Behavioral agency research and theory: a review and research agenda
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2020 |
Outros Autores: | , |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por eng |
Título da fonte: | Cadernos EBAPE.BR |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.fgv.br/cadernosebape/article/view/77017 |
Resumo: | The behavioral agency theory verifies the relationship between company executives, CEOs, and managers, and their decision-making within the firm. The mechanisms of governance and the forms of remuneration are instruments that monitor internal members avoiding risks that potentially harm the organization’s valuation. This article highlights the importance of the behavioral agency theory both for firms that trust their decision-making process to an agent and for the behavior of this agent. Both aspects are subject to concerns that usually lead to recommendations to establish or improve the executives’ compensation plans. Through bibliometric research analyzing 107 articles, it was possible to verify that executives’ performance compensation, according to agency theory, is the most used mechanism to stimulate executives to make decisions toward the company’s growth and best performance. This study’s theoretical and empirical contribution point to the need for future research on this topic since understanding the agent’s behavior is strategic for companies to help the agent to act on its benefit while reducing the possibilities of inadequate and harmful behavior. |
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Behavioral agency research and theory: a review and research agendaInvestigación y teoría de la agencia comportamental: una revisión de la literaturaPesquisa e teoria da agência comportamental: uma revisão e agenda de pesquisaBehavioral agency theory. Executive risk-taking. Corporate governance. Bibliometric research.Teoría de la agencia comportamental. Asunción de riesgos ejecutivos. Gobierno corporativo. Bibliométrico.Teoria da agência comportamental. Risco executivo. Governança corporativa. Pesquisa bibliométrica.The behavioral agency theory verifies the relationship between company executives, CEOs, and managers, and their decision-making within the firm. The mechanisms of governance and the forms of remuneration are instruments that monitor internal members avoiding risks that potentially harm the organization’s valuation. This article highlights the importance of the behavioral agency theory both for firms that trust their decision-making process to an agent and for the behavior of this agent. Both aspects are subject to concerns that usually lead to recommendations to establish or improve the executives’ compensation plans. Through bibliometric research analyzing 107 articles, it was possible to verify that executives’ performance compensation, according to agency theory, is the most used mechanism to stimulate executives to make decisions toward the company’s growth and best performance. This study’s theoretical and empirical contribution point to the need for future research on this topic since understanding the agent’s behavior is strategic for companies to help the agent to act on its benefit while reducing the possibilities of inadequate and harmful behavior.La teoría de la agencia comportamental verifica la relación entre los ejecutivos de la empresa, los directores ejecutivos y los gerentes, y su toma de decisiones dentro de la empresa. Los mecanismos de gobierno y las formas de remuneración se convierten en monitores de los miembros internos con respecto a la experiencia de la junta directiva para evitar la subvaloración. Este artículo destaca la importancia de la teoría de la agencia de comportamiento tanto para las empresas que confían su proceso de toma de decisiones a un agente como para el comportamiento de este agente. Ambos aspectos están sujetos a preocupaciones que generalmente llevan a recomendaciones para establecer o mejorar los planes de remuneración de los ejecutivos. A través de una investigación bibliométrica que analiza 107 artículos, fue posible verificar que la remuneración de desempeño de los ejecutivos, según la teoría de la agencia, es el mecanismo más utilizado para estimular a los ejecutivos a tomar decisiones sobre el crecimiento y el mejor desempeño de la compañía. La contribución teórica y empírica de este estudio apunta a la necesidad de futuras investigaciones sobre este tema, ya que entender el comportamiento del agente es estratégico para que las empresas ayuden al agente a actuar en su beneficio, al tiempo que reducen las posibilidades de comportamiento inadecuado y perjudicial.A teoria da agência comportamental verifica a relação entre os executivos, CEOs e gerentes da empresa e suas decisões dentro da empresa. Os mecanismos de governança e as formas de remuneração passam a ser monitores dos membros internos quanto à experiência do conselho de administração para evitar desvalorizações. Este artigo destaca a importância da teoria da agência comportamental tanto para empresas que confiam em seu processo de tomada de decisão a um agente quanto para o comportamento desse agente. Ambos os aspectos estão sujeitos a preocupações que geralmente levam a recomendações para estabelecer ou melhorar os planos de remuneração dos executivos. Por meio de uma pesquisa bibliométrica que analisou 107 artigos, foi possível verificar que a remuneração por desempenho dos executivos, segundo a teoria da agência, é o mecanismo mais utilizado para estimular os executivos a tomar decisões sobre o crescimento e o melhor desempenho da empresa. A contribuição teórica e empírica deste estudo aponta para a necessidade de pesquisas futuras sobre esse tema, uma vez que a compreensão do comportamento do agente é estratégica para que as empresas ajudem o agente a atuar em benefício dela enquanto reduzem as possibilidades de comportamentos inadequados e prejudiciais.Escola Brasileira de Administração Pública e de Empresas da Fundação Getulio Vargas2020-04-06info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.fgv.br/cadernosebape/article/view/7701710.1590/1679-395177017Cadernos EBAPE.BR; Vol. 18 No. 2 (2020); 220-236Cadernos EBAPE.BR; Vol. 18 Núm. 2 (2020); 220-236Cadernos EBAPE.BR; v. 18 n. 2 (2020); 220-2361679-3951reponame:Cadernos EBAPE.BRinstname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGVporenghttps://periodicos.fgv.br/cadernosebape/article/view/77017/77326https://periodicos.fgv.br/cadernosebape/article/view/77017/77329Copyright (c) 2020 Cadernos EBAPE.BRinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessMassa, Rubens MussolinPartyka, Raul BealLana, Jeferson2022-07-08T20:07:50Zoai:ojs.periodicos.fgv.br:article/77017Revistahttps://periodicos.fgv.br/cadernosebapehttps://periodicos.fgv.br/cadernosebape/oaicadernosebape@fgv.br||cadernosebape@fgv.br1679-39511679-3951opendoar:2024-05-13T10:00:11.340004Cadernos EBAPE.BR - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)true |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Behavioral agency research and theory: a review and research agenda Investigación y teoría de la agencia comportamental: una revisión de la literatura Pesquisa e teoria da agência comportamental: uma revisão e agenda de pesquisa |
title |
Behavioral agency research and theory: a review and research agenda |
spellingShingle |
Behavioral agency research and theory: a review and research agenda Massa, Rubens Mussolin Behavioral agency theory. Executive risk-taking. Corporate governance. Bibliometric research. Teoría de la agencia comportamental. Asunción de riesgos ejecutivos. Gobierno corporativo. Bibliométrico. Teoria da agência comportamental. Risco executivo. Governança corporativa. Pesquisa bibliométrica. |
title_short |
Behavioral agency research and theory: a review and research agenda |
title_full |
Behavioral agency research and theory: a review and research agenda |
title_fullStr |
Behavioral agency research and theory: a review and research agenda |
title_full_unstemmed |
Behavioral agency research and theory: a review and research agenda |
title_sort |
Behavioral agency research and theory: a review and research agenda |
author |
Massa, Rubens Mussolin |
author_facet |
Massa, Rubens Mussolin Partyka, Raul Beal Lana, Jeferson |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Partyka, Raul Beal Lana, Jeferson |
author2_role |
author author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Massa, Rubens Mussolin Partyka, Raul Beal Lana, Jeferson |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Behavioral agency theory. Executive risk-taking. Corporate governance. Bibliometric research. Teoría de la agencia comportamental. Asunción de riesgos ejecutivos. Gobierno corporativo. Bibliométrico. Teoria da agência comportamental. Risco executivo. Governança corporativa. Pesquisa bibliométrica. |
topic |
Behavioral agency theory. Executive risk-taking. Corporate governance. Bibliometric research. Teoría de la agencia comportamental. Asunción de riesgos ejecutivos. Gobierno corporativo. Bibliométrico. Teoria da agência comportamental. Risco executivo. Governança corporativa. Pesquisa bibliométrica. |
description |
The behavioral agency theory verifies the relationship between company executives, CEOs, and managers, and their decision-making within the firm. The mechanisms of governance and the forms of remuneration are instruments that monitor internal members avoiding risks that potentially harm the organization’s valuation. This article highlights the importance of the behavioral agency theory both for firms that trust their decision-making process to an agent and for the behavior of this agent. Both aspects are subject to concerns that usually lead to recommendations to establish or improve the executives’ compensation plans. Through bibliometric research analyzing 107 articles, it was possible to verify that executives’ performance compensation, according to agency theory, is the most used mechanism to stimulate executives to make decisions toward the company’s growth and best performance. This study’s theoretical and empirical contribution point to the need for future research on this topic since understanding the agent’s behavior is strategic for companies to help the agent to act on its benefit while reducing the possibilities of inadequate and harmful behavior. |
publishDate |
2020 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2020-04-06 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.fgv.br/cadernosebape/article/view/77017 10.1590/1679-395177017 |
url |
https://periodicos.fgv.br/cadernosebape/article/view/77017 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.1590/1679-395177017 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por eng |
language |
por eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.fgv.br/cadernosebape/article/view/77017/77326 https://periodicos.fgv.br/cadernosebape/article/view/77017/77329 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2020 Cadernos EBAPE.BR info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2020 Cadernos EBAPE.BR |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Escola Brasileira de Administração Pública e de Empresas da Fundação Getulio Vargas |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Escola Brasileira de Administração Pública e de Empresas da Fundação Getulio Vargas |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Cadernos EBAPE.BR; Vol. 18 No. 2 (2020); 220-236 Cadernos EBAPE.BR; Vol. 18 Núm. 2 (2020); 220-236 Cadernos EBAPE.BR; v. 18 n. 2 (2020); 220-236 1679-3951 reponame:Cadernos EBAPE.BR instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) instacron:FGV |
instname_str |
Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) |
instacron_str |
FGV |
institution |
FGV |
reponame_str |
Cadernos EBAPE.BR |
collection |
Cadernos EBAPE.BR |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Cadernos EBAPE.BR - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
cadernosebape@fgv.br||cadernosebape@fgv.br |
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