A selling mechanism

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Pérez-Castrillo,David
Data de Publicação: 2003
Outros Autores: Sotomayor,Marilda
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Revista Brasileira de Economia (Online)
Texto Completo: http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-71402003000400012
Resumo: For the assignment game, we propose the following selling mechanism: sellers, simultaneously, fix their prices first; then buyers, sequentially, decide which object to buy, if any. The first phase of the game determines the potential prices, while the second phase determines the actual matching. We prove that the set of subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies in the strong sense of the mechanism coincides with the set of sellers' optimal stable outcomes when buyers use maximal strategies.
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spelling A selling mechanismmatching modelassignment modelmechanismimplementationFor the assignment game, we propose the following selling mechanism: sellers, simultaneously, fix their prices first; then buyers, sequentially, decide which object to buy, if any. The first phase of the game determines the potential prices, while the second phase determines the actual matching. We prove that the set of subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies in the strong sense of the mechanism coincides with the set of sellers' optimal stable outcomes when buyers use maximal strategies.Fundação Getúlio Vargas2003-12-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-71402003000400012Revista Brasileira de Economia v.57 n.4 2003reponame:Revista Brasileira de Economia (Online)instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGV10.1590/S0034-71402003000400012info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessPérez-Castrillo,DavidSotomayor,Marildaeng2004-06-14T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S0034-71402003000400012Revistahttp://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/ojs/index.php/rbe/issue/archivehttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.php||rbe@fgv.br1806-91340034-7140opendoar:2004-06-14T00:00Revista Brasileira de Economia (Online) - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv A selling mechanism
title A selling mechanism
spellingShingle A selling mechanism
Pérez-Castrillo,David
matching model
assignment model
mechanism
implementation
title_short A selling mechanism
title_full A selling mechanism
title_fullStr A selling mechanism
title_full_unstemmed A selling mechanism
title_sort A selling mechanism
author Pérez-Castrillo,David
author_facet Pérez-Castrillo,David
Sotomayor,Marilda
author_role author
author2 Sotomayor,Marilda
author2_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Pérez-Castrillo,David
Sotomayor,Marilda
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv matching model
assignment model
mechanism
implementation
topic matching model
assignment model
mechanism
implementation
description For the assignment game, we propose the following selling mechanism: sellers, simultaneously, fix their prices first; then buyers, sequentially, decide which object to buy, if any. The first phase of the game determines the potential prices, while the second phase determines the actual matching. We prove that the set of subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies in the strong sense of the mechanism coincides with the set of sellers' optimal stable outcomes when buyers use maximal strategies.
publishDate 2003
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2003-12-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-71402003000400012
url http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-71402003000400012
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv 10.1590/S0034-71402003000400012
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv text/html
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Fundação Getúlio Vargas
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Fundação Getúlio Vargas
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Revista Brasileira de Economia v.57 n.4 2003
reponame:Revista Brasileira de Economia (Online)
instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
instacron:FGV
instname_str Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
instacron_str FGV
institution FGV
reponame_str Revista Brasileira de Economia (Online)
collection Revista Brasileira de Economia (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Revista Brasileira de Economia (Online) - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv ||rbe@fgv.br
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