O olho do dono engorda o gado? Controle familiar, controle e administração dos fundadores e o desempenho financeiro das companhias abertas brasileiras

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Fernandes Junior, Matheus
Data de Publicação: 2010
Tipo de documento: Dissertação
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações do Mackenzie
Texto Completo: http://dspace.mackenzie.br/handle/10899/23582
Resumo: Family control and management can be considered efficient and beneficial to corporate performance by reducing conflicts between shareholders and managers, lowering administrative myopia, reducing information asymmetry and profiting from social and political family influence. On the other hand, they may also be inefficient and harmful to performance by bringing conflicts between majority and minority shareholders, by being subject to nepotism and particularism, by obstructing takeovers and by extending family conflicts into the firm. It ends in doubts about positive, negative or null correlation of family control and management and corporate performance. This study investigated this issue, bringing two main contributions: the analysis of family or individual control, founding family control and founder CEO administration and its relation with performance for the Brazilian environment, and the deployment of a specific measurement index for corporate governance, which is usually approached via proxies in existing literature. Empirical analysis evaluating the performance of 230 companies with higher liquidity (on the Sao Paulo stock exchange BM&FBOVESPA) in the years of 2006, 2007 and 2008 and evaluated taking into consideration family control, founding family control and CEO position occupied by the person who founded the company (CEO founder). They were compared with control groups without such characteristics. Econometric models showed no evidence of different market performance for family or founding family control. However, CEO founder showed superior market performance compared with non CEO founder firms. Operational performance measured by accountancy parameters of family controlled, founding family controlled and founder CEO managed companies was lower than operational performance of other companies. Such results differ from the ones obtained in the US and Western Europe, which showed both superior market and operational performance for family, founding family control and founder CEO administration.
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spelling 2016-03-15T19:26:50Z2020-05-28T18:04:22Z2010-07-142020-05-28T18:04:22Z2010-02-10http://dspace.mackenzie.br/handle/10899/23582Family control and management can be considered efficient and beneficial to corporate performance by reducing conflicts between shareholders and managers, lowering administrative myopia, reducing information asymmetry and profiting from social and political family influence. On the other hand, they may also be inefficient and harmful to performance by bringing conflicts between majority and minority shareholders, by being subject to nepotism and particularism, by obstructing takeovers and by extending family conflicts into the firm. It ends in doubts about positive, negative or null correlation of family control and management and corporate performance. This study investigated this issue, bringing two main contributions: the analysis of family or individual control, founding family control and founder CEO administration and its relation with performance for the Brazilian environment, and the deployment of a specific measurement index for corporate governance, which is usually approached via proxies in existing literature. Empirical analysis evaluating the performance of 230 companies with higher liquidity (on the Sao Paulo stock exchange BM&FBOVESPA) in the years of 2006, 2007 and 2008 and evaluated taking into consideration family control, founding family control and CEO position occupied by the person who founded the company (CEO founder). They were compared with control groups without such characteristics. Econometric models showed no evidence of different market performance for family or founding family control. However, CEO founder showed superior market performance compared with non CEO founder firms. Operational performance measured by accountancy parameters of family controlled, founding family controlled and founder CEO managed companies was lower than operational performance of other companies. Such results differ from the ones obtained in the US and Western Europe, which showed both superior market and operational performance for family, founding family control and founder CEO administration.As estruturas de controle e administração familiares são apontadas, por um lado, como eficientes e benéficas ao desempenho das empresas pelo seu potencial de redução de conflitos entre acionistas e administradores, menor miopia administrativa, reduzida assimetria de informação e possível influência social e política das famílias, entre outros fatores. Por outro, são apontadas como estruturas prejudiciais ao desempenho, por serem fonte de conflitos entre os acionistas majoritários e minoritários, estarem sujeitas ao nepotismo e particularismo, pela inibição de takeovers, por estenderem os conflitos familiares à empresa e assim por diante. As conclusões sobre a correlação (positiva, negativa ou inexistente) destes fatores com o desempenho das empresas seguem dúbias. Este trabalho investigou esta questão, trazendo duas contribuições principais: o estudo da relação entre controle familiar ou individual, famílias fundadoras e administração do fundador no contexto nacional e o uso de um índice específico para a medida da governança corporativa como variável de controle, o qual usualmente é tratado pela literatura estrangeira através de proxies. Na análise empírica foi investigado o desempenho das 230 empresas mais líquidas listadas na BM&FBOVESPA, nos anos de 2006, 2007 e 2008 frente ao controle familiar, ao controle da família fundadora da empresa e ao fato do cargo de CEO ser ocupado pela pessoa que fundou a firma, comparandoas aos grupos de controle não familiares ou não geridos pelo fundador. Modelos econométricos indicaram que, sob o ponto de vista de mercado, não há evidências claras de diferenças de desempenho entre empresas cujo controle é familiar ou individual e das famílias fundadoras e as empresas em geral. Já as empresas administradas pelo fundador (CEO fundador) apresentaram desempenho de mercado (Valor de Mercado sobre o Valor Contábil e Q de Tobin) superior às demais. Por outro lado, o desempenho operacional, medido por critérios contábeis, foi menor para o controle familiar, da família fundadora e para a administração do CEO fundador, comparado às empresas em geral. Os resultados referentes ao desempenho operacional diferem dos obtidos em estudos realizados nos Estados Unidos e Europa Ocidental que apontam relações positivas entre o desempenho de mercado e operacional - e o controle e administração familiares.Fundo Mackenzie de Pesquisaapplication/pdfporUniversidade Presbiteriana MackenzieAdministração de EmpresasUPMBRAdministraçãocontrole familiardesempenho financeiroCEO fundadorfamily controlfinancial performancefounder CEOCNPQ::CIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADAS::ADMINISTRACAO::ADMINISTRACAO DE EMPRESASO olho do dono engorda o gado? Controle familiar, controle e administração dos fundadores e o desempenho financeiro das companhias abertas brasileirasinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesisBarros, Lucas Ayres Barreira de Camposhttp://lattes.cnpq.br/0198661144573382Nakamura, Wilson Toshirohttp://lattes.cnpq.br/1327686935533816Silveira, Alexandre Di Miceli dahttp://lattes.cnpq.br/4773608871754250http://lattes.cnpq.br/0038031895476130Fernandes Junior, Matheushttp://tede.mackenzie.br/jspui/retrieve/3073/Matheus%20Fernandes%20Junior.pdf.jpghttp://tede.mackenzie.br/jspui/bitstream/tede/757/1/Matheus%20Fernandes%20Junior.pdfinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações do Mackenzieinstname:Universidade Presbiteriana Mackenzie (MACKENZIE)instacron:MACKENZIE10899/235822020-05-28 15:04:22.521Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertaçõeshttp://tede.mackenzie.br/jspui/PRI
dc.title.por.fl_str_mv O olho do dono engorda o gado? Controle familiar, controle e administração dos fundadores e o desempenho financeiro das companhias abertas brasileiras
title O olho do dono engorda o gado? Controle familiar, controle e administração dos fundadores e o desempenho financeiro das companhias abertas brasileiras
spellingShingle O olho do dono engorda o gado? Controle familiar, controle e administração dos fundadores e o desempenho financeiro das companhias abertas brasileiras
Fernandes Junior, Matheus
controle familiar
desempenho financeiro
CEO fundador
family control
financial performance
founder CEO
CNPQ::CIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADAS::ADMINISTRACAO::ADMINISTRACAO DE EMPRESAS
title_short O olho do dono engorda o gado? Controle familiar, controle e administração dos fundadores e o desempenho financeiro das companhias abertas brasileiras
title_full O olho do dono engorda o gado? Controle familiar, controle e administração dos fundadores e o desempenho financeiro das companhias abertas brasileiras
title_fullStr O olho do dono engorda o gado? Controle familiar, controle e administração dos fundadores e o desempenho financeiro das companhias abertas brasileiras
title_full_unstemmed O olho do dono engorda o gado? Controle familiar, controle e administração dos fundadores e o desempenho financeiro das companhias abertas brasileiras
title_sort O olho do dono engorda o gado? Controle familiar, controle e administração dos fundadores e o desempenho financeiro das companhias abertas brasileiras
author Fernandes Junior, Matheus
author_facet Fernandes Junior, Matheus
author_role author
dc.contributor.advisor1.fl_str_mv Barros, Lucas Ayres Barreira de Campos
dc.contributor.advisor1Lattes.fl_str_mv http://lattes.cnpq.br/0198661144573382
dc.contributor.referee1.fl_str_mv Nakamura, Wilson Toshiro
dc.contributor.referee1Lattes.fl_str_mv http://lattes.cnpq.br/1327686935533816
dc.contributor.referee2.fl_str_mv Silveira, Alexandre Di Miceli da
dc.contributor.referee2Lattes.fl_str_mv http://lattes.cnpq.br/4773608871754250
dc.contributor.authorLattes.fl_str_mv http://lattes.cnpq.br/0038031895476130
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Fernandes Junior, Matheus
contributor_str_mv Barros, Lucas Ayres Barreira de Campos
Nakamura, Wilson Toshiro
Silveira, Alexandre Di Miceli da
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv controle familiar
desempenho financeiro
CEO fundador
topic controle familiar
desempenho financeiro
CEO fundador
family control
financial performance
founder CEO
CNPQ::CIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADAS::ADMINISTRACAO::ADMINISTRACAO DE EMPRESAS
dc.subject.eng.fl_str_mv family control
financial performance
founder CEO
dc.subject.cnpq.fl_str_mv CNPQ::CIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADAS::ADMINISTRACAO::ADMINISTRACAO DE EMPRESAS
description Family control and management can be considered efficient and beneficial to corporate performance by reducing conflicts between shareholders and managers, lowering administrative myopia, reducing information asymmetry and profiting from social and political family influence. On the other hand, they may also be inefficient and harmful to performance by bringing conflicts between majority and minority shareholders, by being subject to nepotism and particularism, by obstructing takeovers and by extending family conflicts into the firm. It ends in doubts about positive, negative or null correlation of family control and management and corporate performance. This study investigated this issue, bringing two main contributions: the analysis of family or individual control, founding family control and founder CEO administration and its relation with performance for the Brazilian environment, and the deployment of a specific measurement index for corporate governance, which is usually approached via proxies in existing literature. Empirical analysis evaluating the performance of 230 companies with higher liquidity (on the Sao Paulo stock exchange BM&FBOVESPA) in the years of 2006, 2007 and 2008 and evaluated taking into consideration family control, founding family control and CEO position occupied by the person who founded the company (CEO founder). They were compared with control groups without such characteristics. Econometric models showed no evidence of different market performance for family or founding family control. However, CEO founder showed superior market performance compared with non CEO founder firms. Operational performance measured by accountancy parameters of family controlled, founding family controlled and founder CEO managed companies was lower than operational performance of other companies. Such results differ from the ones obtained in the US and Western Europe, which showed both superior market and operational performance for family, founding family control and founder CEO administration.
publishDate 2010
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv 2010-07-14
2020-05-28T18:04:22Z
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv 2010-02-10
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv 2016-03-15T19:26:50Z
2020-05-28T18:04:22Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis
format masterThesis
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://dspace.mackenzie.br/handle/10899/23582
url http://dspace.mackenzie.br/handle/10899/23582
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Presbiteriana Mackenzie
dc.publisher.program.fl_str_mv Administração de Empresas
dc.publisher.initials.fl_str_mv UPM
dc.publisher.country.fl_str_mv BR
dc.publisher.department.fl_str_mv Administração
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Presbiteriana Mackenzie
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações do Mackenzie
instname:Universidade Presbiteriana Mackenzie (MACKENZIE)
instacron:MACKENZIE
instname_str Universidade Presbiteriana Mackenzie (MACKENZIE)
instacron_str MACKENZIE
institution MACKENZIE
reponame_str Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações do Mackenzie
collection Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações do Mackenzie
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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