The Ethical Justification of the Thesis that Separates Law from Morality Through John Austin

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Rabelo, Galvão
Data de Publicação: 2015
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Revista Brasileira de Filosofia do Direito
Texto Completo: https://www.indexlaw.org/index.php/filosofiadireito/article/view/819
Resumo: The british legal philosopher John Austin stands at the threshold of the evolution of the legal positivist tradition. His work, which dates back to the first half of the 19th century, was especially important to establish the basic elements of this school of legal understanding. Among his contributions to the legal positivist doctrine, lies the creation of the thesis that separates morality from law. Under an ethical context, however, John Austin was an ardent utilitarian who defended the use of the principle of utility as the only rational criteria for the unveiling of superior moral standards (divine laws). Considering both dimensions of his understanding, it has long been wondered if his utilitarian ethics have influenced, somehow, his legal theory, especially in regards to the separation thesis. Said thesis, which is in the center of the legal positivist tradition, has been interpreted in different ways in contemporary legal debate. A particular branch, called ethical positivism, opened new perspectives to the study of this tradition, defending the legal positivism theory as a morally satisfactory theoretical model for the contemporary legal systems. Hence, using the main premise of ethical positivism (which states that there are moral reasons to defend the separation thesis) as an interprative and methodological tool, this paper plans on revisiting the link between John Austins legal and ethical convictions, in order to comprehend what were the moral reasons which led him to defend the separation of what law is and what it should be.
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spelling The Ethical Justification of the Thesis that Separates Law from Morality Through John AustinA Justificação Ética da Tese da Separação entre o Direito e a Moral em John AustinLegal positivism; John Austin; Separation thesis; Utilitarianism; Ethical positivismPositivismo jurídico; John Austin; Tese da separação; Utilitarismo; Positivismo éticoThe british legal philosopher John Austin stands at the threshold of the evolution of the legal positivist tradition. His work, which dates back to the first half of the 19th century, was especially important to establish the basic elements of this school of legal understanding. Among his contributions to the legal positivist doctrine, lies the creation of the thesis that separates morality from law. Under an ethical context, however, John Austin was an ardent utilitarian who defended the use of the principle of utility as the only rational criteria for the unveiling of superior moral standards (divine laws). Considering both dimensions of his understanding, it has long been wondered if his utilitarian ethics have influenced, somehow, his legal theory, especially in regards to the separation thesis. Said thesis, which is in the center of the legal positivist tradition, has been interpreted in different ways in contemporary legal debate. A particular branch, called ethical positivism, opened new perspectives to the study of this tradition, defending the legal positivism theory as a morally satisfactory theoretical model for the contemporary legal systems. Hence, using the main premise of ethical positivism (which states that there are moral reasons to defend the separation thesis) as an interprative and methodological tool, this paper plans on revisiting the link between John Austins legal and ethical convictions, in order to comprehend what were the moral reasons which led him to defend the separation of what law is and what it should be.O jurista britânico John Austin está inserido no limiar do desenvolvimento da tradição juspositivista. Sua obra, que data da primeira metade do século XIX, foi especialmente importante para a fixação dos elementos básicos dessa vertente do pensamento jurídico. Entre suas contribuições para a doutrina juspositivista está a sua formulação da tese da separação entre o direito e a moral. No âmbito ético, por seu turno, John Austin foi um fervoroso utilitarista e defendeu a utilização do princípio da utilidade como o único critério racional para o desvelamento das normas morais superiores (as leis divinas). Considerando essas duas dimensões do seu pensamento, há muito se questiona se a sua ética utilitarista teria influenciado, de algum modo, a sua teoria jurídica, especialmente no que tange à tese da separação. Esta última, que está no centro da tradição juspositivista, tem sido interpretada de diferentes modos no debate jurídico contemporâneo. Uma vertente em especial, o chamado positivismo ético, abriu novas perspectivas para o estudo dessa tradição, ao defender a teoria juspositivista como um modelo teórico moralmente satisfatório para os sistemas jurídicos contemporâneos. Desse modo, utilizando a premissa central do positivismo ético (de que existem razões morais para a defesa da tese da separação) como instrumento metodológico- interpretativo, pretende-se retomar a questão da relação entre as convicções éticas e jurídicas de John Austin, a fim de compreender quais foram as razões morais que o levaram a defender a separação entre o que é o direito e aquilo que ele deveria ser.Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa e Pos-Graduacao em Direito - CONPEDIRabelo, Galvão2015-12-06info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionArtigo Avaliado pelos Paresapplication/pdfhttps://www.indexlaw.org/index.php/filosofiadireito/article/view/81910.26668/IndexLawJournals/2526-012X/2015.v1i1.819Revista Brasileira de Filosofia do Direito; v. 1, n. 1 (2015): JANEIRO-DEZEMRBO2526-012X2526-012Xreponame:Revista Brasileira de Filosofia do Direitoinstname:Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa e Pós-graduação em Direito (CONPEDI)instacron:CONPEDIporhttps://www.indexlaw.org/index.php/filosofiadireito/article/view/819/814Direitos autorais 2016 Galvão Rabelohttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2018-02-18T03:18:58Zoai:ojs.indexlaw.org:article/819Revistahttps://www.indexlaw.org/index.php/filosofiadireitoONGhttps://www.indexlaw.org/index.php/filosofiadireito/oaipublicacao@conpedi.org.br2526-012X2526-012Xopendoar:2018-02-18T03:18:58Revista Brasileira de Filosofia do Direito - Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa e Pós-graduação em Direito (CONPEDI)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The Ethical Justification of the Thesis that Separates Law from Morality Through John Austin
A Justificação Ética da Tese da Separação entre o Direito e a Moral em John Austin
title The Ethical Justification of the Thesis that Separates Law from Morality Through John Austin
spellingShingle The Ethical Justification of the Thesis that Separates Law from Morality Through John Austin
Rabelo, Galvão
Legal positivism; John Austin; Separation thesis; Utilitarianism; Ethical positivism
Positivismo jurídico; John Austin; Tese da separação; Utilitarismo; Positivismo ético
title_short The Ethical Justification of the Thesis that Separates Law from Morality Through John Austin
title_full The Ethical Justification of the Thesis that Separates Law from Morality Through John Austin
title_fullStr The Ethical Justification of the Thesis that Separates Law from Morality Through John Austin
title_full_unstemmed The Ethical Justification of the Thesis that Separates Law from Morality Through John Austin
title_sort The Ethical Justification of the Thesis that Separates Law from Morality Through John Austin
author Rabelo, Galvão
author_facet Rabelo, Galvão
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv

dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Rabelo, Galvão
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Legal positivism; John Austin; Separation thesis; Utilitarianism; Ethical positivism
Positivismo jurídico; John Austin; Tese da separação; Utilitarismo; Positivismo ético
topic Legal positivism; John Austin; Separation thesis; Utilitarianism; Ethical positivism
Positivismo jurídico; John Austin; Tese da separação; Utilitarismo; Positivismo ético
description The british legal philosopher John Austin stands at the threshold of the evolution of the legal positivist tradition. His work, which dates back to the first half of the 19th century, was especially important to establish the basic elements of this school of legal understanding. Among his contributions to the legal positivist doctrine, lies the creation of the thesis that separates morality from law. Under an ethical context, however, John Austin was an ardent utilitarian who defended the use of the principle of utility as the only rational criteria for the unveiling of superior moral standards (divine laws). Considering both dimensions of his understanding, it has long been wondered if his utilitarian ethics have influenced, somehow, his legal theory, especially in regards to the separation thesis. Said thesis, which is in the center of the legal positivist tradition, has been interpreted in different ways in contemporary legal debate. A particular branch, called ethical positivism, opened new perspectives to the study of this tradition, defending the legal positivism theory as a morally satisfactory theoretical model for the contemporary legal systems. Hence, using the main premise of ethical positivism (which states that there are moral reasons to defend the separation thesis) as an interprative and methodological tool, this paper plans on revisiting the link between John Austins legal and ethical convictions, in order to comprehend what were the moral reasons which led him to defend the separation of what law is and what it should be.
publishDate 2015
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2015-12-06
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Artigo Avaliado pelos Pares
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://www.indexlaw.org/index.php/filosofiadireito/article/view/819
10.26668/IndexLawJournals/2526-012X/2015.v1i1.819
url https://www.indexlaw.org/index.php/filosofiadireito/article/view/819
identifier_str_mv 10.26668/IndexLawJournals/2526-012X/2015.v1i1.819
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://www.indexlaw.org/index.php/filosofiadireito/article/view/819/814
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Direitos autorais 2016 Galvão Rabelo
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Direitos autorais 2016 Galvão Rabelo
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa e Pos-Graduacao em Direito - CONPEDI
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa e Pos-Graduacao em Direito - CONPEDI
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Revista Brasileira de Filosofia do Direito; v. 1, n. 1 (2015): JANEIRO-DEZEMRBO
2526-012X
2526-012X
reponame:Revista Brasileira de Filosofia do Direito
instname:Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa e Pós-graduação em Direito (CONPEDI)
instacron:CONPEDI
instname_str Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa e Pós-graduação em Direito (CONPEDI)
instacron_str CONPEDI
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reponame_str Revista Brasileira de Filosofia do Direito
collection Revista Brasileira de Filosofia do Direito
repository.name.fl_str_mv Revista Brasileira de Filosofia do Direito - Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa e Pós-graduação em Direito (CONPEDI)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv publicacao@conpedi.org.br
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