Ownership concentration, top management and board compensation
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2013 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | RAC. Revista de Administração Contemporânea (Online) |
Texto Completo: | http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1415-65552013000300004 |
Resumo: | The degree of ownership concentration may influence executive and board compensation (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003). This article analyzes this relationship. Detailed information about top management and board compensation became available starting in 2010 through new Securities Commission filings. Linear regression models applied to a sample of 315 Brazilian companies traded on the national exchange indicate a negative and statistically significant economic correlation between executive compensation and the degree of ownership concentration. Ceteris paribus, companies with a lower degree of ownership concentration pay higher compensation to top executives. Family controlled companies pay more to their chief executive, but not to the managerial team as a whole, and the compensation of directors increases with a greater proportion of control group members or their relatives on the board. There was support for the Managerial Power Hypothesis in companies with a lower degree of ownership concentration and for the extraction of private benefits in companies where it is greater. |
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Ownership concentration, top management and board compensationexecutive compensationownership concentrationcorporate governanceagency costsmanagerial power hypothesisThe degree of ownership concentration may influence executive and board compensation (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003). This article analyzes this relationship. Detailed information about top management and board compensation became available starting in 2010 through new Securities Commission filings. Linear regression models applied to a sample of 315 Brazilian companies traded on the national exchange indicate a negative and statistically significant economic correlation between executive compensation and the degree of ownership concentration. Ceteris paribus, companies with a lower degree of ownership concentration pay higher compensation to top executives. Family controlled companies pay more to their chief executive, but not to the managerial team as a whole, and the compensation of directors increases with a greater proportion of control group members or their relatives on the board. There was support for the Managerial Power Hypothesis in companies with a lower degree of ownership concentration and for the extraction of private benefits in companies where it is greater.Associação Nacional de Pós-Graduação e Pesquisa em Administração2013-06-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1415-65552013000300004Revista de Administração Contemporânea v.17 n.3 2013reponame:RAC. Revista de Administração Contemporânea (Online)instname:Associação Nacional de Pós-Graduação e Pesquisa em Administração (ANPAD)instacron:ANPAD10.1590/S1415-65552013000300004info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessPinto,Marcos BarbosaLeal,Ricardo Pereira Câmaraeng2013-05-10T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S1415-65552013000300004Revistahttps://rac.anpad.org.br/index.php/racONGhttps://rac.anpad.org.br/index.php/rac/oairac@anpad.org.br1982-78491415-6555opendoar:2013-05-10T00:00RAC. Revista de Administração Contemporânea (Online) - Associação Nacional de Pós-Graduação e Pesquisa em Administração (ANPAD)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Ownership concentration, top management and board compensation |
title |
Ownership concentration, top management and board compensation |
spellingShingle |
Ownership concentration, top management and board compensation Pinto,Marcos Barbosa executive compensation ownership concentration corporate governance agency costs managerial power hypothesis |
title_short |
Ownership concentration, top management and board compensation |
title_full |
Ownership concentration, top management and board compensation |
title_fullStr |
Ownership concentration, top management and board compensation |
title_full_unstemmed |
Ownership concentration, top management and board compensation |
title_sort |
Ownership concentration, top management and board compensation |
author |
Pinto,Marcos Barbosa |
author_facet |
Pinto,Marcos Barbosa Leal,Ricardo Pereira Câmara |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Leal,Ricardo Pereira Câmara |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Pinto,Marcos Barbosa Leal,Ricardo Pereira Câmara |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
executive compensation ownership concentration corporate governance agency costs managerial power hypothesis |
topic |
executive compensation ownership concentration corporate governance agency costs managerial power hypothesis |
description |
The degree of ownership concentration may influence executive and board compensation (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003). This article analyzes this relationship. Detailed information about top management and board compensation became available starting in 2010 through new Securities Commission filings. Linear regression models applied to a sample of 315 Brazilian companies traded on the national exchange indicate a negative and statistically significant economic correlation between executive compensation and the degree of ownership concentration. Ceteris paribus, companies with a lower degree of ownership concentration pay higher compensation to top executives. Family controlled companies pay more to their chief executive, but not to the managerial team as a whole, and the compensation of directors increases with a greater proportion of control group members or their relatives on the board. There was support for the Managerial Power Hypothesis in companies with a lower degree of ownership concentration and for the extraction of private benefits in companies where it is greater. |
publishDate |
2013 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2013-06-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1415-65552013000300004 |
url |
http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1415-65552013000300004 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
10.1590/S1415-65552013000300004 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
text/html |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Associação Nacional de Pós-Graduação e Pesquisa em Administração |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Associação Nacional de Pós-Graduação e Pesquisa em Administração |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Revista de Administração Contemporânea v.17 n.3 2013 reponame:RAC. Revista de Administração Contemporânea (Online) instname:Associação Nacional de Pós-Graduação e Pesquisa em Administração (ANPAD) instacron:ANPAD |
instname_str |
Associação Nacional de Pós-Graduação e Pesquisa em Administração (ANPAD) |
instacron_str |
ANPAD |
institution |
ANPAD |
reponame_str |
RAC. Revista de Administração Contemporânea (Online) |
collection |
RAC. Revista de Administração Contemporânea (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
RAC. Revista de Administração Contemporânea (Online) - Associação Nacional de Pós-Graduação e Pesquisa em Administração (ANPAD) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
rac@anpad.org.br |
_version_ |
1754209052490989568 |