Behavioral agency research and theory: a review and research agenda
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2020 |
Outros Autores: | , |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Cadernos EBAPE.BR |
Texto Completo: | http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1679-39512020000200220 |
Resumo: | Abstract The behavioral agency theory verifies the relationship between company executives, CEOs, and managers, and their decision-making within the firm. The mechanisms of governance and the forms of remuneration are instruments that monitor internal members avoiding risks that potentially harm the organization’s valuation. This article highlights the importance of the behavioral agency theory both for firms that trust their decision-making process to an agent and for the behavior of this agent. Both aspects are subject to concerns that usually lead to recommendations to establish or improve the executives’ compensation plans. Through bibliometric research analyzing 107 articles, it was possible to verify that executives’ performance compensation, according to agency theory, is the most used mechanism to stimulate executives to make decisions toward the company’s growth and best performance. This study’s theoretical and empirical contribution point to the need for future research on this topic since understanding the agent’s behavior is strategic for companies to help the agent to act on its benefit while reducing the possibilities of inadequate and harmful behavior. |
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Behavioral agency research and theory: a review and research agendaBehavioral agency theoryExecutive risk-takingCorporate governanceBibliometric researchAbstract The behavioral agency theory verifies the relationship between company executives, CEOs, and managers, and their decision-making within the firm. The mechanisms of governance and the forms of remuneration are instruments that monitor internal members avoiding risks that potentially harm the organization’s valuation. This article highlights the importance of the behavioral agency theory both for firms that trust their decision-making process to an agent and for the behavior of this agent. Both aspects are subject to concerns that usually lead to recommendations to establish or improve the executives’ compensation plans. Through bibliometric research analyzing 107 articles, it was possible to verify that executives’ performance compensation, according to agency theory, is the most used mechanism to stimulate executives to make decisions toward the company’s growth and best performance. This study’s theoretical and empirical contribution point to the need for future research on this topic since understanding the agent’s behavior is strategic for companies to help the agent to act on its benefit while reducing the possibilities of inadequate and harmful behavior.Fundação Getulio Vargas, Escola Brasileira de Administração Pública e de Empresas2020-06-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1679-39512020000200220Cadernos EBAPE.BR v.18 n.2 2020reponame:Cadernos EBAPE.BRinstname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGV10.1590/1679-395177017xinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessMASSA,RUBENS MUSSOLINPARTYKA,RAUL BEALLANA,JEFERSONeng2020-07-08T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S1679-39512020000200220Revistahttp://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/ojs/index.php/cadernosebape/indexhttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.phpcadernosebape@fgv.br||cadernosebape@fgv.br1679-39511679-3951opendoar:2020-07-08T00:00Cadernos EBAPE.BR - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Behavioral agency research and theory: a review and research agenda |
title |
Behavioral agency research and theory: a review and research agenda |
spellingShingle |
Behavioral agency research and theory: a review and research agenda MASSA,RUBENS MUSSOLIN Behavioral agency theory Executive risk-taking Corporate governance Bibliometric research |
title_short |
Behavioral agency research and theory: a review and research agenda |
title_full |
Behavioral agency research and theory: a review and research agenda |
title_fullStr |
Behavioral agency research and theory: a review and research agenda |
title_full_unstemmed |
Behavioral agency research and theory: a review and research agenda |
title_sort |
Behavioral agency research and theory: a review and research agenda |
author |
MASSA,RUBENS MUSSOLIN |
author_facet |
MASSA,RUBENS MUSSOLIN PARTYKA,RAUL BEAL LANA,JEFERSON |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
PARTYKA,RAUL BEAL LANA,JEFERSON |
author2_role |
author author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
MASSA,RUBENS MUSSOLIN PARTYKA,RAUL BEAL LANA,JEFERSON |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Behavioral agency theory Executive risk-taking Corporate governance Bibliometric research |
topic |
Behavioral agency theory Executive risk-taking Corporate governance Bibliometric research |
description |
Abstract The behavioral agency theory verifies the relationship between company executives, CEOs, and managers, and their decision-making within the firm. The mechanisms of governance and the forms of remuneration are instruments that monitor internal members avoiding risks that potentially harm the organization’s valuation. This article highlights the importance of the behavioral agency theory both for firms that trust their decision-making process to an agent and for the behavior of this agent. Both aspects are subject to concerns that usually lead to recommendations to establish or improve the executives’ compensation plans. Through bibliometric research analyzing 107 articles, it was possible to verify that executives’ performance compensation, according to agency theory, is the most used mechanism to stimulate executives to make decisions toward the company’s growth and best performance. This study’s theoretical and empirical contribution point to the need for future research on this topic since understanding the agent’s behavior is strategic for companies to help the agent to act on its benefit while reducing the possibilities of inadequate and harmful behavior. |
publishDate |
2020 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2020-06-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1679-39512020000200220 |
url |
http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1679-39512020000200220 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
10.1590/1679-395177017x |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
text/html |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Fundação Getulio Vargas, Escola Brasileira de Administração Pública e de Empresas |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Fundação Getulio Vargas, Escola Brasileira de Administração Pública e de Empresas |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Cadernos EBAPE.BR v.18 n.2 2020 reponame:Cadernos EBAPE.BR instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) instacron:FGV |
instname_str |
Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) |
instacron_str |
FGV |
institution |
FGV |
reponame_str |
Cadernos EBAPE.BR |
collection |
Cadernos EBAPE.BR |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Cadernos EBAPE.BR - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
cadernosebape@fgv.br||cadernosebape@fgv.br |
_version_ |
1754115886705278976 |