Transcendental propositions as indispensable conditions of our self-understanding as human beings a brief commentary on Hanna's Kant

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Horácio de Sá Pereira, Roberto
Data de Publicação: 2017
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Kant e-prints (Online)
Texto Completo: https://www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/index.php/kant-e-prints/article/view/660
Resumo: In this critical review of Robert Hanna's ingenious book (2006), I aim to support Hanna’s main insightful reading of Kant, namely what he calls "a priori truth with a human face," without appealing to Kant's divide between a priori and a posteriori and analytic and synthetic truths. My suggestion is that transcendental propositions are necessary neither in the usual epistemological sense that analytic propositions are, let alone in the metaphysical sense that some empirical propositions are. Instead, they are necessary in the theoretical domain in the weak alternative sense that they make possible the empirical recognition of appearances as an object as an indispensable condition of our self-consciousness experience, and they are a priori in the practical domain in the sense that their truth is vital for our self-comprehension as human beings.
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spelling Transcendental propositions as indispensable conditions of our self-understanding as human beings a brief commentary on Hanna's Kantself-consciousness experienceepistemologicalself-comprehensionIn this critical review of Robert Hanna's ingenious book (2006), I aim to support Hanna’s main insightful reading of Kant, namely what he calls "a priori truth with a human face," without appealing to Kant's divide between a priori and a posteriori and analytic and synthetic truths. My suggestion is that transcendental propositions are necessary neither in the usual epistemological sense that analytic propositions are, let alone in the metaphysical sense that some empirical propositions are. Instead, they are necessary in the theoretical domain in the weak alternative sense that they make possible the empirical recognition of appearances as an object as an indispensable condition of our self-consciousness experience, and they are a priori in the practical domain in the sense that their truth is vital for our self-comprehension as human beings.Centre for Logic, Epistemology, and the History of Science (CLE)2017-03-10info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/index.php/kant-e-prints/article/view/660Kant e-prints; v. 11 n. 1 (2016); 58-69Kant e-Prints; Vol. 11 No. 1 (2016); 58-691677-163Xreponame:Kant e-prints (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:Unicampporhttps://www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/index.php/kant-e-prints/article/view/660/537Copyright (c) 2017 Kant e-Printsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessHorácio de Sá Pereira, Roberto2021-10-17T20:55:25Zoai:www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/:article/660Revistahttps://www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/index.php/kant-e-prints/PUBhttps://www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/index.php/kant-e-prints/oaiclekant@unicamp.br||danielomarperez@hotmail.com||daniel.omar.perez@pq.cnpq.br1677-163X1677-163Xopendoar:2021-10-17T20:55:25Kant e-prints (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Transcendental propositions as indispensable conditions of our self-understanding as human beings a brief commentary on Hanna's Kant
title Transcendental propositions as indispensable conditions of our self-understanding as human beings a brief commentary on Hanna's Kant
spellingShingle Transcendental propositions as indispensable conditions of our self-understanding as human beings a brief commentary on Hanna's Kant
Horácio de Sá Pereira, Roberto
self-consciousness experience
epistemological
self-comprehension
title_short Transcendental propositions as indispensable conditions of our self-understanding as human beings a brief commentary on Hanna's Kant
title_full Transcendental propositions as indispensable conditions of our self-understanding as human beings a brief commentary on Hanna's Kant
title_fullStr Transcendental propositions as indispensable conditions of our self-understanding as human beings a brief commentary on Hanna's Kant
title_full_unstemmed Transcendental propositions as indispensable conditions of our self-understanding as human beings a brief commentary on Hanna's Kant
title_sort Transcendental propositions as indispensable conditions of our self-understanding as human beings a brief commentary on Hanna's Kant
author Horácio de Sá Pereira, Roberto
author_facet Horácio de Sá Pereira, Roberto
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Horácio de Sá Pereira, Roberto
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv self-consciousness experience
epistemological
self-comprehension
topic self-consciousness experience
epistemological
self-comprehension
description In this critical review of Robert Hanna's ingenious book (2006), I aim to support Hanna’s main insightful reading of Kant, namely what he calls "a priori truth with a human face," without appealing to Kant's divide between a priori and a posteriori and analytic and synthetic truths. My suggestion is that transcendental propositions are necessary neither in the usual epistemological sense that analytic propositions are, let alone in the metaphysical sense that some empirical propositions are. Instead, they are necessary in the theoretical domain in the weak alternative sense that they make possible the empirical recognition of appearances as an object as an indispensable condition of our self-consciousness experience, and they are a priori in the practical domain in the sense that their truth is vital for our self-comprehension as human beings.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2017-03-10
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
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dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/index.php/kant-e-prints/article/view/660
url https://www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/index.php/kant-e-prints/article/view/660
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/index.php/kant-e-prints/article/view/660/537
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2017 Kant e-Prints
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2017 Kant e-Prints
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Centre for Logic, Epistemology, and the History of Science (CLE)
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Centre for Logic, Epistemology, and the History of Science (CLE)
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Kant e-prints; v. 11 n. 1 (2016); 58-69
Kant e-Prints; Vol. 11 No. 1 (2016); 58-69
1677-163X
reponame:Kant e-prints (Online)
instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron:Unicamp
instname_str Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron_str Unicamp
institution Unicamp
reponame_str Kant e-prints (Online)
collection Kant e-prints (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Kant e-prints (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv clekant@unicamp.br||danielomarperez@hotmail.com||daniel.omar.perez@pq.cnpq.br
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