Concepts and experience
| Autor(a) principal: | |
|---|---|
| Data de Publicação: | 2016 |
| Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
| Idioma: | por |
| Título da fonte: | Kant e-prints (Online) |
| Texto Completo: | https://www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/index.php/kant-e-prints/article/view/666 |
Resumo: | In this paper, I focus on the thesis of Non-conceptualism regarding perceptual experience, such as construed by Robert Hanna in his reading of Kant. My aim here is two-fold. First, I argue that Non-conceptualism so construed is motivated by worries distinct from the ones that motivate Conceptualism, such as construed by John McDowell in his influential book Mind and World. Second, I argue that Non-conceptualism and Conceptualism, as construed by Hanna and McDowell, respectively, are in fact compatible views. |
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Concepts and experienceIn this paper, I focus on the thesis of Non-conceptualism regarding perceptual experience, such as construed by Robert Hanna in his reading of Kant. My aim here is two-fold. First, I argue that Non-conceptualism so construed is motivated by worries distinct from the ones that motivate Conceptualism, such as construed by John McDowell in his influential book Mind and World. Second, I argue that Non-conceptualism and Conceptualism, as construed by Hanna and McDowell, respectively, are in fact compatible views.Centre for Logic, Epistemology, and the History of Science (CLE)2016-05-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/index.php/kant-e-prints/article/view/666Kant e-prints; v. 11 n. 1 (2016); 123-134Kant e-Prints; Vol. 11 No. 1 (2016); 123-1341677-163Xreponame:Kant e-prints (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:Unicampporhttps://www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/index.php/kant-e-prints/article/view/666/543Copyright (c) 2017 Kant e-Printsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessAbath, André2021-10-17T20:55:25Zoai:www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/:article/666Revistahttps://www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/index.php/kant-e-prints/PUBhttps://www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/index.php/kant-e-prints/oaiclekant@unicamp.br||danielomarperez@hotmail.com||daniel.omar.perez@pq.cnpq.br1677-163X1677-163Xopendoar:2021-10-17T20:55:25Kant e-prints (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
| dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Concepts and experience |
| title |
Concepts and experience |
| spellingShingle |
Concepts and experience Abath, André |
| title_short |
Concepts and experience |
| title_full |
Concepts and experience |
| title_fullStr |
Concepts and experience |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Concepts and experience |
| title_sort |
Concepts and experience |
| author |
Abath, André |
| author_facet |
Abath, André |
| author_role |
author |
| dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Abath, André |
| description |
In this paper, I focus on the thesis of Non-conceptualism regarding perceptual experience, such as construed by Robert Hanna in his reading of Kant. My aim here is two-fold. First, I argue that Non-conceptualism so construed is motivated by worries distinct from the ones that motivate Conceptualism, such as construed by John McDowell in his influential book Mind and World. Second, I argue that Non-conceptualism and Conceptualism, as construed by Hanna and McDowell, respectively, are in fact compatible views. |
| publishDate |
2016 |
| dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2016-05-01 |
| dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
| format |
article |
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publishedVersion |
| dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/index.php/kant-e-prints/article/view/666 |
| url |
https://www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/index.php/kant-e-prints/article/view/666 |
| dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
| language |
por |
| dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://www.cle.unicamp.br/eprints/index.php/kant-e-prints/article/view/666/543 |
| dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2017 Kant e-Prints info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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Copyright (c) 2017 Kant e-Prints |
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openAccess |
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application/pdf |
| dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Centre for Logic, Epistemology, and the History of Science (CLE) |
| publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Centre for Logic, Epistemology, and the History of Science (CLE) |
| dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Kant e-prints; v. 11 n. 1 (2016); 123-134 Kant e-Prints; Vol. 11 No. 1 (2016); 123-134 1677-163X reponame:Kant e-prints (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:Unicamp |
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Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
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Unicamp |
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Unicamp |
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Kant e-prints (Online) |
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Kant e-prints (Online) |
| repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Kant e-prints (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
| repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
clekant@unicamp.br||danielomarperez@hotmail.com||daniel.omar.perez@pq.cnpq.br |
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1754842243563257856 |