Strategic contractual relationships in the automotive sector

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Augusto,Cleiciele Albuquerque
Data de Publicação: 2017
Outros Autores: Souza,José Paulo de, Cário,Silvio Antônio Ferraz
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Revista de Administração (São Paulo)
Texto Completo: http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0080-21072017000400443
Resumo: Abstract The aim of the present study is to understand contractual relations through the complementarity of the Transaction Costs Theory, Measurement Costs Theory, and the Resource-Based View. Initially, we sought to define an analytical model appropriate to the complementarity objective, considering the categories of each approach. The proposition was: given the possibility of measuring the attributes of products, the contractual relationship can be used to guarantee property rights over assets of high specificity and strategic value, avoiding the costs of vertical integration. Secondly, a qualitative descriptive cross-cut (2014 and 2015) study was carried out. In this phase, the complementarity proposition was analyzed based on data obtained through semi-structured interviews with logistics, production, and purchasing managers of automakers located in the state of Paraná, and some of their direct suppliers. Our proposition indicates that when there is the possibility of measuring product attributes, the contractual relationship can be used to secure property rights of high-specificity assets and strategic resources, avoiding the costs of vertical integration. This proposition was verified because, in the case of high-specificity auto parts, the measurability of their dimensions ensures protection of specific and residual property rights. In the case of strategic resources, when there is a possibility of measurement and control, contracting is allowed, even including the acquisition of innovations that bring competitive advantage (Bluetooth, integrated GPS with SD card, back-up sensor, air bags). It was observed that, even though competitive advantages constitute valuable and rare resources for automakers at their launch, this did not prevent contracting. Verification can offer an alternative path to rational Transaction Costs Theory, as proposed by Williamson, and the use of vertical integration as a form of controlling strategic resources, recommended by the Resource-Based View, which still requires further studies in order to overcome persistent limitations in the model.
id USP-27_18097303a6382d68a0f7c23161a277ae
oai_identifier_str oai:scielo:S0080-21072017000400443
network_acronym_str USP-27
network_name_str Revista de Administração (São Paulo)
repository_id_str
spelling Strategic contractual relationships in the automotive sectorContractsMeasurement attributesSpecific assetsResources and strategic capabilitiesAutomakersAbstract The aim of the present study is to understand contractual relations through the complementarity of the Transaction Costs Theory, Measurement Costs Theory, and the Resource-Based View. Initially, we sought to define an analytical model appropriate to the complementarity objective, considering the categories of each approach. The proposition was: given the possibility of measuring the attributes of products, the contractual relationship can be used to guarantee property rights over assets of high specificity and strategic value, avoiding the costs of vertical integration. Secondly, a qualitative descriptive cross-cut (2014 and 2015) study was carried out. In this phase, the complementarity proposition was analyzed based on data obtained through semi-structured interviews with logistics, production, and purchasing managers of automakers located in the state of Paraná, and some of their direct suppliers. Our proposition indicates that when there is the possibility of measuring product attributes, the contractual relationship can be used to secure property rights of high-specificity assets and strategic resources, avoiding the costs of vertical integration. This proposition was verified because, in the case of high-specificity auto parts, the measurability of their dimensions ensures protection of specific and residual property rights. In the case of strategic resources, when there is a possibility of measurement and control, contracting is allowed, even including the acquisition of innovations that bring competitive advantage (Bluetooth, integrated GPS with SD card, back-up sensor, air bags). It was observed that, even though competitive advantages constitute valuable and rare resources for automakers at their launch, this did not prevent contracting. Verification can offer an alternative path to rational Transaction Costs Theory, as proposed by Williamson, and the use of vertical integration as a form of controlling strategic resources, recommended by the Resource-Based View, which still requires further studies in order to overcome persistent limitations in the model.Departamento de Administração da Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade da Universidade de São Paulo2017-12-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0080-21072017000400443Revista de Administração (São Paulo) v.52 n.4 2017reponame:Revista de Administração (São Paulo)instname:Universidade de São Paulo (USP)instacron:USP10.1016/j.rausp.2017.08.006info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessAugusto,Cleiciele AlbuquerqueSouza,José Paulo deCário,Silvio Antônio Ferrazeng2017-11-27T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S0080-21072017000400443Revistahttp://rausp.usp.br/PUBhttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.phprausp@usp.br||reinhard@usp.br1984-61420080-2107opendoar:2017-11-27T00:00Revista de Administração (São Paulo) - Universidade de São Paulo (USP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Strategic contractual relationships in the automotive sector
title Strategic contractual relationships in the automotive sector
spellingShingle Strategic contractual relationships in the automotive sector
Augusto,Cleiciele Albuquerque
Contracts
Measurement attributes
Specific assets
Resources and strategic capabilities
Automakers
title_short Strategic contractual relationships in the automotive sector
title_full Strategic contractual relationships in the automotive sector
title_fullStr Strategic contractual relationships in the automotive sector
title_full_unstemmed Strategic contractual relationships in the automotive sector
title_sort Strategic contractual relationships in the automotive sector
author Augusto,Cleiciele Albuquerque
author_facet Augusto,Cleiciele Albuquerque
Souza,José Paulo de
Cário,Silvio Antônio Ferraz
author_role author
author2 Souza,José Paulo de
Cário,Silvio Antônio Ferraz
author2_role author
author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Augusto,Cleiciele Albuquerque
Souza,José Paulo de
Cário,Silvio Antônio Ferraz
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Contracts
Measurement attributes
Specific assets
Resources and strategic capabilities
Automakers
topic Contracts
Measurement attributes
Specific assets
Resources and strategic capabilities
Automakers
description Abstract The aim of the present study is to understand contractual relations through the complementarity of the Transaction Costs Theory, Measurement Costs Theory, and the Resource-Based View. Initially, we sought to define an analytical model appropriate to the complementarity objective, considering the categories of each approach. The proposition was: given the possibility of measuring the attributes of products, the contractual relationship can be used to guarantee property rights over assets of high specificity and strategic value, avoiding the costs of vertical integration. Secondly, a qualitative descriptive cross-cut (2014 and 2015) study was carried out. In this phase, the complementarity proposition was analyzed based on data obtained through semi-structured interviews with logistics, production, and purchasing managers of automakers located in the state of Paraná, and some of their direct suppliers. Our proposition indicates that when there is the possibility of measuring product attributes, the contractual relationship can be used to secure property rights of high-specificity assets and strategic resources, avoiding the costs of vertical integration. This proposition was verified because, in the case of high-specificity auto parts, the measurability of their dimensions ensures protection of specific and residual property rights. In the case of strategic resources, when there is a possibility of measurement and control, contracting is allowed, even including the acquisition of innovations that bring competitive advantage (Bluetooth, integrated GPS with SD card, back-up sensor, air bags). It was observed that, even though competitive advantages constitute valuable and rare resources for automakers at their launch, this did not prevent contracting. Verification can offer an alternative path to rational Transaction Costs Theory, as proposed by Williamson, and the use of vertical integration as a form of controlling strategic resources, recommended by the Resource-Based View, which still requires further studies in order to overcome persistent limitations in the model.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2017-12-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0080-21072017000400443
url http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0080-21072017000400443
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv 10.1016/j.rausp.2017.08.006
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv text/html
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Departamento de Administração da Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade da Universidade de São Paulo
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Departamento de Administração da Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade da Universidade de São Paulo
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Revista de Administração (São Paulo) v.52 n.4 2017
reponame:Revista de Administração (São Paulo)
instname:Universidade de São Paulo (USP)
instacron:USP
instname_str Universidade de São Paulo (USP)
instacron_str USP
institution USP
reponame_str Revista de Administração (São Paulo)
collection Revista de Administração (São Paulo)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Revista de Administração (São Paulo) - Universidade de São Paulo (USP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv rausp@usp.br||reinhard@usp.br
_version_ 1748936717293846528