Strategies for price reduction of HIV medicines under a monopoly situation in Brazil

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Chaves,Gabriela Costa
Data de Publicação: 2015
Outros Autores: Hasenclever,Lia, Osorio-de-Castro,Claudia Garcia Serpa, Oliveira,Maria Auxiliadora
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Revista de Saúde Pública
Texto Completo: http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-89102015000100309
Resumo: ABSTRACT OBJECTIVE To analyze Government strategies for reducing prices of antiretroviral medicines for HIV in Brazil. METHODS Analysis of Ministry of Health purchases of antiretroviral medicines, from 2005 to 2013. Expenditures and costs of the treatment per year were analyzed and compared to international prices of atazanavir. Price reductions were estimated based on the terms of a voluntary license of patent rights and technology transfer in the Partnership for Productive Development Agreement for atazanavir. RESULTS Atazanavir, a patented medicine, represented a significant share of the expenditures on antiretrovirals purchased from the private sector. Prices in Brazil were higher than international references, and no evidence was found of a relationship between purchase volume and price paid by the Ministry of Health. Concerning the latest strategy to reduce prices, involving local production of the 200 mg capsule, the price reduction was greater than the estimated reduction. As for the 300 mg capsule, the amounts paid in the first two years after the Partnership for Productive Development Agreement were close to the estimated values. Prices in nominal values for both dosage forms remained virtually constant between 2011 (the signature of the Partnership for Productive Development Agreement), 2012 and 2013 (after the establishment of the Partnership). CONCLUSIONS Price reduction of medicines is complex in limited-competition environments. The use of a Partnership for Productive Development Agreement as a strategy to increase the capacity of local production and to reduce prices raises issues regarding its effectiveness in reducing prices and to overcome patent barriers. Investments in research and development that can stimulate technological accumulation should be considered by the Government to strengthen its bargaining power to negotiate medicines prices under a monopoly situation.
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spelling Strategies for price reduction of HIV medicines under a monopoly situation in BrazilAnti-HIV Agents, supply & distributionDrug PriceHealth Care CostsIntellectual PropertyNational Drug PolicyABSTRACT OBJECTIVE To analyze Government strategies for reducing prices of antiretroviral medicines for HIV in Brazil. METHODS Analysis of Ministry of Health purchases of antiretroviral medicines, from 2005 to 2013. Expenditures and costs of the treatment per year were analyzed and compared to international prices of atazanavir. Price reductions were estimated based on the terms of a voluntary license of patent rights and technology transfer in the Partnership for Productive Development Agreement for atazanavir. RESULTS Atazanavir, a patented medicine, represented a significant share of the expenditures on antiretrovirals purchased from the private sector. Prices in Brazil were higher than international references, and no evidence was found of a relationship between purchase volume and price paid by the Ministry of Health. Concerning the latest strategy to reduce prices, involving local production of the 200 mg capsule, the price reduction was greater than the estimated reduction. As for the 300 mg capsule, the amounts paid in the first two years after the Partnership for Productive Development Agreement were close to the estimated values. Prices in nominal values for both dosage forms remained virtually constant between 2011 (the signature of the Partnership for Productive Development Agreement), 2012 and 2013 (after the establishment of the Partnership). CONCLUSIONS Price reduction of medicines is complex in limited-competition environments. The use of a Partnership for Productive Development Agreement as a strategy to increase the capacity of local production and to reduce prices raises issues regarding its effectiveness in reducing prices and to overcome patent barriers. Investments in research and development that can stimulate technological accumulation should be considered by the Government to strengthen its bargaining power to negotiate medicines prices under a monopoly situation.Faculdade de Saúde Pública da Universidade de São Paulo2015-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-89102015000100309Revista de Saúde Pública v.49 2015reponame:Revista de Saúde Públicainstname:Universidade de São Paulo (USP)instacron:USP10.1590/S0034-8910.2015049005459info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessChaves,Gabriela CostaHasenclever,LiaOsorio-de-Castro,Claudia Garcia SerpaOliveira,Maria Auxiliadoraeng2016-04-27T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S0034-89102015000100309Revistahttp://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_serial&pid=0034-8910&lng=pt&nrm=isoONGhttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.phprevsp@org.usp.br||revsp1@usp.br1518-87870034-8910opendoar:2016-04-27T00:00Revista de Saúde Pública - Universidade de São Paulo (USP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Strategies for price reduction of HIV medicines under a monopoly situation in Brazil
title Strategies for price reduction of HIV medicines under a monopoly situation in Brazil
spellingShingle Strategies for price reduction of HIV medicines under a monopoly situation in Brazil
Chaves,Gabriela Costa
Anti-HIV Agents, supply & distribution
Drug Price
Health Care Costs
Intellectual Property
National Drug Policy
title_short Strategies for price reduction of HIV medicines under a monopoly situation in Brazil
title_full Strategies for price reduction of HIV medicines under a monopoly situation in Brazil
title_fullStr Strategies for price reduction of HIV medicines under a monopoly situation in Brazil
title_full_unstemmed Strategies for price reduction of HIV medicines under a monopoly situation in Brazil
title_sort Strategies for price reduction of HIV medicines under a monopoly situation in Brazil
author Chaves,Gabriela Costa
author_facet Chaves,Gabriela Costa
Hasenclever,Lia
Osorio-de-Castro,Claudia Garcia Serpa
Oliveira,Maria Auxiliadora
author_role author
author2 Hasenclever,Lia
Osorio-de-Castro,Claudia Garcia Serpa
Oliveira,Maria Auxiliadora
author2_role author
author
author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Chaves,Gabriela Costa
Hasenclever,Lia
Osorio-de-Castro,Claudia Garcia Serpa
Oliveira,Maria Auxiliadora
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Anti-HIV Agents, supply & distribution
Drug Price
Health Care Costs
Intellectual Property
National Drug Policy
topic Anti-HIV Agents, supply & distribution
Drug Price
Health Care Costs
Intellectual Property
National Drug Policy
description ABSTRACT OBJECTIVE To analyze Government strategies for reducing prices of antiretroviral medicines for HIV in Brazil. METHODS Analysis of Ministry of Health purchases of antiretroviral medicines, from 2005 to 2013. Expenditures and costs of the treatment per year were analyzed and compared to international prices of atazanavir. Price reductions were estimated based on the terms of a voluntary license of patent rights and technology transfer in the Partnership for Productive Development Agreement for atazanavir. RESULTS Atazanavir, a patented medicine, represented a significant share of the expenditures on antiretrovirals purchased from the private sector. Prices in Brazil were higher than international references, and no evidence was found of a relationship between purchase volume and price paid by the Ministry of Health. Concerning the latest strategy to reduce prices, involving local production of the 200 mg capsule, the price reduction was greater than the estimated reduction. As for the 300 mg capsule, the amounts paid in the first two years after the Partnership for Productive Development Agreement were close to the estimated values. Prices in nominal values for both dosage forms remained virtually constant between 2011 (the signature of the Partnership for Productive Development Agreement), 2012 and 2013 (after the establishment of the Partnership). CONCLUSIONS Price reduction of medicines is complex in limited-competition environments. The use of a Partnership for Productive Development Agreement as a strategy to increase the capacity of local production and to reduce prices raises issues regarding its effectiveness in reducing prices and to overcome patent barriers. Investments in research and development that can stimulate technological accumulation should be considered by the Government to strengthen its bargaining power to negotiate medicines prices under a monopoly situation.
publishDate 2015
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2015-01-01
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dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-89102015000100309
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dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
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dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv 10.1590/S0034-8910.2015049005459
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
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dc.format.none.fl_str_mv text/html
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Faculdade de Saúde Pública da Universidade de São Paulo
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Faculdade de Saúde Pública da Universidade de São Paulo
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Revista de Saúde Pública v.49 2015
reponame:Revista de Saúde Pública
instname:Universidade de São Paulo (USP)
instacron:USP
instname_str Universidade de São Paulo (USP)
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reponame_str Revista de Saúde Pública
collection Revista de Saúde Pública
repository.name.fl_str_mv Revista de Saúde Pública - Universidade de São Paulo (USP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv revsp@org.usp.br||revsp1@usp.br
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