Random matching in the college admissions problem
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2008 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/25818 |
Resumo: | In the college admissions problem, we consider the incentives confronting agents who face the prospect of being matched by a random stable mechanism. We provide a fairly complete characterization of ordinal equilibria. Namely, every ordinal equilibrium yields a degenerate probability distribution. Furthermore, individual rationality is a necessary and sufficient condition for an equilibrium outcome, while stability is guaranteed in ordinal equilibria where firms act straightforwardly. Finally, we relate equilibrium behavior in random and in deterministic mechanisms. |
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Random matching in the college admissions problemMatchingCollege Admissions ProblemStabilityRandom MechanismIn the college admissions problem, we consider the incentives confronting agents who face the prospect of being matched by a random stable mechanism. We provide a fairly complete characterization of ordinal equilibria. Namely, every ordinal equilibrium yields a degenerate probability distribution. Furthermore, individual rationality is a necessary and sufficient condition for an equilibrium outcome, while stability is guaranteed in ordinal equilibria where firms act straightforwardly. Finally, we relate equilibrium behavior in random and in deterministic mechanisms.SpringerRepositório da Universidade de LisboaPais, Joana2022-10-28T10:35:01Z20082008-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/25818engPais, Joana.(2008) "Random matching in the college admissions problem". Economic Theory, Vol. 35, No.1: pp. 99-116.10.1007/s00199-006-0191-6info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-03-06T14:55:20Zoai:www.repository.utl.pt:10400.5/25818Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T17:09:34.346419Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Random matching in the college admissions problem |
title |
Random matching in the college admissions problem |
spellingShingle |
Random matching in the college admissions problem Pais, Joana Matching College Admissions Problem Stability Random Mechanism |
title_short |
Random matching in the college admissions problem |
title_full |
Random matching in the college admissions problem |
title_fullStr |
Random matching in the college admissions problem |
title_full_unstemmed |
Random matching in the college admissions problem |
title_sort |
Random matching in the college admissions problem |
author |
Pais, Joana |
author_facet |
Pais, Joana |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Pais, Joana |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Matching College Admissions Problem Stability Random Mechanism |
topic |
Matching College Admissions Problem Stability Random Mechanism |
description |
In the college admissions problem, we consider the incentives confronting agents who face the prospect of being matched by a random stable mechanism. We provide a fairly complete characterization of ordinal equilibria. Namely, every ordinal equilibrium yields a degenerate probability distribution. Furthermore, individual rationality is a necessary and sufficient condition for an equilibrium outcome, while stability is guaranteed in ordinal equilibria where firms act straightforwardly. Finally, we relate equilibrium behavior in random and in deterministic mechanisms. |
publishDate |
2008 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2008 2008-01-01T00:00:00Z 2022-10-28T10:35:01Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/25818 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/25818 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
Pais, Joana.(2008) "Random matching in the college admissions problem". Economic Theory, Vol. 35, No.1: pp. 99-116. 10.1007/s00199-006-0191-6 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Springer |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Springer |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
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Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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RCAAP |
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RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
collection |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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1799131190587817984 |