The effect of ownership-control divergence on investment sensitivity to idiosyncratic risk: evidence from an emerging economy
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2018 |
Tipo de documento: | Tese |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da USP |
Texto Completo: | http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/18/18157/tde-16042018-103130/ |
Resumo: | This study investigates the moderating role of the agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders on the investment-risk relationship. When the ownership-control structure is concentrated, the agency theory indicates that the separation between cash-flow rights and voting rights induces the controlling shareholder to extract private benefits. To assess the effect of ownership-control divergence on the investment-risk relation, we use system generalized method of moments estimator (SYS-GMM) in longitudinal data from 412 Brazilian firms between 1997 and 2010. Our results show that investment is less sensitive to idiosyncratic risk for companies in which the largest shareholder presents high levels of ownership-control divergence. The impact of excess voting rights on the investment-risk sensitivity holds after we group firms according to distinct corporate governance and financial characteristics, such as financial constraints, family control, board independence, and the type of control-enhancing mechanism. Board independence does not affect controlling shareholders\' behavior toward risky investments. Among the control-enhancing mechanisms, the issuance of dual class shares is the main driver of the lower investment sensitivity to idiosyncratic risk. Our findings are consistent with entrenchment effects in the sense that dominant shareholders may select riskier projects when investing other people\'s money, which have both managerial and policy implications. |
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Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da USP |
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The effect of ownership-control divergence on investment sensitivity to idiosyncratic risk: evidence from an emerging economyO efeito da divergência propriedade-controle na sensibilidade do investimento ao risco idiossincrático: evidência de uma economia emergenteAgency problemsDecisões de investimentoDivergência propriedade-controleEconomia emergenteEmerging economyIdiosyncratic riskInvestment decisionsOwnership-control divergenceProblemas de agênciaRisco idiossincráticoThis study investigates the moderating role of the agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders on the investment-risk relationship. When the ownership-control structure is concentrated, the agency theory indicates that the separation between cash-flow rights and voting rights induces the controlling shareholder to extract private benefits. To assess the effect of ownership-control divergence on the investment-risk relation, we use system generalized method of moments estimator (SYS-GMM) in longitudinal data from 412 Brazilian firms between 1997 and 2010. Our results show that investment is less sensitive to idiosyncratic risk for companies in which the largest shareholder presents high levels of ownership-control divergence. The impact of excess voting rights on the investment-risk sensitivity holds after we group firms according to distinct corporate governance and financial characteristics, such as financial constraints, family control, board independence, and the type of control-enhancing mechanism. Board independence does not affect controlling shareholders\' behavior toward risky investments. Among the control-enhancing mechanisms, the issuance of dual class shares is the main driver of the lower investment sensitivity to idiosyncratic risk. Our findings are consistent with entrenchment effects in the sense that dominant shareholders may select riskier projects when investing other people\'s money, which have both managerial and policy implications.Este estudo investiga o papel moderador do conflito de agência entre acionistas controladores e minoritários no relacionamento investimento-risco. Quando a estrutura de propriedade e controle é concentrada, a teoria da agência indica que a separação entre direitos de fluxo de caixa e direitos de voto induz o acionista controlador a extrair benefícios privados. Para avaliar o efeito da divergência propriedade-controle na relação investimento-risco, utilizamos o estimador de método dos momentos generalizado sistêmico (MMG-SIS) em dados longitudinais de 412 empresas brasileiras entre 1997 e 2010. Nossos resultados mostram que o investimento é menos sensível ao risco idiossincrático para empresas em que o maior acionista apresenta altos níveis de divergência propriedade-controle. O impacto dos direitos de voto em excesso na sensibilidade investimento-risco mantém-se após agruparmos as empresas de acordo com características de governança corporativa e financeiras, tais como restrições financeiras, controle familiar, independência do conselho e o tipo de mecanismo para aumento do controle. A independência do conselho não afeta o comportamento dos acionistas controladores em relação a investimentos arriscados. Entre os mecanismos para aumento do controle, a emissão de duas classes de ações é a principal direcionadora da menor sensibilidade do investimento ao risco idiossincrático. Nossas descobertas são consistentes com os efeitos de entrincheiramento no sentido de que os acionistas dominantes podem selecionar projetos mais arriscados ao investirem o dinheiro de outras pessoas, o que tem implicações gerenciais e políticas.Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USPKalatzis, Aquiles Elie GuimarãesCaixe, Daniel Ferreira2018-02-05info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesisapplication/pdfhttp://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/18/18157/tde-16042018-103130/reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da USPinstname:Universidade de São Paulo (USP)instacron:USPLiberar o conteúdo para acesso público.info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesseng2018-07-19T20:50:39Zoai:teses.usp.br:tde-16042018-103130Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertaçõeshttp://www.teses.usp.br/PUBhttp://www.teses.usp.br/cgi-bin/mtd2br.plvirginia@if.usp.br|| atendimento@aguia.usp.br||virginia@if.usp.bropendoar:27212018-07-19T20:50:39Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da USP - Universidade de São Paulo (USP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
The effect of ownership-control divergence on investment sensitivity to idiosyncratic risk: evidence from an emerging economy O efeito da divergência propriedade-controle na sensibilidade do investimento ao risco idiossincrático: evidência de uma economia emergente |
title |
The effect of ownership-control divergence on investment sensitivity to idiosyncratic risk: evidence from an emerging economy |
spellingShingle |
The effect of ownership-control divergence on investment sensitivity to idiosyncratic risk: evidence from an emerging economy Caixe, Daniel Ferreira Agency problems Decisões de investimento Divergência propriedade-controle Economia emergente Emerging economy Idiosyncratic risk Investment decisions Ownership-control divergence Problemas de agência Risco idiossincrático |
title_short |
The effect of ownership-control divergence on investment sensitivity to idiosyncratic risk: evidence from an emerging economy |
title_full |
The effect of ownership-control divergence on investment sensitivity to idiosyncratic risk: evidence from an emerging economy |
title_fullStr |
The effect of ownership-control divergence on investment sensitivity to idiosyncratic risk: evidence from an emerging economy |
title_full_unstemmed |
The effect of ownership-control divergence on investment sensitivity to idiosyncratic risk: evidence from an emerging economy |
title_sort |
The effect of ownership-control divergence on investment sensitivity to idiosyncratic risk: evidence from an emerging economy |
author |
Caixe, Daniel Ferreira |
author_facet |
Caixe, Daniel Ferreira |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Kalatzis, Aquiles Elie Guimarães |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Caixe, Daniel Ferreira |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Agency problems Decisões de investimento Divergência propriedade-controle Economia emergente Emerging economy Idiosyncratic risk Investment decisions Ownership-control divergence Problemas de agência Risco idiossincrático |
topic |
Agency problems Decisões de investimento Divergência propriedade-controle Economia emergente Emerging economy Idiosyncratic risk Investment decisions Ownership-control divergence Problemas de agência Risco idiossincrático |
description |
This study investigates the moderating role of the agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders on the investment-risk relationship. When the ownership-control structure is concentrated, the agency theory indicates that the separation between cash-flow rights and voting rights induces the controlling shareholder to extract private benefits. To assess the effect of ownership-control divergence on the investment-risk relation, we use system generalized method of moments estimator (SYS-GMM) in longitudinal data from 412 Brazilian firms between 1997 and 2010. Our results show that investment is less sensitive to idiosyncratic risk for companies in which the largest shareholder presents high levels of ownership-control divergence. The impact of excess voting rights on the investment-risk sensitivity holds after we group firms according to distinct corporate governance and financial characteristics, such as financial constraints, family control, board independence, and the type of control-enhancing mechanism. Board independence does not affect controlling shareholders\' behavior toward risky investments. Among the control-enhancing mechanisms, the issuance of dual class shares is the main driver of the lower investment sensitivity to idiosyncratic risk. Our findings are consistent with entrenchment effects in the sense that dominant shareholders may select riskier projects when investing other people\'s money, which have both managerial and policy implications. |
publishDate |
2018 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2018-02-05 |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis |
format |
doctoralThesis |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/18/18157/tde-16042018-103130/ |
url |
http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/18/18157/tde-16042018-103130/ |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
|
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Liberar o conteúdo para acesso público. info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Liberar o conteúdo para acesso público. |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.coverage.none.fl_str_mv |
|
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USP |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USP |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da USP instname:Universidade de São Paulo (USP) instacron:USP |
instname_str |
Universidade de São Paulo (USP) |
instacron_str |
USP |
institution |
USP |
reponame_str |
Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da USP |
collection |
Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da USP |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da USP - Universidade de São Paulo (USP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
virginia@if.usp.br|| atendimento@aguia.usp.br||virginia@if.usp.br |
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1815257067466784768 |