The Bigger, the Better: Coalitions in the GATT/WTO
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2012 |
Outros Autores: | , |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Brazilian Political Science Review |
Texto Completo: | http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1981-38212012000200002 |
Resumo: | What does it take to make a coalition successful? Bigger coalitions are more likely to be successful because the GATT/WTO is a consensus-based institution and countries are informally penalized if they isolate themselves. Through a Bayesian statistical analysis, the article corroborates the above hypothesis. To further investigate the research question, qualitative case studies of the G-10 in the Uruguay Round and the Public Health Coalition in the Doha Round are conducted. These cases show that the more convincing the framing of a position, the better are the chances of coalitions keeping a large number of followers and supporters, thereby affecting their odds of success. By building a unique database and applying a new research design to the topic, the study rigorously tests theories about coalitions that had previously only been proposed but not empirically analyzed. |
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Brazilian Political Science Review |
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The Bigger, the Better: Coalitions in the GATT/WTOinternational coalitionsbayesian analysismultilateralismeconomic opennessinternational negotiationsWhat does it take to make a coalition successful? Bigger coalitions are more likely to be successful because the GATT/WTO is a consensus-based institution and countries are informally penalized if they isolate themselves. Through a Bayesian statistical analysis, the article corroborates the above hypothesis. To further investigate the research question, qualitative case studies of the G-10 in the Uruguay Round and the Public Health Coalition in the Doha Round are conducted. These cases show that the more convincing the framing of a position, the better are the chances of coalitions keeping a large number of followers and supporters, thereby affecting their odds of success. By building a unique database and applying a new research design to the topic, the study rigorously tests theories about coalitions that had previously only been proposed but not empirically analyzed.Associação Brasileira de Ciência Política2012-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1981-38212012000200002Brazilian Political Science Review v.6 n.2 2012reponame:Brazilian Political Science Reviewinstname:Associação Brasileira de Ciência Política (ABCP)instacron:ABCP10.1590/S1981-38212012000200002info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessCepaluni,GabrielGaldino,ManoelOliveira,Amâncio Jorge deeng2013-08-20T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S1981-38212012000200002Revistahttps://brazilianpoliticalsciencereview.org/https://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.phpbpsr@brazilianpoliticalsciencareview.org||bpsr@bpsr.org.br1981-38211981-3821opendoar:2013-08-20T00:00Brazilian Political Science Review - Associação Brasileira de Ciência Política (ABCP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
The Bigger, the Better: Coalitions in the GATT/WTO |
title |
The Bigger, the Better: Coalitions in the GATT/WTO |
spellingShingle |
The Bigger, the Better: Coalitions in the GATT/WTO Cepaluni,Gabriel international coalitions bayesian analysis multilateralism economic openness international negotiations |
title_short |
The Bigger, the Better: Coalitions in the GATT/WTO |
title_full |
The Bigger, the Better: Coalitions in the GATT/WTO |
title_fullStr |
The Bigger, the Better: Coalitions in the GATT/WTO |
title_full_unstemmed |
The Bigger, the Better: Coalitions in the GATT/WTO |
title_sort |
The Bigger, the Better: Coalitions in the GATT/WTO |
author |
Cepaluni,Gabriel |
author_facet |
Cepaluni,Gabriel Galdino,Manoel Oliveira,Amâncio Jorge de |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Galdino,Manoel Oliveira,Amâncio Jorge de |
author2_role |
author author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Cepaluni,Gabriel Galdino,Manoel Oliveira,Amâncio Jorge de |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
international coalitions bayesian analysis multilateralism economic openness international negotiations |
topic |
international coalitions bayesian analysis multilateralism economic openness international negotiations |
description |
What does it take to make a coalition successful? Bigger coalitions are more likely to be successful because the GATT/WTO is a consensus-based institution and countries are informally penalized if they isolate themselves. Through a Bayesian statistical analysis, the article corroborates the above hypothesis. To further investigate the research question, qualitative case studies of the G-10 in the Uruguay Round and the Public Health Coalition in the Doha Round are conducted. These cases show that the more convincing the framing of a position, the better are the chances of coalitions keeping a large number of followers and supporters, thereby affecting their odds of success. By building a unique database and applying a new research design to the topic, the study rigorously tests theories about coalitions that had previously only been proposed but not empirically analyzed. |
publishDate |
2012 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2012-01-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1981-38212012000200002 |
url |
http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1981-38212012000200002 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
10.1590/S1981-38212012000200002 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
text/html |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Associação Brasileira de Ciência Política |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Associação Brasileira de Ciência Política |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Brazilian Political Science Review v.6 n.2 2012 reponame:Brazilian Political Science Review instname:Associação Brasileira de Ciência Política (ABCP) instacron:ABCP |
instname_str |
Associação Brasileira de Ciência Política (ABCP) |
instacron_str |
ABCP |
institution |
ABCP |
reponame_str |
Brazilian Political Science Review |
collection |
Brazilian Political Science Review |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Brazilian Political Science Review - Associação Brasileira de Ciência Política (ABCP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
bpsr@brazilianpoliticalsciencareview.org||bpsr@bpsr.org.br |
_version_ |
1754302907826569216 |