Ownership concentration, top management and board compensation

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Pinto,Marcos Barbosa
Data de Publicação: 2013
Outros Autores: Leal,Ricardo Pereira Câmara
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: RAC. Revista de Administração Contemporânea (Online)
Texto Completo: http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1415-65552013000300004
Resumo: The degree of ownership concentration may influence executive and board compensation (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003). This article analyzes this relationship. Detailed information about top management and board compensation became available starting in 2010 through new Securities Commission filings. Linear regression models applied to a sample of 315 Brazilian companies traded on the national exchange indicate a negative and statistically significant economic correlation between executive compensation and the degree of ownership concentration. Ceteris paribus, companies with a lower degree of ownership concentration pay higher compensation to top executives. Family controlled companies pay more to their chief executive, but not to the managerial team as a whole, and the compensation of directors increases with a greater proportion of control group members or their relatives on the board. There was support for the Managerial Power Hypothesis in companies with a lower degree of ownership concentration and for the extraction of private benefits in companies where it is greater.
id ANPPGA-1_77145284231c12b650fe3451760a6d35
oai_identifier_str oai:scielo:S1415-65552013000300004
network_acronym_str ANPPGA-1
network_name_str RAC. Revista de Administração Contemporânea (Online)
repository_id_str
spelling Ownership concentration, top management and board compensationexecutive compensationownership concentrationcorporate governanceagency costsmanagerial power hypothesisThe degree of ownership concentration may influence executive and board compensation (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003). This article analyzes this relationship. Detailed information about top management and board compensation became available starting in 2010 through new Securities Commission filings. Linear regression models applied to a sample of 315 Brazilian companies traded on the national exchange indicate a negative and statistically significant economic correlation between executive compensation and the degree of ownership concentration. Ceteris paribus, companies with a lower degree of ownership concentration pay higher compensation to top executives. Family controlled companies pay more to their chief executive, but not to the managerial team as a whole, and the compensation of directors increases with a greater proportion of control group members or their relatives on the board. There was support for the Managerial Power Hypothesis in companies with a lower degree of ownership concentration and for the extraction of private benefits in companies where it is greater.Associação Nacional de Pós-Graduação e Pesquisa em Administração2013-06-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1415-65552013000300004Revista de Administração Contemporânea v.17 n.3 2013reponame:RAC. Revista de Administração Contemporânea (Online)instname:Associação Nacional de Pós-Graduação e Pesquisa em Administração (ANPAD)instacron:ANPAD10.1590/S1415-65552013000300004info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessPinto,Marcos BarbosaLeal,Ricardo Pereira Câmaraeng2013-05-10T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S1415-65552013000300004Revistahttps://rac.anpad.org.br/index.php/racONGhttps://rac.anpad.org.br/index.php/rac/oairac@anpad.org.br1982-78491415-6555opendoar:2013-05-10T00:00RAC. Revista de Administração Contemporânea (Online) - Associação Nacional de Pós-Graduação e Pesquisa em Administração (ANPAD)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Ownership concentration, top management and board compensation
title Ownership concentration, top management and board compensation
spellingShingle Ownership concentration, top management and board compensation
Pinto,Marcos Barbosa
executive compensation
ownership concentration
corporate governance
agency costs
managerial power hypothesis
title_short Ownership concentration, top management and board compensation
title_full Ownership concentration, top management and board compensation
title_fullStr Ownership concentration, top management and board compensation
title_full_unstemmed Ownership concentration, top management and board compensation
title_sort Ownership concentration, top management and board compensation
author Pinto,Marcos Barbosa
author_facet Pinto,Marcos Barbosa
Leal,Ricardo Pereira Câmara
author_role author
author2 Leal,Ricardo Pereira Câmara
author2_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Pinto,Marcos Barbosa
Leal,Ricardo Pereira Câmara
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv executive compensation
ownership concentration
corporate governance
agency costs
managerial power hypothesis
topic executive compensation
ownership concentration
corporate governance
agency costs
managerial power hypothesis
description The degree of ownership concentration may influence executive and board compensation (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003). This article analyzes this relationship. Detailed information about top management and board compensation became available starting in 2010 through new Securities Commission filings. Linear regression models applied to a sample of 315 Brazilian companies traded on the national exchange indicate a negative and statistically significant economic correlation between executive compensation and the degree of ownership concentration. Ceteris paribus, companies with a lower degree of ownership concentration pay higher compensation to top executives. Family controlled companies pay more to their chief executive, but not to the managerial team as a whole, and the compensation of directors increases with a greater proportion of control group members or their relatives on the board. There was support for the Managerial Power Hypothesis in companies with a lower degree of ownership concentration and for the extraction of private benefits in companies where it is greater.
publishDate 2013
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2013-06-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1415-65552013000300004
url http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1415-65552013000300004
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv 10.1590/S1415-65552013000300004
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv text/html
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Associação Nacional de Pós-Graduação e Pesquisa em Administração
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Associação Nacional de Pós-Graduação e Pesquisa em Administração
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Revista de Administração Contemporânea v.17 n.3 2013
reponame:RAC. Revista de Administração Contemporânea (Online)
instname:Associação Nacional de Pós-Graduação e Pesquisa em Administração (ANPAD)
instacron:ANPAD
instname_str Associação Nacional de Pós-Graduação e Pesquisa em Administração (ANPAD)
instacron_str ANPAD
institution ANPAD
reponame_str RAC. Revista de Administração Contemporânea (Online)
collection RAC. Revista de Administração Contemporânea (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv RAC. Revista de Administração Contemporânea (Online) - Associação Nacional de Pós-Graduação e Pesquisa em Administração (ANPAD)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv rac@anpad.org.br
_version_ 1754209052490989568

Registros relacionados