The projective theory of consciousness: from neuroscience to philosophical psychology

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Pereira Junior, Alfredo
Data de Publicação: 2023
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Trans/Form/Ação (Online)
Texto Completo: https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/article/view/8298
Resumo: The development of the interdisciplinary areas of cognitive, affective and action neurosciences contributes to the identification of neurobiological bases of conscious experience. The structure of consciousness was philosophically conceived a century ago (HUSSERL, 1913) as consisting of a subjective pole, the bearer of experiences, and an objective pole composed of experienced contents. In more recent formulations, Nagel (1974) refers to a “point of view”, in which qualitative experiences are anchored, while Velmans (1990, 1993, 2009, 2017) understands that phenomenal content is composed of mental representations “projected” to the space external to the brains that construct them. In Freudian psychology, the conscious mind contains a tension between the Id and the Ego (FREUD, 1913). How to relate this bipolar structure with the results of neuroscience? I propose the notion of projection [also used by Williford et al. (2012)] as a bridge principle connecting the neurobiological systems of knowing, feeling and acting with the bipolar structure. The projective process is considered responsible for the generation of the sense of self and the sense of the world, composing an informational phenomenal field generated by the nervous system and experienced in the first-person perspective. After presenting the projective hypothesis, I discuss its philosophical status, relating it to the phenomenal (BLOCK, 1995, 2008, 2011) and high-order thought (ROSENTHAL, 2006; BROWN, 2014) approaches, and a mathematical model of projection (RUDRAUF et al., 2017). Eight ways of testing the status of the projective hypothesis are briefly mentioned.
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spelling The projective theory of consciousness: from neuroscience to philosophical psychologyProjectionConsciousnessCognitiveNon-ConceptualFeelingThe development of the interdisciplinary areas of cognitive, affective and action neurosciences contributes to the identification of neurobiological bases of conscious experience. The structure of consciousness was philosophically conceived a century ago (HUSSERL, 1913) as consisting of a subjective pole, the bearer of experiences, and an objective pole composed of experienced contents. In more recent formulations, Nagel (1974) refers to a “point of view”, in which qualitative experiences are anchored, while Velmans (1990, 1993, 2009, 2017) understands that phenomenal content is composed of mental representations “projected” to the space external to the brains that construct them. In Freudian psychology, the conscious mind contains a tension between the Id and the Ego (FREUD, 1913). How to relate this bipolar structure with the results of neuroscience? I propose the notion of projection [also used by Williford et al. (2012)] as a bridge principle connecting the neurobiological systems of knowing, feeling and acting with the bipolar structure. The projective process is considered responsible for the generation of the sense of self and the sense of the world, composing an informational phenomenal field generated by the nervous system and experienced in the first-person perspective. After presenting the projective hypothesis, I discuss its philosophical status, relating it to the phenomenal (BLOCK, 1995, 2008, 2011) and high-order thought (ROSENTHAL, 2006; BROWN, 2014) approaches, and a mathematical model of projection (RUDRAUF et al., 2017). Eight ways of testing the status of the projective hypothesis are briefly mentioned.Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências2023-02-10info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdftext/htmlapplication/x-mobipocket-ebookapplication/epub+ziphttps://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/article/view/8298TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia da Unesp; v. 41 n. Special Issue: Número Especial; 199-232TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 41 No. Special Issue: Special Issue/2018; 199-232TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 41 Núm. Special Issue: Número Especial; 199-232TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 41 No. Special Issue: Número Especial; 199-232TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia; V. 41 N. Special Issue: Número Especial; 199-2321980-539X0101-3173reponame:Trans/Form/Ação (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)instacron:UNESPenghttps://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/article/view/8298/10513https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/article/view/8298/10514https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/article/view/8298/12897https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/article/view/8298/12898Copyright (c) 2018 TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofiahttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessPereira Junior, Alfredo2023-04-28T13:38:52Zoai:ojs.revistas.marilia.unesp.br:article/8298Revistahttps://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/PUBhttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.phptransformacao@marilia.unesp.br1980-539X0101-3173opendoar:2023-04-28T13:38:52Trans/Form/Ação (Online) - Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The projective theory of consciousness: from neuroscience to philosophical psychology
title The projective theory of consciousness: from neuroscience to philosophical psychology
spellingShingle The projective theory of consciousness: from neuroscience to philosophical psychology
Pereira Junior, Alfredo
Projection
Consciousness
Cognitive
Non-Conceptual
Feeling
title_short The projective theory of consciousness: from neuroscience to philosophical psychology
title_full The projective theory of consciousness: from neuroscience to philosophical psychology
title_fullStr The projective theory of consciousness: from neuroscience to philosophical psychology
title_full_unstemmed The projective theory of consciousness: from neuroscience to philosophical psychology
title_sort The projective theory of consciousness: from neuroscience to philosophical psychology
author Pereira Junior, Alfredo
author_facet Pereira Junior, Alfredo
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Pereira Junior, Alfredo
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Projection
Consciousness
Cognitive
Non-Conceptual
Feeling
topic Projection
Consciousness
Cognitive
Non-Conceptual
Feeling
description The development of the interdisciplinary areas of cognitive, affective and action neurosciences contributes to the identification of neurobiological bases of conscious experience. The structure of consciousness was philosophically conceived a century ago (HUSSERL, 1913) as consisting of a subjective pole, the bearer of experiences, and an objective pole composed of experienced contents. In more recent formulations, Nagel (1974) refers to a “point of view”, in which qualitative experiences are anchored, while Velmans (1990, 1993, 2009, 2017) understands that phenomenal content is composed of mental representations “projected” to the space external to the brains that construct them. In Freudian psychology, the conscious mind contains a tension between the Id and the Ego (FREUD, 1913). How to relate this bipolar structure with the results of neuroscience? I propose the notion of projection [also used by Williford et al. (2012)] as a bridge principle connecting the neurobiological systems of knowing, feeling and acting with the bipolar structure. The projective process is considered responsible for the generation of the sense of self and the sense of the world, composing an informational phenomenal field generated by the nervous system and experienced in the first-person perspective. After presenting the projective hypothesis, I discuss its philosophical status, relating it to the phenomenal (BLOCK, 1995, 2008, 2011) and high-order thought (ROSENTHAL, 2006; BROWN, 2014) approaches, and a mathematical model of projection (RUDRAUF et al., 2017). Eight ways of testing the status of the projective hypothesis are briefly mentioned.
publishDate 2023
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2023-02-10
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/article/view/8298
url https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/article/view/8298
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/article/view/8298/10513
https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/article/view/8298/10514
https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/article/view/8298/12897
https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/article/view/8298/12898
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2018 TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2018 TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
text/html
application/x-mobipocket-ebook
application/epub+zip
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia da Unesp; v. 41 n. Special Issue: Número Especial; 199-232
TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 41 No. Special Issue: Special Issue/2018; 199-232
TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 41 Núm. Special Issue: Número Especial; 199-232
TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 41 No. Special Issue: Número Especial; 199-232
TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia; V. 41 N. Special Issue: Número Especial; 199-232
1980-539X
0101-3173
reponame:Trans/Form/Ação (Online)
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instname_str Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)
instacron_str UNESP
institution UNESP
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collection Trans/Form/Ação (Online)
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repository.mail.fl_str_mv transformacao@marilia.unesp.br
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