The buddhist concept of selflessness according to Je Tsongkhapa

• Autor(a) principal: Piza, Adriana Toledo
• Data de Publicação: 2019
• Tipo de documento: Tese
• Idioma: eng
• Título da fonte: Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da USP
• Texto Completo: http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8133/tde-20052019-121610/
• topic: Ausência de identidade; Buddhist philosophy; Dependent-origination; Filosofia budista; Inference; Inferência; Madhyamaka; Madhyamaka; Origem-dependente; Selflessness

This doctoral research has the purpose of articulating a consistent presentation of the Buddhist concept of selflessness as explained by the great Tibetan Buddhist scholar Tsongkhapa (Tibet, 13571419 CE), who composed some major philosophical masterpieces about this key Buddhist concept based on Ngrjuna´s (India, ca 150250 CE) famous Mla-madhyamaka-krik (MMK). Tsongkhapa presents himself as a follower of Ngrjuna, that is, as a proponent of the \'Middle Way\' (madhyamaka, dbu ma pa) Buddhist philosophical school. As our study of the first treatise in which he presents his view on selflessness advanced, we realized that it was necessary to dedicate part of our research to the analysis of the epistemological theory that substantiates his explanation of selflessness, since his approach to the subject is based on the use of what he calls \'rational analysis\' and \'inferential knowledge\'. Therefore, a preliminary part of our thesis is dedicated to the clarification of Tsongkhapa´s conceptions of rational analysis and inferential knowledge, which are based primarily on the theory of \'valid cognition\' (pramna, tshad ma) elaborated centuries earlier by the great Indian scholar Dharmakrti (6th and 7th centuries CE). The next stage of our research was guided by the following question: since, for Tsongkhapa, not possessing a self means the same as not possessing a nature (svabhva, rang zhin), a concept upon which Dharmakrti´s explanation of inferential knowledge is based, how does Tsongkhapa combine his presentation of selflessness with Dharmakrti´s epistemology without generating internal contradictions in his system? We have concluded that, in Tsongkhapa´s presentation of selflessness as united with causation, that is, as one implying the other due to the introduction of the key distinction between \'inherent nature\' and \'mere nature\', there is no contradiction between his epistemological use of inferences based on the notion of mere natures (recognized as conventional) and his final ontological assertion that phenomena lack inherent natures.