A double face view on mind-brain relationship: the problem of mental causation1

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Coelho, Jonas Gonçalves
Data de Publicação: 2017
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Institucional da UNESP
Texto Completo: http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/S0101-31732017000300011
http://hdl.handle.net/11449/211289
Resumo: Interpreting results of contemporary neuroscientif studies, I present a non-reductive physicalist account of mind-brain relationship from which the criticism of unintelligibility ascribed to the notion of mental causation is considered. Assuming that a paradigmatic criticism addressed to the notion of mental causation is that presented by Jaegwon Kim’s analysis on the theory of mind-body supervenience, I present his argument arguing that it encompasses a formulation of the problem of mental causation, which leads to difficulties by him pointed. To ask how mental events, being a non-physical property of the brain, could act causally on brain structure and functioning?, is not to treat the mind as a property of the brain, but as a Cartesian substance. I argue that, rather than asking how does mind could act causally on the brain?, as if the mind were something apart and independent of the brain, it would be more in line with a non-reductive physicalist view to ask how the brain, guided by its mind, could act causally on itself?. To justify this last formulation of the problem of mental causation, I propose a double face view, which consists in considering the consciousness as the essential property of the mind, and mind and brain as inseparable, dependent and irreducible faces. It means, in general terms, that the conscious mind is the result of brain structure and activity - conscious mind as brain - and that the brain, using its conscious mind as a guide to its actions, interacts with its body, and with the physical and sociocultural environment, constructing and being constructed by both - brain as conscious mind.
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spelling A double face view on mind-brain relationship: the problem of mental causation1Double face viewConscious mindMental causationMind-brain relationshipSupervenienceJaegwon KimAbordagem dupla faceMente conscienteCausação mentalRelação mente-cérebroSuperveniênciaJaegwon KimInterpreting results of contemporary neuroscientif studies, I present a non-reductive physicalist account of mind-brain relationship from which the criticism of unintelligibility ascribed to the notion of mental causation is considered. Assuming that a paradigmatic criticism addressed to the notion of mental causation is that presented by Jaegwon Kim’s analysis on the theory of mind-body supervenience, I present his argument arguing that it encompasses a formulation of the problem of mental causation, which leads to difficulties by him pointed. To ask how mental events, being a non-physical property of the brain, could act causally on brain structure and functioning?, is not to treat the mind as a property of the brain, but as a Cartesian substance. I argue that, rather than asking how does mind could act causally on the brain?, as if the mind were something apart and independent of the brain, it would be more in line with a non-reductive physicalist view to ask how the brain, guided by its mind, could act causally on itself?. To justify this last formulation of the problem of mental causation, I propose a double face view, which consists in considering the consciousness as the essential property of the mind, and mind and brain as inseparable, dependent and irreducible faces. It means, in general terms, that the conscious mind is the result of brain structure and activity - conscious mind as brain - and that the brain, using its conscious mind as a guide to its actions, interacts with its body, and with the physical and sociocultural environment, constructing and being constructed by both - brain as conscious mind.Interpretando resultados de estudos neurocientíficos contemporâneos, apresento, em linhas gerais, uma abordagem fisicalista não-reducionista da relação mente-cérebro, a partir da qual a crítica de ininteligibilidade atribuída à noção de causação mental é considerada. Assumindo que uma crítica paradigmática à noção de causação mental é aquela apresentada por Jaegwon Kim, em suas reflexões sobre a teoria da superveniência mente-corpo, considero criticamente o seu argumento, oferecendo uma concepção geral a respeito da relação mente-cérebro, a qual acredito tornar a noção de causação mental inteligível. Penso que o principal problema do argumento de Kim se relaciona à formulação da questão da causação mental por ele aceita. Por exemplo, ao perguntar como os eventos mentais, sendo propriedades não-físicas do cérebro, podem agir causalmente sobre a estrutura e funcionamento do cérebro? a mente está sendo considerada não como uma propriedade do cérebro, mas como uma substância cartesiana. Entendo que, em vez de perguntar como a mente age causalmente sobre o cérebro?, como se a mente fosse algo dele separada e independente, seria mais conforme a uma concepção fisicalista não-reducionista perguntar como o cérebro, guiado por sua mente, pode agir causalmente sobre si mesmo? Para justificar essa formulação do problema da causação mental, proponho uma abordagem dupla face da relação mente-cérebro, segundo a qual a consciência é a propriedade essencial da mente, sendo a mente inseparável do cérebro, embora a ele irredutível, e a estrutura e funcionamento do cérebro dependente numa certa medida da existência da mente. Isso significa, em termos gerais, que a mente consciente resulta da estrutura e funcionamento do cérebro - mente consciente como cérebro -, e que o cérebro, usando a mente consciente como um guia para sua ação, interage com seu corpo e com o ambiente físico e sociocultural circundante, construindo e sendo construído por ambos - cérebro como mente consciente.University of Sao Paulo State, Human Science DepartmentUniversidade Estadual Paulista, Departamento de FilosofiaUniversidade de São Paulo (USP)Coelho, Jonas Gonçalves2021-07-14T10:22:06Z2021-07-14T10:22:06Z2017info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/article197-220application/pdfhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1590/S0101-31732017000300011Trans/Form/Ação. Universidade Estadual Paulista, Departamento de Filosofia, v. 40, n. 3, p. 197-220, 2017.0101-31731980-539Xhttp://hdl.handle.net/11449/21128910.1590/S0101-31732017000300011S0101-31732017000300197S0101-31732017000300197.pdfSciELOreponame:Repositório Institucional da UNESPinstname:Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)instacron:UNESPengTrans/Form/Açãoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2023-11-30T06:17:22Zoai:repositorio.unesp.br:11449/211289Repositório InstitucionalPUBhttp://repositorio.unesp.br/oai/requestopendoar:29462024-08-05T19:09:32.630009Repositório Institucional da UNESP - Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv A double face view on mind-brain relationship: the problem of mental causation1
title A double face view on mind-brain relationship: the problem of mental causation1
spellingShingle A double face view on mind-brain relationship: the problem of mental causation1
Coelho, Jonas Gonçalves
Double face view
Conscious mind
Mental causation
Mind-brain relationship
Supervenience
Jaegwon Kim
Abordagem dupla face
Mente consciente
Causação mental
Relação mente-cérebro
Superveniência
Jaegwon Kim
title_short A double face view on mind-brain relationship: the problem of mental causation1
title_full A double face view on mind-brain relationship: the problem of mental causation1
title_fullStr A double face view on mind-brain relationship: the problem of mental causation1
title_full_unstemmed A double face view on mind-brain relationship: the problem of mental causation1
title_sort A double face view on mind-brain relationship: the problem of mental causation1
author Coelho, Jonas Gonçalves
author_facet Coelho, Jonas Gonçalves
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Universidade de São Paulo (USP)
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Coelho, Jonas Gonçalves
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Double face view
Conscious mind
Mental causation
Mind-brain relationship
Supervenience
Jaegwon Kim
Abordagem dupla face
Mente consciente
Causação mental
Relação mente-cérebro
Superveniência
Jaegwon Kim
topic Double face view
Conscious mind
Mental causation
Mind-brain relationship
Supervenience
Jaegwon Kim
Abordagem dupla face
Mente consciente
Causação mental
Relação mente-cérebro
Superveniência
Jaegwon Kim
description Interpreting results of contemporary neuroscientif studies, I present a non-reductive physicalist account of mind-brain relationship from which the criticism of unintelligibility ascribed to the notion of mental causation is considered. Assuming that a paradigmatic criticism addressed to the notion of mental causation is that presented by Jaegwon Kim’s analysis on the theory of mind-body supervenience, I present his argument arguing that it encompasses a formulation of the problem of mental causation, which leads to difficulties by him pointed. To ask how mental events, being a non-physical property of the brain, could act causally on brain structure and functioning?, is not to treat the mind as a property of the brain, but as a Cartesian substance. I argue that, rather than asking how does mind could act causally on the brain?, as if the mind were something apart and independent of the brain, it would be more in line with a non-reductive physicalist view to ask how the brain, guided by its mind, could act causally on itself?. To justify this last formulation of the problem of mental causation, I propose a double face view, which consists in considering the consciousness as the essential property of the mind, and mind and brain as inseparable, dependent and irreducible faces. It means, in general terms, that the conscious mind is the result of brain structure and activity - conscious mind as brain - and that the brain, using its conscious mind as a guide to its actions, interacts with its body, and with the physical and sociocultural environment, constructing and being constructed by both - brain as conscious mind.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2017
2021-07-14T10:22:06Z
2021-07-14T10:22:06Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/S0101-31732017000300011
Trans/Form/Ação. Universidade Estadual Paulista, Departamento de Filosofia, v. 40, n. 3, p. 197-220, 2017.
0101-3173
1980-539X
http://hdl.handle.net/11449/211289
10.1590/S0101-31732017000300011
S0101-31732017000300197
S0101-31732017000300197.pdf
url http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/S0101-31732017000300011
http://hdl.handle.net/11449/211289
identifier_str_mv Trans/Form/Ação. Universidade Estadual Paulista, Departamento de Filosofia, v. 40, n. 3, p. 197-220, 2017.
0101-3173
1980-539X
10.1590/S0101-31732017000300011
S0101-31732017000300197
S0101-31732017000300197.pdf
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Trans/Form/Ação
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv 197-220
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual Paulista, Departamento de Filosofia
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual Paulista, Departamento de Filosofia
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv SciELO
reponame:Repositório Institucional da UNESP
instname:Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)
instacron:UNESP
instname_str Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)
instacron_str UNESP
institution UNESP
reponame_str Repositório Institucional da UNESP
collection Repositório Institucional da UNESP
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Institucional da UNESP - Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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