The effect of ownership-control divergence on investment sensitivity to idiosyncratic risk: evidence from an emerging economy

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Caixe, Daniel Ferreira
Data de Publicação: 2018
Tipo de documento: Tese
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da USP
Texto Completo: http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/18/18157/tde-16042018-103130/
Resumo: This study investigates the moderating role of the agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders on the investment-risk relationship. When the ownership-control structure is concentrated, the agency theory indicates that the separation between cash-flow rights and voting rights induces the controlling shareholder to extract private benefits. To assess the effect of ownership-control divergence on the investment-risk relation, we use system generalized method of moments estimator (SYS-GMM) in longitudinal data from 412 Brazilian firms between 1997 and 2010. Our results show that investment is less sensitive to idiosyncratic risk for companies in which the largest shareholder presents high levels of ownership-control divergence. The impact of excess voting rights on the investment-risk sensitivity holds after we group firms according to distinct corporate governance and financial characteristics, such as financial constraints, family control, board independence, and the type of control-enhancing mechanism. Board independence does not affect controlling shareholders\' behavior toward risky investments. Among the control-enhancing mechanisms, the issuance of dual class shares is the main driver of the lower investment sensitivity to idiosyncratic risk. Our findings are consistent with entrenchment effects in the sense that dominant shareholders may select riskier projects when investing other people\'s money, which have both managerial and policy implications.
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spelling The effect of ownership-control divergence on investment sensitivity to idiosyncratic risk: evidence from an emerging economyO efeito da divergência propriedade-controle na sensibilidade do investimento ao risco idiossincrático: evidência de uma economia emergenteAgency problemsDecisões de investimentoDivergência propriedade-controleEconomia emergenteEmerging economyIdiosyncratic riskInvestment decisionsOwnership-control divergenceProblemas de agênciaRisco idiossincráticoThis study investigates the moderating role of the agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders on the investment-risk relationship. When the ownership-control structure is concentrated, the agency theory indicates that the separation between cash-flow rights and voting rights induces the controlling shareholder to extract private benefits. To assess the effect of ownership-control divergence on the investment-risk relation, we use system generalized method of moments estimator (SYS-GMM) in longitudinal data from 412 Brazilian firms between 1997 and 2010. Our results show that investment is less sensitive to idiosyncratic risk for companies in which the largest shareholder presents high levels of ownership-control divergence. The impact of excess voting rights on the investment-risk sensitivity holds after we group firms according to distinct corporate governance and financial characteristics, such as financial constraints, family control, board independence, and the type of control-enhancing mechanism. Board independence does not affect controlling shareholders\' behavior toward risky investments. Among the control-enhancing mechanisms, the issuance of dual class shares is the main driver of the lower investment sensitivity to idiosyncratic risk. Our findings are consistent with entrenchment effects in the sense that dominant shareholders may select riskier projects when investing other people\'s money, which have both managerial and policy implications.Este estudo investiga o papel moderador do conflito de agência entre acionistas controladores e minoritários no relacionamento investimento-risco. Quando a estrutura de propriedade e controle é concentrada, a teoria da agência indica que a separação entre direitos de fluxo de caixa e direitos de voto induz o acionista controlador a extrair benefícios privados. Para avaliar o efeito da divergência propriedade-controle na relação investimento-risco, utilizamos o estimador de método dos momentos generalizado sistêmico (MMG-SIS) em dados longitudinais de 412 empresas brasileiras entre 1997 e 2010. Nossos resultados mostram que o investimento é menos sensível ao risco idiossincrático para empresas em que o maior acionista apresenta altos níveis de divergência propriedade-controle. O impacto dos direitos de voto em excesso na sensibilidade investimento-risco mantém-se após agruparmos as empresas de acordo com características de governança corporativa e financeiras, tais como restrições financeiras, controle familiar, independência do conselho e o tipo de mecanismo para aumento do controle. A independência do conselho não afeta o comportamento dos acionistas controladores em relação a investimentos arriscados. Entre os mecanismos para aumento do controle, a emissão de duas classes de ações é a principal direcionadora da menor sensibilidade do investimento ao risco idiossincrático. Nossas descobertas são consistentes com os efeitos de entrincheiramento no sentido de que os acionistas dominantes podem selecionar projetos mais arriscados ao investirem o dinheiro de outras pessoas, o que tem implicações gerenciais e políticas.Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USPKalatzis, Aquiles Elie GuimarãesCaixe, Daniel Ferreira2018-02-05info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesisapplication/pdfhttp://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/18/18157/tde-16042018-103130/reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da USPinstname:Universidade de São Paulo (USP)instacron:USPLiberar o conteúdo para acesso público.info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesseng2018-07-19T20:50:39Zoai:teses.usp.br:tde-16042018-103130Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertaçõeshttp://www.teses.usp.br/PUBhttp://www.teses.usp.br/cgi-bin/mtd2br.plvirginia@if.usp.br|| atendimento@aguia.usp.br||virginia@if.usp.bropendoar:27212018-07-19T20:50:39Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da USP - Universidade de São Paulo (USP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The effect of ownership-control divergence on investment sensitivity to idiosyncratic risk: evidence from an emerging economy
O efeito da divergência propriedade-controle na sensibilidade do investimento ao risco idiossincrático: evidência de uma economia emergente
title The effect of ownership-control divergence on investment sensitivity to idiosyncratic risk: evidence from an emerging economy
spellingShingle The effect of ownership-control divergence on investment sensitivity to idiosyncratic risk: evidence from an emerging economy
Caixe, Daniel Ferreira
Agency problems
Decisões de investimento
Divergência propriedade-controle
Economia emergente
Emerging economy
Idiosyncratic risk
Investment decisions
Ownership-control divergence
Problemas de agência
Risco idiossincrático
title_short The effect of ownership-control divergence on investment sensitivity to idiosyncratic risk: evidence from an emerging economy
title_full The effect of ownership-control divergence on investment sensitivity to idiosyncratic risk: evidence from an emerging economy
title_fullStr The effect of ownership-control divergence on investment sensitivity to idiosyncratic risk: evidence from an emerging economy
title_full_unstemmed The effect of ownership-control divergence on investment sensitivity to idiosyncratic risk: evidence from an emerging economy
title_sort The effect of ownership-control divergence on investment sensitivity to idiosyncratic risk: evidence from an emerging economy
author Caixe, Daniel Ferreira
author_facet Caixe, Daniel Ferreira
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Kalatzis, Aquiles Elie Guimarães
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Caixe, Daniel Ferreira
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Agency problems
Decisões de investimento
Divergência propriedade-controle
Economia emergente
Emerging economy
Idiosyncratic risk
Investment decisions
Ownership-control divergence
Problemas de agência
Risco idiossincrático
topic Agency problems
Decisões de investimento
Divergência propriedade-controle
Economia emergente
Emerging economy
Idiosyncratic risk
Investment decisions
Ownership-control divergence
Problemas de agência
Risco idiossincrático
description This study investigates the moderating role of the agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders on the investment-risk relationship. When the ownership-control structure is concentrated, the agency theory indicates that the separation between cash-flow rights and voting rights induces the controlling shareholder to extract private benefits. To assess the effect of ownership-control divergence on the investment-risk relation, we use system generalized method of moments estimator (SYS-GMM) in longitudinal data from 412 Brazilian firms between 1997 and 2010. Our results show that investment is less sensitive to idiosyncratic risk for companies in which the largest shareholder presents high levels of ownership-control divergence. The impact of excess voting rights on the investment-risk sensitivity holds after we group firms according to distinct corporate governance and financial characteristics, such as financial constraints, family control, board independence, and the type of control-enhancing mechanism. Board independence does not affect controlling shareholders\' behavior toward risky investments. Among the control-enhancing mechanisms, the issuance of dual class shares is the main driver of the lower investment sensitivity to idiosyncratic risk. Our findings are consistent with entrenchment effects in the sense that dominant shareholders may select riskier projects when investing other people\'s money, which have both managerial and policy implications.
publishDate 2018
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2018-02-05
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis
format doctoralThesis
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dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/18/18157/tde-16042018-103130/
url http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/18/18157/tde-16042018-103130/
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
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dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Liberar o conteúdo para acesso público.
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Liberar o conteúdo para acesso público.
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
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dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USP
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USP
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reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da USP
instname:Universidade de São Paulo (USP)
instacron:USP
instname_str Universidade de São Paulo (USP)
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reponame_str Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da USP
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