11 n. 1 (2016); 58-69 Kant e-Prints; Vol. 11 No. 1 (2016); 58-69 1677-163X reponame:Kant e-prints (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:Unicamp |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
Unicamp |
institution |
Unicamp |
reponame_str |
Kant e-prints (Online) |
collection |
Kant e-prints (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Kant e-prints (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
clekant@unicamp.br||danielomarperez@hotmail.com||daniel.omar.perez@pq.cnpq.br |
_version_ |
1754842243340959744 |