A double face view on mind-brain relationship: the problem of mental causation1
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2017 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Institucional da UNESP |
Texto Completo: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/S0101-31732017000300011 http://hdl.handle.net/11449/211289 |
Resumo: | Interpreting results of contemporary neuroscientif studies, I present a non-reductive physicalist account of mind-brain relationship from which the criticism of unintelligibility ascribed to the notion of mental causation is considered. Assuming that a paradigmatic criticism addressed to the notion of mental causation is that presented by Jaegwon Kim’s analysis on the theory of mind-body supervenience, I present his argument arguing that it encompasses a formulation of the problem of mental causation, which leads to difficulties by him pointed. To ask how mental events, being a non-physical property of the brain, could act causally on brain structure and functioning?, is not to treat the mind as a property of the brain, but as a Cartesian substance. I argue that, rather than asking how does mind could act causally on the brain?, as if the mind were something apart and independent of the brain, it would be more in line with a non-reductive physicalist view to ask how the brain, guided by its mind, could act causally on itself?. To justify this last formulation of the problem of mental causation, I propose a double face view, which consists in considering the consciousness as the essential property of the mind, and mind and brain as inseparable, dependent and irreducible faces. It means, in general terms, that the conscious mind is the result of brain structure and activity - conscious mind as brain - and that the brain, using its conscious mind as a guide to its actions, interacts with its body, and with the physical and sociocultural environment, constructing and being constructed by both - brain as conscious mind. |
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A double face view on mind-brain relationship: the problem of mental causation1Double face viewConscious mindMental causationMind-brain relationshipSupervenienceJaegwon KimAbordagem dupla faceMente conscienteCausação mentalRelação mente-cérebroSuperveniênciaJaegwon KimInterpreting results of contemporary neuroscientif studies, I present a non-reductive physicalist account of mind-brain relationship from which the criticism of unintelligibility ascribed to the notion of mental causation is considered. Assuming that a paradigmatic criticism addressed to the notion of mental causation is that presented by Jaegwon Kim’s analysis on the theory of mind-body supervenience, I present his argument arguing that it encompasses a formulation of the problem of mental causation, which leads to difficulties by him pointed. To ask how mental events, being a non-physical property of the brain, could act causally on brain structure and functioning?, is not to treat the mind as a property of the brain, but as a Cartesian substance. I argue that, rather than asking how does mind could act causally on the brain?, as if the mind were something apart and independent of the brain, it would be more in line with a non-reductive physicalist view to ask how the brain, guided by its mind, could act causally on itself?. To justify this last formulation of the problem of mental causation, I propose a double face view, which consists in considering the consciousness as the essential property of the mind, and mind and brain as inseparable, dependent and irreducible faces. It means, in general terms, that the conscious mind is the result of brain structure and activity - conscious mind as brain - and that the brain, using its conscious mind as a guide to its actions, interacts with its body, and with the physical and sociocultural environment, constructing and being constructed by both - brain as conscious mind.Interpretando resultados de estudos neurocientíficos contemporâneos, apresento, em linhas gerais, uma abordagem fisicalista não-reducionista da relação mente-cérebro, a partir da qual a crítica de ininteligibilidade atribuída à noção de causação mental é considerada. Assumindo que uma crítica paradigmática à noção de causação mental é aquela apresentada por Jaegwon Kim, em suas reflexões sobre a teoria da superveniência mente-corpo, considero criticamente o seu argumento, oferecendo uma concepção geral a respeito da relação mente-cérebro, a qual acredito tornar a noção de causação mental inteligível. Penso que o principal problema do argumento de Kim se relaciona à formulação da questão da causação mental por ele aceita. Por exemplo, ao perguntar como os eventos mentais, sendo propriedades não-físicas do cérebro, podem agir causalmente sobre a estrutura e funcionamento do cérebro? a mente está sendo considerada não como uma propriedade do cérebro, mas como uma substância cartesiana. Entendo que, em vez de perguntar como a mente age causalmente sobre o cérebro?, como se a mente fosse algo dele separada e independente, seria mais conforme a uma concepção fisicalista não-reducionista perguntar como o cérebro, guiado por sua mente, pode agir causalmente sobre si mesmo? Para justificar essa formulação do problema da causação mental, proponho uma abordagem dupla face da relação mente-cérebro, segundo a qual a consciência é a propriedade essencial da mente, sendo a mente inseparável do cérebro, embora a ele irredutível, e a estrutura e funcionamento do cérebro dependente numa certa medida da existência da mente. Isso significa, em termos gerais, que a mente consciente resulta da estrutura e funcionamento do cérebro - mente consciente como cérebro -, e que o cérebro, usando a mente consciente como um guia para sua ação, interage com seu corpo e com o ambiente físico e sociocultural circundante, construindo e sendo construído por ambos - cérebro como mente consciente.University of Sao Paulo State, Human Science DepartmentUniversidade Estadual Paulista, Departamento de FilosofiaUniversidade de São Paulo (USP)Coelho, Jonas Gonçalves2021-07-14T10:22:06Z2021-07-14T10:22:06Z2017info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/article197-220application/pdfhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1590/S0101-31732017000300011Trans/Form/Ação. Universidade Estadual Paulista, Departamento de Filosofia, v. 40, n. 3, p. 197-220, 2017.0101-31731980-539Xhttp://hdl.handle.net/11449/21128910.1590/S0101-31732017000300011S0101-31732017000300197S0101-31732017000300197.pdfSciELOreponame:Repositório Institucional da UNESPinstname:Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)instacron:UNESPengTrans/Form/Açãoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2023-11-30T06:17:22Zoai:repositorio.unesp.br:11449/211289Repositório InstitucionalPUBhttp://repositorio.unesp.br/oai/requestopendoar:29462024-08-05T19:09:32.630009Repositório Institucional da UNESP - Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
A double face view on mind-brain relationship: the problem of mental causation1 |
title |
A double face view on mind-brain relationship: the problem of mental causation1 |
spellingShingle |
A double face view on mind-brain relationship: the problem of mental causation1 Coelho, Jonas Gonçalves Double face view Conscious mind Mental causation Mind-brain relationship Supervenience Jaegwon Kim Abordagem dupla face Mente consciente Causação mental Relação mente-cérebro Superveniência Jaegwon Kim |
title_short |
A double face view on mind-brain relationship: the problem of mental causation1 |
title_full |
A double face view on mind-brain relationship: the problem of mental causation1 |
title_fullStr |
A double face view on mind-brain relationship: the problem of mental causation1 |
title_full_unstemmed |
A double face view on mind-brain relationship: the problem of mental causation1 |
title_sort |
A double face view on mind-brain relationship: the problem of mental causation1 |
author |
Coelho, Jonas Gonçalves |
author_facet |
Coelho, Jonas Gonçalves |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade de São Paulo (USP) |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Coelho, Jonas Gonçalves |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Double face view Conscious mind Mental causation Mind-brain relationship Supervenience Jaegwon Kim Abordagem dupla face Mente consciente Causação mental Relação mente-cérebro Superveniência Jaegwon Kim |
topic |
Double face view Conscious mind Mental causation Mind-brain relationship Supervenience Jaegwon Kim Abordagem dupla face Mente consciente Causação mental Relação mente-cérebro Superveniência Jaegwon Kim |
description |
Interpreting results of contemporary neuroscientif studies, I present a non-reductive physicalist account of mind-brain relationship from which the criticism of unintelligibility ascribed to the notion of mental causation is considered. Assuming that a paradigmatic criticism addressed to the notion of mental causation is that presented by Jaegwon Kim’s analysis on the theory of mind-body supervenience, I present his argument arguing that it encompasses a formulation of the problem of mental causation, which leads to difficulties by him pointed. To ask how mental events, being a non-physical property of the brain, could act causally on brain structure and functioning?, is not to treat the mind as a property of the brain, but as a Cartesian substance. I argue that, rather than asking how does mind could act causally on the brain?, as if the mind were something apart and independent of the brain, it would be more in line with a non-reductive physicalist view to ask how the brain, guided by its mind, could act causally on itself?. To justify this last formulation of the problem of mental causation, I propose a double face view, which consists in considering the consciousness as the essential property of the mind, and mind and brain as inseparable, dependent and irreducible faces. It means, in general terms, that the conscious mind is the result of brain structure and activity - conscious mind as brain - and that the brain, using its conscious mind as a guide to its actions, interacts with its body, and with the physical and sociocultural environment, constructing and being constructed by both - brain as conscious mind. |
publishDate |
2017 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2017 2021-07-14T10:22:06Z 2021-07-14T10:22:06Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/S0101-31732017000300011 Trans/Form/Ação. Universidade Estadual Paulista, Departamento de Filosofia, v. 40, n. 3, p. 197-220, 2017. 0101-3173 1980-539X http://hdl.handle.net/11449/211289 10.1590/S0101-31732017000300011 S0101-31732017000300197 S0101-31732017000300197.pdf |
url |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/S0101-31732017000300011 http://hdl.handle.net/11449/211289 |
identifier_str_mv |
Trans/Form/Ação. Universidade Estadual Paulista, Departamento de Filosofia, v. 40, n. 3, p. 197-220, 2017. 0101-3173 1980-539X 10.1590/S0101-31732017000300011 S0101-31732017000300197 S0101-31732017000300197.pdf |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
Trans/Form/Ação |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
197-220 application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual Paulista, Departamento de Filosofia |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual Paulista, Departamento de Filosofia |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
SciELO reponame:Repositório Institucional da UNESP instname:Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP) instacron:UNESP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP) |
instacron_str |
UNESP |
institution |
UNESP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Institucional da UNESP |
collection |
Repositório Institucional da UNESP |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Institucional da UNESP - Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
|
_version_ |
1808129027115843584 |