The Ethical Justification of the Thesis that Separates Law from Morality Through John Austin
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2015 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Revista Brasileira de Filosofia do Direito |
Texto Completo: | https://www.indexlaw.org/index.php/filosofiadireito/article/view/819 |
Resumo: | The british legal philosopher John Austin stands at the threshold of the evolution of the legal positivist tradition. His work, which dates back to the first half of the 19th century, was especially important to establish the basic elements of this school of legal understanding. Among his contributions to the legal positivist doctrine, lies the creation of the thesis that separates morality from law. Under an ethical context, however, John Austin was an ardent utilitarian who defended the use of the principle of utility as the only rational criteria for the unveiling of superior moral standards (divine laws). Considering both dimensions of his understanding, it has long been wondered if his utilitarian ethics have influenced, somehow, his legal theory, especially in regards to the separation thesis. Said thesis, which is in the center of the legal positivist tradition, has been interpreted in different ways in contemporary legal debate. A particular branch, called ethical positivism, opened new perspectives to the study of this tradition, defending the legal positivism theory as a morally satisfactory theoretical model for the contemporary legal systems. Hence, using the main premise of ethical positivism (which states that there are moral reasons to defend the separation thesis) as an interprative and methodological tool, this paper plans on revisiting the link between John Austins legal and ethical convictions, in order to comprehend what were the moral reasons which led him to defend the separation of what law is and what it should be. |
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The Ethical Justification of the Thesis that Separates Law from Morality Through John AustinA Justificação Ética da Tese da Separação entre o Direito e a Moral em John AustinLegal positivism; John Austin; Separation thesis; Utilitarianism; Ethical positivismPositivismo jurídico; John Austin; Tese da separação; Utilitarismo; Positivismo éticoThe british legal philosopher John Austin stands at the threshold of the evolution of the legal positivist tradition. His work, which dates back to the first half of the 19th century, was especially important to establish the basic elements of this school of legal understanding. Among his contributions to the legal positivist doctrine, lies the creation of the thesis that separates morality from law. Under an ethical context, however, John Austin was an ardent utilitarian who defended the use of the principle of utility as the only rational criteria for the unveiling of superior moral standards (divine laws). Considering both dimensions of his understanding, it has long been wondered if his utilitarian ethics have influenced, somehow, his legal theory, especially in regards to the separation thesis. Said thesis, which is in the center of the legal positivist tradition, has been interpreted in different ways in contemporary legal debate. A particular branch, called ethical positivism, opened new perspectives to the study of this tradition, defending the legal positivism theory as a morally satisfactory theoretical model for the contemporary legal systems. Hence, using the main premise of ethical positivism (which states that there are moral reasons to defend the separation thesis) as an interprative and methodological tool, this paper plans on revisiting the link between John Austins legal and ethical convictions, in order to comprehend what were the moral reasons which led him to defend the separation of what law is and what it should be.O jurista britânico John Austin está inserido no limiar do desenvolvimento da tradição juspositivista. Sua obra, que data da primeira metade do século XIX, foi especialmente importante para a fixação dos elementos básicos dessa vertente do pensamento jurídico. Entre suas contribuições para a doutrina juspositivista está a sua formulação da tese da separação entre o direito e a moral. No âmbito ético, por seu turno, John Austin foi um fervoroso utilitarista e defendeu a utilização do princípio da utilidade como o único critério racional para o desvelamento das normas morais superiores (as leis divinas). Considerando essas duas dimensões do seu pensamento, há muito se questiona se a sua ética utilitarista teria influenciado, de algum modo, a sua teoria jurídica, especialmente no que tange à tese da separação. Esta última, que está no centro da tradição juspositivista, tem sido interpretada de diferentes modos no debate jurídico contemporâneo. Uma vertente em especial, o chamado positivismo ético, abriu novas perspectivas para o estudo dessa tradição, ao defender a teoria juspositivista como um modelo teórico moralmente satisfatório para os sistemas jurídicos contemporâneos. Desse modo, utilizando a premissa central do positivismo ético (de que existem razões morais para a defesa da tese da separação) como instrumento metodológico- interpretativo, pretende-se retomar a questão da relação entre as convicções éticas e jurídicas de John Austin, a fim de compreender quais foram as razões morais que o levaram a defender a separação entre o que é o direito e aquilo que ele deveria ser.Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa e Pos-Graduacao em Direito - CONPEDIRabelo, Galvão2015-12-06info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionArtigo Avaliado pelos Paresapplication/pdfhttps://www.indexlaw.org/index.php/filosofiadireito/article/view/81910.26668/IndexLawJournals/2526-012X/2015.v1i1.819Revista Brasileira de Filosofia do Direito; v. 1, n. 1 (2015): JANEIRO-DEZEMRBO2526-012X2526-012Xreponame:Revista Brasileira de Filosofia do Direitoinstname:Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa e Pós-graduação em Direito (CONPEDI)instacron:CONPEDIporhttps://www.indexlaw.org/index.php/filosofiadireito/article/view/819/814Direitos autorais 2016 Galvão Rabelohttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2018-02-18T03:18:58Zoai:ojs.indexlaw.org:article/819Revistahttps://www.indexlaw.org/index.php/filosofiadireitoONGhttps://www.indexlaw.org/index.php/filosofiadireito/oaipublicacao@conpedi.org.br2526-012X2526-012Xopendoar:2018-02-18T03:18:58Revista Brasileira de Filosofia do Direito - Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa e Pós-graduação em Direito (CONPEDI)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
The Ethical Justification of the Thesis that Separates Law from Morality Through John Austin A Justificação Ética da Tese da Separação entre o Direito e a Moral em John Austin |
title |
The Ethical Justification of the Thesis that Separates Law from Morality Through John Austin |
spellingShingle |
The Ethical Justification of the Thesis that Separates Law from Morality Through John Austin Rabelo, Galvão Legal positivism; John Austin; Separation thesis; Utilitarianism; Ethical positivism Positivismo jurídico; John Austin; Tese da separação; Utilitarismo; Positivismo ético |
title_short |
The Ethical Justification of the Thesis that Separates Law from Morality Through John Austin |
title_full |
The Ethical Justification of the Thesis that Separates Law from Morality Through John Austin |
title_fullStr |
The Ethical Justification of the Thesis that Separates Law from Morality Through John Austin |
title_full_unstemmed |
The Ethical Justification of the Thesis that Separates Law from Morality Through John Austin |
title_sort |
The Ethical Justification of the Thesis that Separates Law from Morality Through John Austin |
author |
Rabelo, Galvão |
author_facet |
Rabelo, Galvão |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
|
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Rabelo, Galvão |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Legal positivism; John Austin; Separation thesis; Utilitarianism; Ethical positivism Positivismo jurídico; John Austin; Tese da separação; Utilitarismo; Positivismo ético |
topic |
Legal positivism; John Austin; Separation thesis; Utilitarianism; Ethical positivism Positivismo jurídico; John Austin; Tese da separação; Utilitarismo; Positivismo ético |
description |
The british legal philosopher John Austin stands at the threshold of the evolution of the legal positivist tradition. His work, which dates back to the first half of the 19th century, was especially important to establish the basic elements of this school of legal understanding. Among his contributions to the legal positivist doctrine, lies the creation of the thesis that separates morality from law. Under an ethical context, however, John Austin was an ardent utilitarian who defended the use of the principle of utility as the only rational criteria for the unveiling of superior moral standards (divine laws). Considering both dimensions of his understanding, it has long been wondered if his utilitarian ethics have influenced, somehow, his legal theory, especially in regards to the separation thesis. Said thesis, which is in the center of the legal positivist tradition, has been interpreted in different ways in contemporary legal debate. A particular branch, called ethical positivism, opened new perspectives to the study of this tradition, defending the legal positivism theory as a morally satisfactory theoretical model for the contemporary legal systems. Hence, using the main premise of ethical positivism (which states that there are moral reasons to defend the separation thesis) as an interprative and methodological tool, this paper plans on revisiting the link between John Austins legal and ethical convictions, in order to comprehend what were the moral reasons which led him to defend the separation of what law is and what it should be. |
publishDate |
2015 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2015-12-06 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Artigo Avaliado pelos Pares |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://www.indexlaw.org/index.php/filosofiadireito/article/view/819 10.26668/IndexLawJournals/2526-012X/2015.v1i1.819 |
url |
https://www.indexlaw.org/index.php/filosofiadireito/article/view/819 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.26668/IndexLawJournals/2526-012X/2015.v1i1.819 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://www.indexlaw.org/index.php/filosofiadireito/article/view/819/814 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Direitos autorais 2016 Galvão Rabelo http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Direitos autorais 2016 Galvão Rabelo http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa e Pos-Graduacao em Direito - CONPEDI |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa e Pos-Graduacao em Direito - CONPEDI |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Revista Brasileira de Filosofia do Direito; v. 1, n. 1 (2015): JANEIRO-DEZEMRBO 2526-012X 2526-012X reponame:Revista Brasileira de Filosofia do Direito instname:Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa e Pós-graduação em Direito (CONPEDI) instacron:CONPEDI |
instname_str |
Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa e Pós-graduação em Direito (CONPEDI) |
instacron_str |
CONPEDI |
institution |
CONPEDI |
reponame_str |
Revista Brasileira de Filosofia do Direito |
collection |
Revista Brasileira de Filosofia do Direito |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Revista Brasileira de Filosofia do Direito - Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa e Pós-graduação em Direito (CONPEDI) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
publicacao@conpedi.org.br |
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1798315077633310720 |