Informal contracting between and within firms
Autor(a) principal: | |
---|---|
Data de Publicação: | 2017 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Revista de Administração (São Paulo) |
Texto Completo: | https://www.revistas.usp.br/rausp/article/view/141257 |
Resumo: | While informal contracts are widely used in modern economies, limited systematic empirical evidence is available to researchers and policy makers. This paper aims to fill the gap by discussing a selected sample of empirical works through the lens of a theoretical framework that clarifies the role of informal contracts. We also highlight unexplored research opportunities offered by more recent theoretical models that investigate how informal contracts are built over time, how they are subject to path dependency, and how relational rents are created, and are awaiting empirical analysis. |
id |
USP-27_ab855127627ceb1d23c21c6d650b0aa7 |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:revistas.usp.br:article/141257 |
network_acronym_str |
USP-27 |
network_name_str |
Revista de Administração (São Paulo) |
repository_id_str |
|
spelling |
Informal contracting between and within firmsInformal contractsEnforcementEmpirical evidenceTestabilityWhile informal contracts are widely used in modern economies, limited systematic empirical evidence is available to researchers and policy makers. This paper aims to fill the gap by discussing a selected sample of empirical works through the lens of a theoretical framework that clarifies the role of informal contracts. We also highlight unexplored research opportunities offered by more recent theoretical models that investigate how informal contracts are built over time, how they are subject to path dependency, and how relational rents are created, and are awaiting empirical analysis.Universidade de São Paulo. Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade2017-12-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionArtigo avaliado pelos Paresapplication/pdfhttps://www.revistas.usp.br/rausp/article/view/14125710.1016/j.rausp.2017.08.009Revista de Administração; v. 52 n. 4 (2017); 492-496Revista de Administração; Vol. 52 No. 4 (2017); 492-496Revista de Administração; Vol. 52 Núm. 4 (2017); 492-4961984-61420080-2107reponame:Revista de Administração (São Paulo)instname:Universidade de São Paulo (USP)instacron:USPenghttps://www.revistas.usp.br/rausp/article/view/141257/136309Copyright (c) 2017 Revista de Administraçãoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessGil, RicardZanarone, Giorgio2021-05-26T11:08:18Zoai:revistas.usp.br:article/141257Revistahttps://www.revistas.usp.br/rauspPUBhttps://www.revistas.usp.br/rausp/oairausp@usp.br||reinhard@usp.br1984-61420080-2107opendoar:2021-05-26T11:08:18Revista de Administração (São Paulo) - Universidade de São Paulo (USP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Informal contracting between and within firms |
title |
Informal contracting between and within firms |
spellingShingle |
Informal contracting between and within firms Gil, Ricard Informal contracts Enforcement Empirical evidence Testability |
title_short |
Informal contracting between and within firms |
title_full |
Informal contracting between and within firms |
title_fullStr |
Informal contracting between and within firms |
title_full_unstemmed |
Informal contracting between and within firms |
title_sort |
Informal contracting between and within firms |
author |
Gil, Ricard |
author_facet |
Gil, Ricard Zanarone, Giorgio |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Zanarone, Giorgio |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Gil, Ricard Zanarone, Giorgio |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Informal contracts Enforcement Empirical evidence Testability |
topic |
Informal contracts Enforcement Empirical evidence Testability |
description |
While informal contracts are widely used in modern economies, limited systematic empirical evidence is available to researchers and policy makers. This paper aims to fill the gap by discussing a selected sample of empirical works through the lens of a theoretical framework that clarifies the role of informal contracts. We also highlight unexplored research opportunities offered by more recent theoretical models that investigate how informal contracts are built over time, how they are subject to path dependency, and how relational rents are created, and are awaiting empirical analysis. |
publishDate |
2017 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2017-12-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Artigo avaliado pelos Pares |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://www.revistas.usp.br/rausp/article/view/141257 10.1016/j.rausp.2017.08.009 |
url |
https://www.revistas.usp.br/rausp/article/view/141257 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.1016/j.rausp.2017.08.009 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://www.revistas.usp.br/rausp/article/view/141257/136309 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2017 Revista de Administração info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2017 Revista de Administração |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade de São Paulo. Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade de São Paulo. Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Revista de Administração; v. 52 n. 4 (2017); 492-496 Revista de Administração; Vol. 52 No. 4 (2017); 492-496 Revista de Administração; Vol. 52 Núm. 4 (2017); 492-496 1984-6142 0080-2107 reponame:Revista de Administração (São Paulo) instname:Universidade de São Paulo (USP) instacron:USP |
instname_str |
Universidade de São Paulo (USP) |
instacron_str |
USP |
institution |
USP |
reponame_str |
Revista de Administração (São Paulo) |
collection |
Revista de Administração (São Paulo) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Revista de Administração (São Paulo) - Universidade de São Paulo (USP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
rausp@usp.br||reinhard@usp.br |
_version_ |
1800222890820370432 |