Power and selection of contract terms: The case from the Brazilian orange juice sector

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Ito,Nobuiuki Costa
Data de Publicação: 2016
Outros Autores: Zylbersztajn,Decio
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Revista de Administração (São Paulo)
Texto Completo: http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0080-21072016000100005
Resumo: ABSTRACT We propose a model to explain how contract terms are selected in the presence of a form of economic power: contract power. The orange juice sector is used to illustrate an analysis that demonstrates the effects of contract power on the economic organization of the sector. We define contract power as the ability to exploit contractual gaps or failures of contractual provisions, which are strategically left incomplete. Empirical evidence from content analysis of antitrust documents supports the logic of contract power in the orange juice sector in three forms: avoiding changes to payment methods from weight to solid contents (quality); using information asymmetries to manipulate indexes that calculate the formula of orange prices; and deliberately harvesting oranges late in order to dehydrate the fruit, which consequently reduces weight and price. The paper contributes to understanding the selection of contract terms and the debate about how antitrust offices can deal with this issue.
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spelling Power and selection of contract terms: The case from the Brazilian orange juice sectorcontractspowermeasurement costagribusinessABSTRACT We propose a model to explain how contract terms are selected in the presence of a form of economic power: contract power. The orange juice sector is used to illustrate an analysis that demonstrates the effects of contract power on the economic organization of the sector. We define contract power as the ability to exploit contractual gaps or failures of contractual provisions, which are strategically left incomplete. Empirical evidence from content analysis of antitrust documents supports the logic of contract power in the orange juice sector in three forms: avoiding changes to payment methods from weight to solid contents (quality); using information asymmetries to manipulate indexes that calculate the formula of orange prices; and deliberately harvesting oranges late in order to dehydrate the fruit, which consequently reduces weight and price. The paper contributes to understanding the selection of contract terms and the debate about how antitrust offices can deal with this issue.Departamento de Administração da Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade da Universidade de São Paulo2016-03-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0080-21072016000100005Revista de Administração (São Paulo) v.51 n.1 2016reponame:Revista de Administração (São Paulo)instname:Universidade de São Paulo (USP)instacron:USP10.5700/rausp1220info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessIto,Nobuiuki CostaZylbersztajn,Decioeng2016-03-30T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S0080-21072016000100005Revistahttp://rausp.usp.br/PUBhttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.phprausp@usp.br||reinhard@usp.br1984-61420080-2107opendoar:2016-03-30T00:00Revista de Administração (São Paulo) - Universidade de São Paulo (USP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Power and selection of contract terms: The case from the Brazilian orange juice sector
title Power and selection of contract terms: The case from the Brazilian orange juice sector
spellingShingle Power and selection of contract terms: The case from the Brazilian orange juice sector
Ito,Nobuiuki Costa
contracts
power
measurement cost
agribusiness
title_short Power and selection of contract terms: The case from the Brazilian orange juice sector
title_full Power and selection of contract terms: The case from the Brazilian orange juice sector
title_fullStr Power and selection of contract terms: The case from the Brazilian orange juice sector
title_full_unstemmed Power and selection of contract terms: The case from the Brazilian orange juice sector
title_sort Power and selection of contract terms: The case from the Brazilian orange juice sector
author Ito,Nobuiuki Costa
author_facet Ito,Nobuiuki Costa
Zylbersztajn,Decio
author_role author
author2 Zylbersztajn,Decio
author2_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Ito,Nobuiuki Costa
Zylbersztajn,Decio
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv contracts
power
measurement cost
agribusiness
topic contracts
power
measurement cost
agribusiness
description ABSTRACT We propose a model to explain how contract terms are selected in the presence of a form of economic power: contract power. The orange juice sector is used to illustrate an analysis that demonstrates the effects of contract power on the economic organization of the sector. We define contract power as the ability to exploit contractual gaps or failures of contractual provisions, which are strategically left incomplete. Empirical evidence from content analysis of antitrust documents supports the logic of contract power in the orange juice sector in three forms: avoiding changes to payment methods from weight to solid contents (quality); using information asymmetries to manipulate indexes that calculate the formula of orange prices; and deliberately harvesting oranges late in order to dehydrate the fruit, which consequently reduces weight and price. The paper contributes to understanding the selection of contract terms and the debate about how antitrust offices can deal with this issue.
publishDate 2016
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2016-03-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0080-21072016000100005
url http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0080-21072016000100005
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv 10.5700/rausp1220
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv text/html
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Departamento de Administração da Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade da Universidade de São Paulo
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Departamento de Administração da Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade da Universidade de São Paulo
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Revista de Administração (São Paulo) v.51 n.1 2016
reponame:Revista de Administração (São Paulo)
instname:Universidade de São Paulo (USP)
instacron:USP
instname_str Universidade de São Paulo (USP)
instacron_str USP
institution USP
reponame_str Revista de Administração (São Paulo)
collection Revista de Administração (São Paulo)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Revista de Administração (São Paulo) - Universidade de São Paulo (USP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv rausp@usp.br||reinhard@usp.br
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