The Brazilian National Councils of Justice and Public Ministry as Instruments of Accountability

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Kerche, Fábio
Data de Publicação: 2020
Outros Autores: Oliveira, Vanessa Elias de, Couto, Cláudio Gonçalves
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
eng
Título da fonte: Revista de Administração Pública
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.fgv.br/rap/article/view/82214
Resumo: Councils acting in the Justice System in democracies have different purposes: to strengthen the independence of the judiciary and the public prosecutor’s office, to increase accountability of judges and prosecutors, or/and to improve justice management. This article analyzes the Brazilian National Council of Justice (CNJ) and the National Council of the Brazilian Public Prosecutor’s Office (CNMP), particularly regarding their purpose as instruments of accountability. The study shows that these bodies were created as instruments to increase transparency and compel judges and prosecutors to be held accountable for their actions and choices. The hypothesis tested in this research is that the two councils did not meet this expectation. The CNJ and CNMP were analyzed for their institutional design, discussing how the composition and distribution of positions at the council encourage independence of the judges and prosecutors rather than accountability. In addition, the article offers data on the councils’ decisions when accusations were presented. Finally, the analysis revealed that CNJ and CNMP are mainly composed of internal members of the Judiciary and the Public Prosecutor’s Office, and identified a lack of expressive punishment applied to judges and prosecutors. Therefore, the hypothesis that the councils do not work as instruments of accountability was confirmed.
id FGV-4_2ad1641ad5dab7c1ee214b8d143eb404
oai_identifier_str oai:ojs.periodicos.fgv.br:article/82214
network_acronym_str FGV-4
network_name_str Revista de Administração Pública
repository_id_str
spelling The Brazilian National Councils of Justice and Public Ministry as Instruments of AccountabilityLos Consejos Nacionales de Justicia y el Ministerio Público en Brasil: ¿instrumentos de accountability?Os Conselhos Nacionais de Justiça e do Ministério Público no Brasil: instrumentos de accountability?judiciarypublic prosecutor’s officeaccountability.Poder JudicialMinisterio Públicoaccountability.judiciárioMinistério Públicoaccountability.Councils acting in the Justice System in democracies have different purposes: to strengthen the independence of the judiciary and the public prosecutor’s office, to increase accountability of judges and prosecutors, or/and to improve justice management. This article analyzes the Brazilian National Council of Justice (CNJ) and the National Council of the Brazilian Public Prosecutor’s Office (CNMP), particularly regarding their purpose as instruments of accountability. The study shows that these bodies were created as instruments to increase transparency and compel judges and prosecutors to be held accountable for their actions and choices. The hypothesis tested in this research is that the two councils did not meet this expectation. The CNJ and CNMP were analyzed for their institutional design, discussing how the composition and distribution of positions at the council encourage independence of the judges and prosecutors rather than accountability. In addition, the article offers data on the councils’ decisions when accusations were presented. Finally, the analysis revealed that CNJ and CNMP are mainly composed of internal members of the Judiciary and the Public Prosecutor’s Office, and identified a lack of expressive punishment applied to judges and prosecutors. Therefore, the hypothesis that the councils do not work as instruments of accountability was confirmed.En las democracias, los consejos, órganos colegiados que operan en el sistema de justicia, tienen diferentes finalidades: fortalecer la independencia del Poder Judicial y del Ministerio Público (MP), incrementar la accountability con relación a jueces y fiscales, y/o mejorar la gestión de la justicia. Este artículo analiza el Consejo Nacional de Justicia (CNJ) y el Consejo Nacional del Ministerio Público (CNMP), considerando principalmente los primeros dos aspectos. Al momento de crear esos órganos, se creía que ambos serían instrumentos para aumentar la transparencia y permitir que jueces y fiscales pudieran responder de sus acciones y opciones. Nuestra hipótesis es que esa expectativa no se ha cumplido. Para probarla, analizaremos el diseño institucional del CNMP y del CNJ, señalando cómo la composición y distribución de cargos fomentan más la independencia que la accountability y también presentaremos datos relacionados con el comportamiento de los consejos ante denuncias disciplinarias. Nuestra conclusión es que, debido al hecho de que el CNJ y el CNMP están compuestos mayoritariamente por miembros internos del Poder Judicial y del MP y al desempeño insignificante con relación al castigo de jueces y fiscales, los órganos refuerzan aún más la significativa independencia de estas instituciones en Brasil.Em democracias, conselhos, órgãos colegiados atuantes no Sistema de Justiça possuem diferentes finalidades: reforçar a independência do Poder Judiciário e do Ministério Público (MP), incrementar a accountability em relação a juízes e promotores e/ou aprimorar a gestão da Justiça. Este artigo analisa o Conselho Nacional de Justiça (CNJ) e o Conselho Nacional do Ministério Público (CNMP), considerando principalmente os dois primeiros aspectos. No momento da criação desses órgãos, acreditava-se que ambos seriam instrumentos para aumentar a transparência e possibilitar que juízes e promotores pudessem responder por suas ações e escolhas. Nossa hipótese é que essa expectativa não se realizou. Para testá-la, analisaremos o desenho institucional do CNMP e do CNJ, apontando como a composição e a distribuição de cargos incentivam mais a independência que a accountability e apresentaremos também dados relativos ao comportamento dos Conselhos frente às denúncias disciplinares. A conclusão é que, em virtude da composição majoritária do CNJ e do CNMP por integrantes internos do Judiciário e do MP e da atuação pouco expressiva em relação à punição de juízes e promotores, os órgãos reforçam ainda mais a expressiva independência dessas instituições no Brasil.Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV EBAPE)2020-09-24info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.fgv.br/rap/article/view/82214Brazilian Journal of Public Administration; Vol. 54 No. 5 (2020); 1334-1360Revista de Administração Pública; Vol. 54 Núm. 5 (2020); 1334-1360Revista de Administração Pública; v. 54 n. 5 (2020); 1334-13601982-31340034-7612reponame:Revista de Administração Públicainstname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGVporenghttps://periodicos.fgv.br/rap/article/view/82214/78304https://periodicos.fgv.br/rap/article/view/82214/pdf_395Copyright (c) 2020 Revista de Administração Públicainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessKerche, FábioOliveira, Vanessa Elias deCouto, Cláudio Gonçalves2020-10-28T19:07:30Zoai:ojs.periodicos.fgv.br:article/82214Revistahttps://ebape.fgv.br/publicacoes/rapONGhttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.php||rap@fgv.br1982-31340034-7612opendoar:2020-10-28T19:07:30Revista de Administração Pública - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The Brazilian National Councils of Justice and Public Ministry as Instruments of Accountability
Los Consejos Nacionales de Justicia y el Ministerio Público en Brasil: ¿instrumentos de accountability?
Os Conselhos Nacionais de Justiça e do Ministério Público no Brasil: instrumentos de accountability?
title The Brazilian National Councils of Justice and Public Ministry as Instruments of Accountability
spellingShingle The Brazilian National Councils of Justice and Public Ministry as Instruments of Accountability
Kerche, Fábio
judiciary
public prosecutor’s office
accountability.
Poder Judicial
Ministerio Público
accountability.
judiciário
Ministério Público
accountability.
title_short The Brazilian National Councils of Justice and Public Ministry as Instruments of Accountability
title_full The Brazilian National Councils of Justice and Public Ministry as Instruments of Accountability
title_fullStr The Brazilian National Councils of Justice and Public Ministry as Instruments of Accountability
title_full_unstemmed The Brazilian National Councils of Justice and Public Ministry as Instruments of Accountability
title_sort The Brazilian National Councils of Justice and Public Ministry as Instruments of Accountability
author Kerche, Fábio
author_facet Kerche, Fábio
Oliveira, Vanessa Elias de
Couto, Cláudio Gonçalves
author_role author
author2 Oliveira, Vanessa Elias de
Couto, Cláudio Gonçalves
author2_role author
author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Kerche, Fábio
Oliveira, Vanessa Elias de
Couto, Cláudio Gonçalves
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv judiciary
public prosecutor’s office
accountability.
Poder Judicial
Ministerio Público
accountability.
judiciário
Ministério Público
accountability.
topic judiciary
public prosecutor’s office
accountability.
Poder Judicial
Ministerio Público
accountability.
judiciário
Ministério Público
accountability.
description Councils acting in the Justice System in democracies have different purposes: to strengthen the independence of the judiciary and the public prosecutor’s office, to increase accountability of judges and prosecutors, or/and to improve justice management. This article analyzes the Brazilian National Council of Justice (CNJ) and the National Council of the Brazilian Public Prosecutor’s Office (CNMP), particularly regarding their purpose as instruments of accountability. The study shows that these bodies were created as instruments to increase transparency and compel judges and prosecutors to be held accountable for their actions and choices. The hypothesis tested in this research is that the two councils did not meet this expectation. The CNJ and CNMP were analyzed for their institutional design, discussing how the composition and distribution of positions at the council encourage independence of the judges and prosecutors rather than accountability. In addition, the article offers data on the councils’ decisions when accusations were presented. Finally, the analysis revealed that CNJ and CNMP are mainly composed of internal members of the Judiciary and the Public Prosecutor’s Office, and identified a lack of expressive punishment applied to judges and prosecutors. Therefore, the hypothesis that the councils do not work as instruments of accountability was confirmed.
publishDate 2020
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2020-09-24
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.fgv.br/rap/article/view/82214
url https://periodicos.fgv.br/rap/article/view/82214
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
eng
language por
eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.fgv.br/rap/article/view/82214/78304
https://periodicos.fgv.br/rap/article/view/82214/pdf_395
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2020 Revista de Administração Pública
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2020 Revista de Administração Pública
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV EBAPE)
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV EBAPE)
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Brazilian Journal of Public Administration; Vol. 54 No. 5 (2020); 1334-1360
Revista de Administração Pública; Vol. 54 Núm. 5 (2020); 1334-1360
Revista de Administração Pública; v. 54 n. 5 (2020); 1334-1360
1982-3134
0034-7612
reponame:Revista de Administração Pública
instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
instacron:FGV
instname_str Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
instacron_str FGV
institution FGV
reponame_str Revista de Administração Pública
collection Revista de Administração Pública
repository.name.fl_str_mv Revista de Administração Pública - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv ||rap@fgv.br
_version_ 1798943774185881600

Registros relacionados