Behavioral agency research and theory: a review and research agenda

• Autor(a) principal: MASSA,RUBENS MUSSOLIN
• Data de Publicação: 2020
• Outros Autores: PARTYKA,RAUL BEAL, LANA,JEFERSON
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: eng
• Título da fonte: Cadernos EBAPE.BR
• Texto Completo: http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1679-39512020000200220
• topic: Behavioral agency theory; Executive risk-taking; Corporate governance; Bibliometric research

Abstract The behavioral agency theory verifies the relationship between company executives, CEOs, and managers, and their decision-making within the firm. The mechanisms of governance and the forms of remuneration are instruments that monitor internal members avoiding risks that potentially harm the organization’s valuation. This article highlights the importance of the behavioral agency theory both for firms that trust their decision-making process to an agent and for the behavior of this agent. Both aspects are subject to concerns that usually lead to recommendations to establish or improve the executives’ compensation plans. Through bibliometric research analyzing 107 articles, it was possible to verify that executives’ performance compensation, according to agency theory, is the most used mechanism to stimulate executives to make decisions toward the company’s growth and best performance. This study’s theoretical and empirical contribution point to the need for future research on this topic since understanding the agent’s behavior is strategic for companies to help the agent to act on its benefit while reducing the possibilities of inadequate and harmful behavior.