One-object-plus-epistemic-phenomenalism
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2019 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Kant e-prints (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/index.php/kant-e-prints/article/view/1321 |
Resumo: | The aim of this paper is to present a novel reading of Kantian idealism. In want of a better name, I call my interpretation “one-object-plus-epistemic phenomenalism”. I partially endorse Allison’s celebrated position, namely his rejection of metaphysical world-dualism. Yet, I reject Allison’s deflationary two-aspect view. I argue that Kantian idealism is also metaphysically committed to an ontological noumenalism (one-object), namely the claim that the ultimate nature of reality is made up of unknown things in themselves (substantia noumena). Natural sciences can only reveal the relational/structural properties of things as they appear rather than the intrinsic properties of substantia noumena in the negative sense. My anti-deflationary reading is similar to Allais’s and my agnostic monism to Hanna’s. However, against both, I hold that appearances are not the accusative objects of our sensible representations, but rather as Kant repeatedly states: “mere representations”. The accusative objects of our senses are substantia noumena in the negative sense. Moreover, my view is also similar to Langton’s. Again, against Langton I hold that appearances are not merely relational properties of substantia noumena, but the way that such substantia noumena exist inside our mind as “mere representations”. In this regard, I also partially endorse Guyer’s and Van Cleve’s phenomenalist reading because these substantia noumena in the negative sense can only be cognized mind-dependently, namely as appearances. However, against Guyer and Van Cleve I hold that the phenomenalist side of Kantian idealism is purely epistemological rather than ontological: what Kant calls the necessary unity of representations according to categories is not a logical construction of objects out of representations, that is, an ontological reduction of noumena to appearances, but rather the way we sense-independently cognize mind-independent noumena. |
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One-object-plus-epistemic-phenomenalismTranscendental IdealismThe one-world viewThe two-World ViewPhenomenalismThe aim of this paper is to present a novel reading of Kantian idealism. In want of a better name, I call my interpretation “one-object-plus-epistemic phenomenalism”. I partially endorse Allison’s celebrated position, namely his rejection of metaphysical world-dualism. Yet, I reject Allison’s deflationary two-aspect view. I argue that Kantian idealism is also metaphysically committed to an ontological noumenalism (one-object), namely the claim that the ultimate nature of reality is made up of unknown things in themselves (substantia noumena). Natural sciences can only reveal the relational/structural properties of things as they appear rather than the intrinsic properties of substantia noumena in the negative sense. My anti-deflationary reading is similar to Allais’s and my agnostic monism to Hanna’s. However, against both, I hold that appearances are not the accusative objects of our sensible representations, but rather as Kant repeatedly states: “mere representations”. The accusative objects of our senses are substantia noumena in the negative sense. Moreover, my view is also similar to Langton’s. Again, against Langton I hold that appearances are not merely relational properties of substantia noumena, but the way that such substantia noumena exist inside our mind as “mere representations”. In this regard, I also partially endorse Guyer’s and Van Cleve’s phenomenalist reading because these substantia noumena in the negative sense can only be cognized mind-dependently, namely as appearances. However, against Guyer and Van Cleve I hold that the phenomenalist side of Kantian idealism is purely epistemological rather than ontological: what Kant calls the necessary unity of representations according to categories is not a logical construction of objects out of representations, that is, an ontological reduction of noumena to appearances, but rather the way we sense-independently cognize mind-independent noumena.Centre for Logic, Epistemology, and the History of Science (CLE)2019-07-16info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/index.php/kant-e-prints/article/view/1321Kant e-prints; v. 14 n. 1 (2019); 6-30Kant e-Prints; Vol. 14 No. 1 (2019); 6-301677-163Xreponame:Kant e-prints (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:Unicampenghttps://www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/index.php/kant-e-prints/article/view/1321/1067Copyright (c) 2019 Kant e-Prints - Revista Internacional de Filosofiainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessHorácio de Sá Pereira, Roberto2021-10-14T03:01:12Zoai:www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/:article/1321Revistahttps://www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/index.php/kant-e-prints/PUBhttps://www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/index.php/kant-e-prints/oaiclekant@unicamp.br||danielomarperez@hotmail.com||daniel.omar.perez@pq.cnpq.br1677-163X1677-163Xopendoar:2021-10-14T03:01:12Kant e-prints (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
One-object-plus-epistemic-phenomenalism |
title |
One-object-plus-epistemic-phenomenalism |
spellingShingle |
One-object-plus-epistemic-phenomenalism Horácio de Sá Pereira, Roberto Transcendental Idealism The one-world view The two-World View Phenomenalism |
title_short |
One-object-plus-epistemic-phenomenalism |
title_full |
One-object-plus-epistemic-phenomenalism |
title_fullStr |
One-object-plus-epistemic-phenomenalism |
title_full_unstemmed |
One-object-plus-epistemic-phenomenalism |
title_sort |
One-object-plus-epistemic-phenomenalism |
author |
Horácio de Sá Pereira, Roberto |
author_facet |
Horácio de Sá Pereira, Roberto |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Horácio de Sá Pereira, Roberto |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Transcendental Idealism The one-world view The two-World View Phenomenalism |
topic |
Transcendental Idealism The one-world view The two-World View Phenomenalism |
description |
The aim of this paper is to present a novel reading of Kantian idealism. In want of a better name, I call my interpretation “one-object-plus-epistemic phenomenalism”. I partially endorse Allison’s celebrated position, namely his rejection of metaphysical world-dualism. Yet, I reject Allison’s deflationary two-aspect view. I argue that Kantian idealism is also metaphysically committed to an ontological noumenalism (one-object), namely the claim that the ultimate nature of reality is made up of unknown things in themselves (substantia noumena). Natural sciences can only reveal the relational/structural properties of things as they appear rather than the intrinsic properties of substantia noumena in the negative sense. My anti-deflationary reading is similar to Allais’s and my agnostic monism to Hanna’s. However, against both, I hold that appearances are not the accusative objects of our sensible representations, but rather as Kant repeatedly states: “mere representations”. The accusative objects of our senses are substantia noumena in the negative sense. Moreover, my view is also similar to Langton’s. Again, against Langton I hold that appearances are not merely relational properties of substantia noumena, but the way that such substantia noumena exist inside our mind as “mere representations”. In this regard, I also partially endorse Guyer’s and Van Cleve’s phenomenalist reading because these substantia noumena in the negative sense can only be cognized mind-dependently, namely as appearances. However, against Guyer and Van Cleve I hold that the phenomenalist side of Kantian idealism is purely epistemological rather than ontological: what Kant calls the necessary unity of representations according to categories is not a logical construction of objects out of representations, that is, an ontological reduction of noumena to appearances, but rather the way we sense-independently cognize mind-independent noumena. |
publishDate |
2019 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2019-07-16 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/index.php/kant-e-prints/article/view/1321 |
url |
https://www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/index.php/kant-e-prints/article/view/1321 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/index.php/kant-e-prints/article/view/1321/1067 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2019 Kant e-Prints - Revista Internacional de Filosofia info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2019 Kant e-Prints - Revista Internacional de Filosofia |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Centre for Logic, Epistemology, and the History of Science (CLE) |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Centre for Logic, Epistemology, and the History of Science (CLE) |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Kant e-prints; v. 14 n. 1 (2019); 6-30 Kant e-Prints; Vol. 14 No. 1 (2019); 6-30 1677-163X reponame:Kant e-prints (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:Unicamp |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
Unicamp |
institution |
Unicamp |
reponame_str |
Kant e-prints (Online) |
collection |
Kant e-prints (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Kant e-prints (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
clekant@unicamp.br||danielomarperez@hotmail.com||daniel.omar.perez@pq.cnpq.br |
_version_ |
1754842243620929536 |