Ocupação e reconstrução do Iraque: a atuação da Coalizão de Autoridade Provisória (2003-2004)

• Autor(a) principal: Amaral, Rodrigo Augusto Duarte [UNESP]
• Data de Publicação: 2017
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Repositório Institucional da UNESP
• Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/11449/150176
• topic: Ocupação; Reconstrução; Iraque; Coalizão de autoridade provisória; Resolução 1483 do CSONU; Agenda político-econômica dos EUA; Occupation; Reconstruction; Coalition of provisional authority; UN Security Council Resolution 1483; US political-economic agenda

Between March 2003 and June 2004, the United States of America (US), together with Britain, occupied Iraq and obtained the status of Provisional Authority granted by the UN Security Council in Resolution 1483 to rebuild the Iraqi state after the overthrow of the Baath Regime. For the first time since the end of World War II, an international power gained occupying power status through United Nations (UN), without being a UN proper mandate, as usually in peacekeeping operations governed by the international body. The 2003 invasion of Iraq had a consensus in American political though that the United States would have the responsibility and duty to overthrow Saddam's regime, which allegedly committed crimes against humanity, posed a threat to international security. To a large extent, the American formula for the invasion and occupation of Iraq consisted in justifying its actions in terms of "humanitarian reason" and legitimizing them by means of legal mechanisms. Implementation of the Iraq occupation plan had a key role for members of the Iraqi opposition elite to the Baath Regime in support of the Anglo-American powers agenda. However, if this unprecedented statebuilding process is analyzed by leaving aside these humanitarian premises, unlike the mainstream US foreign policy analysis, one can identify possible political-economic benefits that result from this reconstruction project in Iraq. Based on the analysis of the official documents of the Provisional Authority Coalition (CPA) and questioning the internationalist liberal premises that guided the justification and later criticism of the results of CPA administration, we were able to identify possible political-economic benefits to the US and its corporations during The 14 months of occupation. Particularly in the energy, agriculture, security services and infrastructure sectors, as well as other financial benefits to non-state sectors (such as NGOs and informal economies). In terms of power, the occupation resulted in the US-Iraq approaching of US dominance, and in terms of market CPA liberalized the Iraqi economy allowing multinational access to various sectors of the Iraqi market. Thus, it is evident the consolidation of an Iraqi political-economic agenda submissive to the North American interests.