The projective theory of consciousness: From neuroscience to philosophical psychology

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Pereira, Alfredo [UNESP]
Data de Publicação: 2018
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Institucional da UNESP
Texto Completo: http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2018.v41esp.11.p199
http://hdl.handle.net/11449/187470
Resumo: The development of the interdisciplinary areas of cognitive, affective and action neurosciences contributes to the identification of neurobiological bases of conscious experience. The structure of consciousness was philosophically conceived a century ago (HUSSERL, 1913) as consisting of a subjective pole, the bearer of experiences, and an objective pole composed of experienced contents. In more recent formulations, Nagel (1974) refers to a “point of view”, in which qualitative experiences are anchored, while Velmans (1990, 1993, 2009, 2017) understands that phenomenal content is composed of mental representations “projected” to the space external to the brains that construct them. In Freudian psychology, the conscious mind contains a tension between the Id and the Ego (FREUD, 1913). How to relate this bipolar structure with the results of neuroscience? I propose the notion of projection [also used by Williford et al. (2012)] as a bridge principle connecting the neurobiological systems of knowing, feeling and acting with the bipolar structure. The projective process is considered responsible for the generation of the sense of self and the sense of the world, composing an informational phenomenal field generated by the nervous system and experienced in the first-person perspective. After presenting the projective hypothesis, I discuss its philosophical status, relating it to the phenomenal (BLOCK, 1995, 2008, 2011) and high-order thought (ROSENTHAL, 2006; BROWN, 2014) approaches, and a mathematical model of projection (RUDRAUF et al., 2017). Eight ways of testing the status of the projective hypothesis are briefly mentioned.
id UNSP_8e70f6c733ca57360f1939cfa5a8724c
oai_identifier_str oai:repositorio.unesp.br:11449/187470
network_acronym_str UNSP
network_name_str Repositório Institucional da UNESP
repository_id_str 2946
spelling The projective theory of consciousness: From neuroscience to philosophical psychologyTeoria projetiva da consciência: Da neurociência à psicologia filosóficaCognitiveConsciousnessFeelingNon-conceptualProjectionThe development of the interdisciplinary areas of cognitive, affective and action neurosciences contributes to the identification of neurobiological bases of conscious experience. The structure of consciousness was philosophically conceived a century ago (HUSSERL, 1913) as consisting of a subjective pole, the bearer of experiences, and an objective pole composed of experienced contents. In more recent formulations, Nagel (1974) refers to a “point of view”, in which qualitative experiences are anchored, while Velmans (1990, 1993, 2009, 2017) understands that phenomenal content is composed of mental representations “projected” to the space external to the brains that construct them. In Freudian psychology, the conscious mind contains a tension between the Id and the Ego (FREUD, 1913). How to relate this bipolar structure with the results of neuroscience? I propose the notion of projection [also used by Williford et al. (2012)] as a bridge principle connecting the neurobiological systems of knowing, feeling and acting with the bipolar structure. The projective process is considered responsible for the generation of the sense of self and the sense of the world, composing an informational phenomenal field generated by the nervous system and experienced in the first-person perspective. After presenting the projective hypothesis, I discuss its philosophical status, relating it to the phenomenal (BLOCK, 1995, 2008, 2011) and high-order thought (ROSENTHAL, 2006; BROWN, 2014) approaches, and a mathematical model of projection (RUDRAUF et al., 2017). Eight ways of testing the status of the projective hypothesis are briefly mentioned.São Paulo State University (Unesp)São Paulo State University (Unesp)Universidade Estadual Paulista (Unesp)Pereira, Alfredo [UNESP]2019-10-06T15:37:08Z2019-10-06T15:37:08Z2018-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/article199-232application/pdfhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2018.v41esp.11.p199Trans/Form/Acao, v. 41, p. 199-232.0101-3173http://hdl.handle.net/11449/18747010.1590/0101-3173.2018.v41esp.11.p199S0101-317320180005001992-s2.0-85063079580S0101-31732018000500199.pdfScopusreponame:Repositório Institucional da UNESPinstname:Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)instacron:UNESPengTrans/Form/Acaoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2023-11-07T06:07:18Zoai:repositorio.unesp.br:11449/187470Repositório InstitucionalPUBhttp://repositorio.unesp.br/oai/requestopendoar:29462023-11-07T06:07:18Repositório Institucional da UNESP - Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The projective theory of consciousness: From neuroscience to philosophical psychology
Teoria projetiva da consciência: Da neurociência à psicologia filosófica
title The projective theory of consciousness: From neuroscience to philosophical psychology
spellingShingle The projective theory of consciousness: From neuroscience to philosophical psychology
Pereira, Alfredo [UNESP]
Cognitive
Consciousness
Feeling
Non-conceptual
Projection
title_short The projective theory of consciousness: From neuroscience to philosophical psychology
title_full The projective theory of consciousness: From neuroscience to philosophical psychology
title_fullStr The projective theory of consciousness: From neuroscience to philosophical psychology
title_full_unstemmed The projective theory of consciousness: From neuroscience to philosophical psychology
title_sort The projective theory of consciousness: From neuroscience to philosophical psychology
author Pereira, Alfredo [UNESP]
author_facet Pereira, Alfredo [UNESP]
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual Paulista (Unesp)
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Pereira, Alfredo [UNESP]
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Cognitive
Consciousness
Feeling
Non-conceptual
Projection
topic Cognitive
Consciousness
Feeling
Non-conceptual
Projection
description The development of the interdisciplinary areas of cognitive, affective and action neurosciences contributes to the identification of neurobiological bases of conscious experience. The structure of consciousness was philosophically conceived a century ago (HUSSERL, 1913) as consisting of a subjective pole, the bearer of experiences, and an objective pole composed of experienced contents. In more recent formulations, Nagel (1974) refers to a “point of view”, in which qualitative experiences are anchored, while Velmans (1990, 1993, 2009, 2017) understands that phenomenal content is composed of mental representations “projected” to the space external to the brains that construct them. In Freudian psychology, the conscious mind contains a tension between the Id and the Ego (FREUD, 1913). How to relate this bipolar structure with the results of neuroscience? I propose the notion of projection [also used by Williford et al. (2012)] as a bridge principle connecting the neurobiological systems of knowing, feeling and acting with the bipolar structure. The projective process is considered responsible for the generation of the sense of self and the sense of the world, composing an informational phenomenal field generated by the nervous system and experienced in the first-person perspective. After presenting the projective hypothesis, I discuss its philosophical status, relating it to the phenomenal (BLOCK, 1995, 2008, 2011) and high-order thought (ROSENTHAL, 2006; BROWN, 2014) approaches, and a mathematical model of projection (RUDRAUF et al., 2017). Eight ways of testing the status of the projective hypothesis are briefly mentioned.
publishDate 2018
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2018-01-01
2019-10-06T15:37:08Z
2019-10-06T15:37:08Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2018.v41esp.11.p199
Trans/Form/Acao, v. 41, p. 199-232.
0101-3173
http://hdl.handle.net/11449/187470
10.1590/0101-3173.2018.v41esp.11.p199
S0101-31732018000500199
2-s2.0-85063079580
S0101-31732018000500199.pdf
url http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2018.v41esp.11.p199
http://hdl.handle.net/11449/187470
identifier_str_mv Trans/Form/Acao, v. 41, p. 199-232.
0101-3173
10.1590/0101-3173.2018.v41esp.11.p199
S0101-31732018000500199
2-s2.0-85063079580
S0101-31732018000500199.pdf
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Trans/Form/Acao
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv 199-232
application/pdf
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Scopus
reponame:Repositório Institucional da UNESP
instname:Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)
instacron:UNESP
instname_str Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)
instacron_str UNESP
institution UNESP
reponame_str Repositório Institucional da UNESP
collection Repositório Institucional da UNESP
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Institucional da UNESP - Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
_version_ 1799964844442517504