The projective theory of consciousness: From neuroscience to philosophical psychology
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2018 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Institucional da UNESP |
Texto Completo: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2018.v41esp.11.p199 http://hdl.handle.net/11449/187470 |
Resumo: | The development of the interdisciplinary areas of cognitive, affective and action neurosciences contributes to the identification of neurobiological bases of conscious experience. The structure of consciousness was philosophically conceived a century ago (HUSSERL, 1913) as consisting of a subjective pole, the bearer of experiences, and an objective pole composed of experienced contents. In more recent formulations, Nagel (1974) refers to a “point of view”, in which qualitative experiences are anchored, while Velmans (1990, 1993, 2009, 2017) understands that phenomenal content is composed of mental representations “projected” to the space external to the brains that construct them. In Freudian psychology, the conscious mind contains a tension between the Id and the Ego (FREUD, 1913). How to relate this bipolar structure with the results of neuroscience? I propose the notion of projection [also used by Williford et al. (2012)] as a bridge principle connecting the neurobiological systems of knowing, feeling and acting with the bipolar structure. The projective process is considered responsible for the generation of the sense of self and the sense of the world, composing an informational phenomenal field generated by the nervous system and experienced in the first-person perspective. After presenting the projective hypothesis, I discuss its philosophical status, relating it to the phenomenal (BLOCK, 1995, 2008, 2011) and high-order thought (ROSENTHAL, 2006; BROWN, 2014) approaches, and a mathematical model of projection (RUDRAUF et al., 2017). Eight ways of testing the status of the projective hypothesis are briefly mentioned. |
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The projective theory of consciousness: From neuroscience to philosophical psychologyTeoria projetiva da consciência: Da neurociência à psicologia filosóficaCognitiveConsciousnessFeelingNon-conceptualProjectionThe development of the interdisciplinary areas of cognitive, affective and action neurosciences contributes to the identification of neurobiological bases of conscious experience. The structure of consciousness was philosophically conceived a century ago (HUSSERL, 1913) as consisting of a subjective pole, the bearer of experiences, and an objective pole composed of experienced contents. In more recent formulations, Nagel (1974) refers to a “point of view”, in which qualitative experiences are anchored, while Velmans (1990, 1993, 2009, 2017) understands that phenomenal content is composed of mental representations “projected” to the space external to the brains that construct them. In Freudian psychology, the conscious mind contains a tension between the Id and the Ego (FREUD, 1913). How to relate this bipolar structure with the results of neuroscience? I propose the notion of projection [also used by Williford et al. (2012)] as a bridge principle connecting the neurobiological systems of knowing, feeling and acting with the bipolar structure. The projective process is considered responsible for the generation of the sense of self and the sense of the world, composing an informational phenomenal field generated by the nervous system and experienced in the first-person perspective. After presenting the projective hypothesis, I discuss its philosophical status, relating it to the phenomenal (BLOCK, 1995, 2008, 2011) and high-order thought (ROSENTHAL, 2006; BROWN, 2014) approaches, and a mathematical model of projection (RUDRAUF et al., 2017). Eight ways of testing the status of the projective hypothesis are briefly mentioned.São Paulo State University (Unesp)São Paulo State University (Unesp)Universidade Estadual Paulista (Unesp)Pereira, Alfredo [UNESP]2019-10-06T15:37:08Z2019-10-06T15:37:08Z2018-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/article199-232application/pdfhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2018.v41esp.11.p199Trans/Form/Acao, v. 41, p. 199-232.0101-3173http://hdl.handle.net/11449/18747010.1590/0101-3173.2018.v41esp.11.p199S0101-317320180005001992-s2.0-85063079580S0101-31732018000500199.pdfScopusreponame:Repositório Institucional da UNESPinstname:Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)instacron:UNESPengTrans/Form/Acaoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2023-11-07T06:07:18Zoai:repositorio.unesp.br:11449/187470Repositório InstitucionalPUBhttp://repositorio.unesp.br/oai/requestopendoar:29462023-11-07T06:07:18Repositório Institucional da UNESP - Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
The projective theory of consciousness: From neuroscience to philosophical psychology Teoria projetiva da consciência: Da neurociência à psicologia filosófica |
title |
The projective theory of consciousness: From neuroscience to philosophical psychology |
spellingShingle |
The projective theory of consciousness: From neuroscience to philosophical psychology Pereira, Alfredo [UNESP] Cognitive Consciousness Feeling Non-conceptual Projection |
title_short |
The projective theory of consciousness: From neuroscience to philosophical psychology |
title_full |
The projective theory of consciousness: From neuroscience to philosophical psychology |
title_fullStr |
The projective theory of consciousness: From neuroscience to philosophical psychology |
title_full_unstemmed |
The projective theory of consciousness: From neuroscience to philosophical psychology |
title_sort |
The projective theory of consciousness: From neuroscience to philosophical psychology |
author |
Pereira, Alfredo [UNESP] |
author_facet |
Pereira, Alfredo [UNESP] |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual Paulista (Unesp) |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Pereira, Alfredo [UNESP] |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Cognitive Consciousness Feeling Non-conceptual Projection |
topic |
Cognitive Consciousness Feeling Non-conceptual Projection |
description |
The development of the interdisciplinary areas of cognitive, affective and action neurosciences contributes to the identification of neurobiological bases of conscious experience. The structure of consciousness was philosophically conceived a century ago (HUSSERL, 1913) as consisting of a subjective pole, the bearer of experiences, and an objective pole composed of experienced contents. In more recent formulations, Nagel (1974) refers to a “point of view”, in which qualitative experiences are anchored, while Velmans (1990, 1993, 2009, 2017) understands that phenomenal content is composed of mental representations “projected” to the space external to the brains that construct them. In Freudian psychology, the conscious mind contains a tension between the Id and the Ego (FREUD, 1913). How to relate this bipolar structure with the results of neuroscience? I propose the notion of projection [also used by Williford et al. (2012)] as a bridge principle connecting the neurobiological systems of knowing, feeling and acting with the bipolar structure. The projective process is considered responsible for the generation of the sense of self and the sense of the world, composing an informational phenomenal field generated by the nervous system and experienced in the first-person perspective. After presenting the projective hypothesis, I discuss its philosophical status, relating it to the phenomenal (BLOCK, 1995, 2008, 2011) and high-order thought (ROSENTHAL, 2006; BROWN, 2014) approaches, and a mathematical model of projection (RUDRAUF et al., 2017). Eight ways of testing the status of the projective hypothesis are briefly mentioned. |
publishDate |
2018 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2018-01-01 2019-10-06T15:37:08Z 2019-10-06T15:37:08Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2018.v41esp.11.p199 Trans/Form/Acao, v. 41, p. 199-232. 0101-3173 http://hdl.handle.net/11449/187470 10.1590/0101-3173.2018.v41esp.11.p199 S0101-31732018000500199 2-s2.0-85063079580 S0101-31732018000500199.pdf |
url |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2018.v41esp.11.p199 http://hdl.handle.net/11449/187470 |
identifier_str_mv |
Trans/Form/Acao, v. 41, p. 199-232. 0101-3173 10.1590/0101-3173.2018.v41esp.11.p199 S0101-31732018000500199 2-s2.0-85063079580 S0101-31732018000500199.pdf |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
Trans/Form/Acao |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
199-232 application/pdf |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Scopus reponame:Repositório Institucional da UNESP instname:Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP) instacron:UNESP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP) |
instacron_str |
UNESP |
institution |
UNESP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Institucional da UNESP |
collection |
Repositório Institucional da UNESP |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Institucional da UNESP - Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
|
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1799964844442517504 |