O poder público inadimplente: uma busca por mecanismos para garantir o cumprimento de obrigações do poder concedente em contratos de concessão de serviço público

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Tourinho, Anna Carolina Morizot
Data de Publicação: 2018
Tipo de documento: Dissertação
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
Texto Completo: https://hdl.handle.net/10438/20500
Resumo: Currently, in Brazil, there is a movement to change the relationship of the public and private sector from a supremacy of the Government status to a more consensual and collaborative relationship. That is because this extraordinary power system used in the concession agreement is proving to be inefficient, costlier, and is being used to support authoritarian practices from the Government. In that context, is urgent to reconsider this superior position that the Government exercise in concession agreements. This paper searched in the national and international doctrine the reasons why it was understood to be important for the Government to have these special powers in such contracts. It was searched in judicial precedents what is the most common forms of the Government´s default. It was analyzed several preventive and reactive mechanisms to avoid the default to happen, to respond to the non-compliance compelling the Government to act as established in the contract, and to compensate the private partner in case it is impossible to meet the agreement. It was understood that the best way to ensure the public interest is to reduce the extraordinary powers from the Government, ensuring legal certainty and reducing the costs to the Government as a partner
id FGV_19c3ef05c750fb939d542655418cdca7
oai_identifier_str oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/20500
network_acronym_str FGV
network_name_str Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
repository_id_str 3974
spelling Tourinho, Anna Carolina MorizotEscolas::DIREITO RIOMoreira, Egon BockmannRibeiro, Leandro MolhanoSampaio, Patrícia Regina PinheiroSampaio, Rômulo Silveira da Rocha2018-03-12T13:49:16Z2018-03-12T13:49:16Z2018-02-06https://hdl.handle.net/10438/20500Currently, in Brazil, there is a movement to change the relationship of the public and private sector from a supremacy of the Government status to a more consensual and collaborative relationship. That is because this extraordinary power system used in the concession agreement is proving to be inefficient, costlier, and is being used to support authoritarian practices from the Government. In that context, is urgent to reconsider this superior position that the Government exercise in concession agreements. This paper searched in the national and international doctrine the reasons why it was understood to be important for the Government to have these special powers in such contracts. It was searched in judicial precedents what is the most common forms of the Government´s default. It was analyzed several preventive and reactive mechanisms to avoid the default to happen, to respond to the non-compliance compelling the Government to act as established in the contract, and to compensate the private partner in case it is impossible to meet the agreement. It was understood that the best way to ensure the public interest is to reduce the extraordinary powers from the Government, ensuring legal certainty and reducing the costs to the Government as a partnerHoje, no Brasil, há uma tendência de substituição no eixo de atuação da Administração com base na supremacia e na unilateralidade para uma ideia de consenso e bilateralidade. Entende-se que Administração e particular devem atuar em conjunto, de forma colaborativa e não em uma situação de subordinação do particular à Administração. Isto porque, cada vez mais, o regime de prerrogativas especiais acaba servindo de base para o estímulo à ineficiência da Administração, geração de contratos mais onerosos, legitimação de práticas autoritárias e facilitação de desvios em razão da flexibilidade de alteração de cláusulas contratuais. Diante deste contexto, é preciso rever a posição de supremacia que o poder concedente exerce em contratos de concessão de serviço público. Buscou-se através do presente trabalho explicações na doutrina nacional e estrangeira que pudessem justificar esse desequilíbrio e as peculiaridades que cercam essa relação entre poder concedente e concessionárias nos contratos de concessão comum. Em seguida, foram analisadas decisões dos Tribunais Regionais Federais para identificar quais são as possíveis formas de descumprimento contratual pela Administração Pública. Por fim, foram analisados mecanismos para evitar que o poder concedente incorra no inadimplemento, para o compelir a cumprir suas obrigações e, finalmente, para compensar o concessionário por eventuais danos sofridos em razão do descumprimento de cláusula contratual. Conclui-se, assim, que a melhor forma de garantir o interesse público é limitar o exercício dos poderes exorbitantes, que deve se dar apenas em situações excepcionais, de forma a garantir segurança jurídica e diminuir os custos de contratar com o poder públicoporConcession contractPublic utilitiesContractual breachGovernment contractContrato de concessãoInadimplementoPoder concedenteServiços públicosConcessãoDireitoConcessões administrativasContratosObrigações (Direito)Serviços públicosO poder público inadimplente: uma busca por mecanismos para garantir o cumprimento de obrigações do poder concedente em contratos de concessão de serviço públicoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGVTEXTDissertação - O poder público inadimplente - Anna Carolina Morizot Tourinho - final.pdf.txtDissertação - O poder público inadimplente - Anna Carolina Morizot Tourinho - final.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain103565https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/fbfef29a-0b7b-4f03-bd09-4c410eaed0de/download64e9b40c288d1460e13bf670d92ef255MD55ORIGINALPDFPDFapplication/pdf1721569https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/6355e429-74d5-4463-8745-ffbf0bdfaef1/download4c55d551921b55736287c03c1d2f815cMD51LICENSElicense.txtlicense.txttext/plain; charset=utf-84707https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/6bc48631-f217-4610-8840-b75ce528bf08/downloaddfb340242cced38a6cca06c627998fa1MD52THUMBNAILDissertação - O poder público inadimplente - Anna Carolina Morizot Tourinho - final.pdf.jpgDissertação - O poder público inadimplente - Anna Carolina Morizot Tourinho - final.pdf.jpgGenerated Thumbnailimage/jpeg2963https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/bfe7bfa8-396a-471c-b64f-b92c6906d157/downloadf8d1302a372614a70d0de31ab4dd0ff8MD5610438/205002024-03-06 14:54:32.575open.accessoai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/20500https://repositorio.fgv.brRepositório InstitucionalPRIhttp://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/dspace-oai/requestopendoar:39742024-03-06T14:54:32Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)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
dc.title.por.fl_str_mv O poder público inadimplente: uma busca por mecanismos para garantir o cumprimento de obrigações do poder concedente em contratos de concessão de serviço público
title O poder público inadimplente: uma busca por mecanismos para garantir o cumprimento de obrigações do poder concedente em contratos de concessão de serviço público
spellingShingle O poder público inadimplente: uma busca por mecanismos para garantir o cumprimento de obrigações do poder concedente em contratos de concessão de serviço público
Tourinho, Anna Carolina Morizot
Concession contract
Public utilities
Contractual breach
Government contract
Contrato de concessão
Inadimplemento
Poder concedente
Serviços públicos
Concessão
Direito
Concessões administrativas
Contratos
Obrigações (Direito)
Serviços públicos
title_short O poder público inadimplente: uma busca por mecanismos para garantir o cumprimento de obrigações do poder concedente em contratos de concessão de serviço público
title_full O poder público inadimplente: uma busca por mecanismos para garantir o cumprimento de obrigações do poder concedente em contratos de concessão de serviço público
title_fullStr O poder público inadimplente: uma busca por mecanismos para garantir o cumprimento de obrigações do poder concedente em contratos de concessão de serviço público
title_full_unstemmed O poder público inadimplente: uma busca por mecanismos para garantir o cumprimento de obrigações do poder concedente em contratos de concessão de serviço público
title_sort O poder público inadimplente: uma busca por mecanismos para garantir o cumprimento de obrigações do poder concedente em contratos de concessão de serviço público
author Tourinho, Anna Carolina Morizot
author_facet Tourinho, Anna Carolina Morizot
author_role author
dc.contributor.unidadefgv.por.fl_str_mv Escolas::DIREITO RIO
dc.contributor.member.none.fl_str_mv Moreira, Egon Bockmann
Ribeiro, Leandro Molhano
Sampaio, Patrícia Regina Pinheiro
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Tourinho, Anna Carolina Morizot
dc.contributor.advisor1.fl_str_mv Sampaio, Rômulo Silveira da Rocha
contributor_str_mv Sampaio, Rômulo Silveira da Rocha
dc.subject.eng.fl_str_mv Concession contract
Public utilities
Contractual breach
Government contract
topic Concession contract
Public utilities
Contractual breach
Government contract
Contrato de concessão
Inadimplemento
Poder concedente
Serviços públicos
Concessão
Direito
Concessões administrativas
Contratos
Obrigações (Direito)
Serviços públicos
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Contrato de concessão
Inadimplemento
Poder concedente
Serviços públicos
Concessão
dc.subject.area.por.fl_str_mv Direito
dc.subject.bibliodata.por.fl_str_mv Concessões administrativas
Contratos
Obrigações (Direito)
Serviços públicos
description Currently, in Brazil, there is a movement to change the relationship of the public and private sector from a supremacy of the Government status to a more consensual and collaborative relationship. That is because this extraordinary power system used in the concession agreement is proving to be inefficient, costlier, and is being used to support authoritarian practices from the Government. In that context, is urgent to reconsider this superior position that the Government exercise in concession agreements. This paper searched in the national and international doctrine the reasons why it was understood to be important for the Government to have these special powers in such contracts. It was searched in judicial precedents what is the most common forms of the Government´s default. It was analyzed several preventive and reactive mechanisms to avoid the default to happen, to respond to the non-compliance compelling the Government to act as established in the contract, and to compensate the private partner in case it is impossible to meet the agreement. It was understood that the best way to ensure the public interest is to reduce the extraordinary powers from the Government, ensuring legal certainty and reducing the costs to the Government as a partner
publishDate 2018
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv 2018-03-12T13:49:16Z
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv 2018-03-12T13:49:16Z
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv 2018-02-06
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis
format masterThesis
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/10438/20500
url https://hdl.handle.net/10438/20500
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
instacron:FGV
instname_str Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
instacron_str FGV
institution FGV
reponame_str Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
collection Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
bitstream.url.fl_str_mv https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/fbfef29a-0b7b-4f03-bd09-4c410eaed0de/download
https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/6355e429-74d5-4463-8745-ffbf0bdfaef1/download
https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/6bc48631-f217-4610-8840-b75ce528bf08/download
https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/bfe7bfa8-396a-471c-b64f-b92c6906d157/download
bitstream.checksum.fl_str_mv 64e9b40c288d1460e13bf670d92ef255
4c55d551921b55736287c03c1d2f815c
dfb340242cced38a6cca06c627998fa1
f8d1302a372614a70d0de31ab4dd0ff8
bitstream.checksumAlgorithm.fl_str_mv MD5
MD5
MD5
MD5
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
_version_ 1802749904989192192