Informal contracting between and within firms

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Gil, Ricard
Data de Publicação: 2017
Outros Autores: Zanarone, Giorgio
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Revista de Administração (São Paulo)
Texto Completo: https://www.revistas.usp.br/rausp/article/view/141257
Resumo: While informal contracts are widely used in modern economies, limited systematic empirical evidence is available to researchers and policy makers. This paper aims to fill the gap by discussing a selected sample of empirical works through the lens of a theoretical framework that clarifies the role of informal contracts. We also highlight unexplored research opportunities offered by more recent theoretical models that investigate how informal contracts are built over time, how they are subject to path dependency, and how relational rents are created, and are awaiting empirical analysis.
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spelling Informal contracting between and within firmsInformal contractsEnforcementEmpirical evidenceTestabilityWhile informal contracts are widely used in modern economies, limited systematic empirical evidence is available to researchers and policy makers. This paper aims to fill the gap by discussing a selected sample of empirical works through the lens of a theoretical framework that clarifies the role of informal contracts. We also highlight unexplored research opportunities offered by more recent theoretical models that investigate how informal contracts are built over time, how they are subject to path dependency, and how relational rents are created, and are awaiting empirical analysis.Universidade de São Paulo. Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade2017-12-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionArtigo avaliado pelos Paresapplication/pdfhttps://www.revistas.usp.br/rausp/article/view/14125710.1016/j.rausp.2017.08.009Revista de Administração; v. 52 n. 4 (2017); 492-496Revista de Administração; Vol. 52 No. 4 (2017); 492-496Revista de Administração; Vol. 52 Núm. 4 (2017); 492-4961984-61420080-2107reponame:Revista de Administração (São Paulo)instname:Universidade de São Paulo (USP)instacron:USPenghttps://www.revistas.usp.br/rausp/article/view/141257/136309Copyright (c) 2017 Revista de Administraçãoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessGil, RicardZanarone, Giorgio2021-05-26T11:08:18Zoai:revistas.usp.br:article/141257Revistahttps://www.revistas.usp.br/rauspPUBhttps://www.revistas.usp.br/rausp/oairausp@usp.br||reinhard@usp.br1984-61420080-2107opendoar:2021-05-26T11:08:18Revista de Administração (São Paulo) - Universidade de São Paulo (USP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Informal contracting between and within firms
title Informal contracting between and within firms
spellingShingle Informal contracting between and within firms
Gil, Ricard
Informal contracts
Enforcement
Empirical evidence
Testability
title_short Informal contracting between and within firms
title_full Informal contracting between and within firms
title_fullStr Informal contracting between and within firms
title_full_unstemmed Informal contracting between and within firms
title_sort Informal contracting between and within firms
author Gil, Ricard
author_facet Gil, Ricard
Zanarone, Giorgio
author_role author
author2 Zanarone, Giorgio
author2_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Gil, Ricard
Zanarone, Giorgio
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Informal contracts
Enforcement
Empirical evidence
Testability
topic Informal contracts
Enforcement
Empirical evidence
Testability
description While informal contracts are widely used in modern economies, limited systematic empirical evidence is available to researchers and policy makers. This paper aims to fill the gap by discussing a selected sample of empirical works through the lens of a theoretical framework that clarifies the role of informal contracts. We also highlight unexplored research opportunities offered by more recent theoretical models that investigate how informal contracts are built over time, how they are subject to path dependency, and how relational rents are created, and are awaiting empirical analysis.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2017-12-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Artigo avaliado pelos Pares
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://www.revistas.usp.br/rausp/article/view/141257
10.1016/j.rausp.2017.08.009
url https://www.revistas.usp.br/rausp/article/view/141257
identifier_str_mv 10.1016/j.rausp.2017.08.009
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://www.revistas.usp.br/rausp/article/view/141257/136309
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2017 Revista de Administração
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2017 Revista de Administração
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade de São Paulo. Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade de São Paulo. Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Revista de Administração; v. 52 n. 4 (2017); 492-496
Revista de Administração; Vol. 52 No. 4 (2017); 492-496
Revista de Administração; Vol. 52 Núm. 4 (2017); 492-496
1984-6142
0080-2107
reponame:Revista de Administração (São Paulo)
instname:Universidade de São Paulo (USP)
instacron:USP
instname_str Universidade de São Paulo (USP)
instacron_str USP
institution USP
reponame_str Revista de Administração (São Paulo)
collection Revista de Administração (São Paulo)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Revista de Administração (São Paulo) - Universidade de São Paulo (USP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv rausp@usp.br||reinhard@usp.br
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