O poder público inadimplente: uma busca por mecanismos para garantir o cumprimento de obrigações do poder concedente em contratos de concessão de serviço público
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2018 |
Tipo de documento: | Dissertação |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) |
Texto Completo: | https://hdl.handle.net/10438/20500 |
Resumo: | Currently, in Brazil, there is a movement to change the relationship of the public and private sector from a supremacy of the Government status to a more consensual and collaborative relationship. That is because this extraordinary power system used in the concession agreement is proving to be inefficient, costlier, and is being used to support authoritarian practices from the Government. In that context, is urgent to reconsider this superior position that the Government exercise in concession agreements. This paper searched in the national and international doctrine the reasons why it was understood to be important for the Government to have these special powers in such contracts. It was searched in judicial precedents what is the most common forms of the Government´s default. It was analyzed several preventive and reactive mechanisms to avoid the default to happen, to respond to the non-compliance compelling the Government to act as established in the contract, and to compensate the private partner in case it is impossible to meet the agreement. It was understood that the best way to ensure the public interest is to reduce the extraordinary powers from the Government, ensuring legal certainty and reducing the costs to the Government as a partner |
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Tourinho, Anna Carolina MorizotEscolas::DIREITO RIOMoreira, Egon BockmannRibeiro, Leandro MolhanoSampaio, Patrícia Regina PinheiroSampaio, Rômulo Silveira da Rocha2018-03-12T13:49:16Z2018-03-12T13:49:16Z2018-02-06https://hdl.handle.net/10438/20500Currently, in Brazil, there is a movement to change the relationship of the public and private sector from a supremacy of the Government status to a more consensual and collaborative relationship. That is because this extraordinary power system used in the concession agreement is proving to be inefficient, costlier, and is being used to support authoritarian practices from the Government. In that context, is urgent to reconsider this superior position that the Government exercise in concession agreements. This paper searched in the national and international doctrine the reasons why it was understood to be important for the Government to have these special powers in such contracts. It was searched in judicial precedents what is the most common forms of the Government´s default. It was analyzed several preventive and reactive mechanisms to avoid the default to happen, to respond to the non-compliance compelling the Government to act as established in the contract, and to compensate the private partner in case it is impossible to meet the agreement. It was understood that the best way to ensure the public interest is to reduce the extraordinary powers from the Government, ensuring legal certainty and reducing the costs to the Government as a partnerHoje, no Brasil, há uma tendência de substituição no eixo de atuação da Administração com base na supremacia e na unilateralidade para uma ideia de consenso e bilateralidade. Entende-se que Administração e particular devem atuar em conjunto, de forma colaborativa e não em uma situação de subordinação do particular à Administração. Isto porque, cada vez mais, o regime de prerrogativas especiais acaba servindo de base para o estímulo à ineficiência da Administração, geração de contratos mais onerosos, legitimação de práticas autoritárias e facilitação de desvios em razão da flexibilidade de alteração de cláusulas contratuais. Diante deste contexto, é preciso rever a posição de supremacia que o poder concedente exerce em contratos de concessão de serviço público. Buscou-se através do presente trabalho explicações na doutrina nacional e estrangeira que pudessem justificar esse desequilíbrio e as peculiaridades que cercam essa relação entre poder concedente e concessionárias nos contratos de concessão comum. Em seguida, foram analisadas decisões dos Tribunais Regionais Federais para identificar quais são as possíveis formas de descumprimento contratual pela Administração Pública. Por fim, foram analisados mecanismos para evitar que o poder concedente incorra no inadimplemento, para o compelir a cumprir suas obrigações e, finalmente, para compensar o concessionário por eventuais danos sofridos em razão do descumprimento de cláusula contratual. Conclui-se, assim, que a melhor forma de garantir o interesse público é limitar o exercício dos poderes exorbitantes, que deve se dar apenas em situações excepcionais, de forma a garantir segurança jurídica e diminuir os custos de contratar com o poder públicoporConcession contractPublic utilitiesContractual breachGovernment contractContrato de concessãoInadimplementoPoder concedenteServiços públicosConcessãoDireitoConcessões administrativasContratosObrigações (Direito)Serviços públicosO poder público inadimplente: uma busca por mecanismos para garantir o cumprimento de obrigações do poder concedente em contratos de concessão de serviço públicoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGVTEXTDissertação - O poder público inadimplente - Anna Carolina Morizot Tourinho - final.pdf.txtDissertação - O poder 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|
dc.title.por.fl_str_mv |
O poder público inadimplente: uma busca por mecanismos para garantir o cumprimento de obrigações do poder concedente em contratos de concessão de serviço público |
title |
O poder público inadimplente: uma busca por mecanismos para garantir o cumprimento de obrigações do poder concedente em contratos de concessão de serviço público |
spellingShingle |
O poder público inadimplente: uma busca por mecanismos para garantir o cumprimento de obrigações do poder concedente em contratos de concessão de serviço público Tourinho, Anna Carolina Morizot Concession contract Public utilities Contractual breach Government contract Contrato de concessão Inadimplemento Poder concedente Serviços públicos Concessão Direito Concessões administrativas Contratos Obrigações (Direito) Serviços públicos |
title_short |
O poder público inadimplente: uma busca por mecanismos para garantir o cumprimento de obrigações do poder concedente em contratos de concessão de serviço público |
title_full |
O poder público inadimplente: uma busca por mecanismos para garantir o cumprimento de obrigações do poder concedente em contratos de concessão de serviço público |
title_fullStr |
O poder público inadimplente: uma busca por mecanismos para garantir o cumprimento de obrigações do poder concedente em contratos de concessão de serviço público |
title_full_unstemmed |
O poder público inadimplente: uma busca por mecanismos para garantir o cumprimento de obrigações do poder concedente em contratos de concessão de serviço público |
title_sort |
O poder público inadimplente: uma busca por mecanismos para garantir o cumprimento de obrigações do poder concedente em contratos de concessão de serviço público |
author |
Tourinho, Anna Carolina Morizot |
author_facet |
Tourinho, Anna Carolina Morizot |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.unidadefgv.por.fl_str_mv |
Escolas::DIREITO RIO |
dc.contributor.member.none.fl_str_mv |
Moreira, Egon Bockmann Ribeiro, Leandro Molhano Sampaio, Patrícia Regina Pinheiro |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Tourinho, Anna Carolina Morizot |
dc.contributor.advisor1.fl_str_mv |
Sampaio, Rômulo Silveira da Rocha |
contributor_str_mv |
Sampaio, Rômulo Silveira da Rocha |
dc.subject.eng.fl_str_mv |
Concession contract Public utilities Contractual breach Government contract |
topic |
Concession contract Public utilities Contractual breach Government contract Contrato de concessão Inadimplemento Poder concedente Serviços públicos Concessão Direito Concessões administrativas Contratos Obrigações (Direito) Serviços públicos |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Contrato de concessão Inadimplemento Poder concedente Serviços públicos Concessão |
dc.subject.area.por.fl_str_mv |
Direito |
dc.subject.bibliodata.por.fl_str_mv |
Concessões administrativas Contratos Obrigações (Direito) Serviços públicos |
description |
Currently, in Brazil, there is a movement to change the relationship of the public and private sector from a supremacy of the Government status to a more consensual and collaborative relationship. That is because this extraordinary power system used in the concession agreement is proving to be inefficient, costlier, and is being used to support authoritarian practices from the Government. In that context, is urgent to reconsider this superior position that the Government exercise in concession agreements. This paper searched in the national and international doctrine the reasons why it was understood to be important for the Government to have these special powers in such contracts. It was searched in judicial precedents what is the most common forms of the Government´s default. It was analyzed several preventive and reactive mechanisms to avoid the default to happen, to respond to the non-compliance compelling the Government to act as established in the contract, and to compensate the private partner in case it is impossible to meet the agreement. It was understood that the best way to ensure the public interest is to reduce the extraordinary powers from the Government, ensuring legal certainty and reducing the costs to the Government as a partner |
publishDate |
2018 |
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv |
2018-03-12T13:49:16Z |
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv |
2018-03-12T13:49:16Z |
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv |
2018-02-06 |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis |
format |
masterThesis |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://hdl.handle.net/10438/20500 |
url |
https://hdl.handle.net/10438/20500 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) instacron:FGV |
instname_str |
Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) |
instacron_str |
FGV |
institution |
FGV |
reponame_str |
Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) |
collection |
Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) |
bitstream.url.fl_str_mv |
https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/fbfef29a-0b7b-4f03-bd09-4c410eaed0de/download https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/07d671e4-694f-4426-b8fd-7597f7c59f7c/download https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/6355e429-74d5-4463-8745-ffbf0bdfaef1/download https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/6bc48631-f217-4610-8840-b75ce528bf08/download https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/bfe7bfa8-396a-471c-b64f-b92c6906d157/download https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/e45182ca-d7e7-4027-aad7-a0826b6a78cc/download |
bitstream.checksum.fl_str_mv |
64e9b40c288d1460e13bf670d92ef255 64e9b40c288d1460e13bf670d92ef255 4c55d551921b55736287c03c1d2f815c dfb340242cced38a6cca06c627998fa1 f8d1302a372614a70d0de31ab4dd0ff8 f8d1302a372614a70d0de31ab4dd0ff8 |
bitstream.checksumAlgorithm.fl_str_mv |
MD5 MD5 MD5 MD5 MD5 MD5 |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
|
_version_ |
1810023629906247680 |