A comment on 'Rational learning lead to nash equilibrium' by professors Ehud Kalai and Ehud Lehrer
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 1995 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10438/947 |
Resumo: | Kalai and Lebrer (93a, b) have recently show that for the case of infinitely repeated games, a coordination assumption on beliefs and optimal strategies ensures convergence to Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we show that for the case of repeated games with long (but finite) horizon, their condition does not imply approximate Nash equilibrium play. Recently Kalai and Lehrer (93a, b) proved that a coordination assumption on beliefs and optimal strategies, ensures that pIayers of an infinitely repeated game eventually pIay 'E-close' to an E-Nash equilibrium. Their coordination assumption requires that if players believes that certain set of outcomes have positive probability then it must be the case that this set of outcomes have, in fact, positive probability. This coordination assumption is called absolute continuity. For the case of finitely repeated games, the absolute continuity assumption is a quite innocuous assumption that just ensures that pIayers' can revise their priors by Bayes' Law. However, for the case of infinitely repeated games, the absolute continuity assumption is a stronger requirement because it also refers to events that can never be observed in finite time. |
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Sandroni, AlvaroWerlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da CostaEscolas::EPGEFGV2008-05-13T15:42:40Z2008-05-13T15:42:40Z1995-020104-8910http://hdl.handle.net/10438/947Kalai and Lebrer (93a, b) have recently show that for the case of infinitely repeated games, a coordination assumption on beliefs and optimal strategies ensures convergence to Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we show that for the case of repeated games with long (but finite) horizon, their condition does not imply approximate Nash equilibrium play. Recently Kalai and Lehrer (93a, b) proved that a coordination assumption on beliefs and optimal strategies, ensures that pIayers of an infinitely repeated game eventually pIay 'E-close' to an E-Nash equilibrium. Their coordination assumption requires that if players believes that certain set of outcomes have positive probability then it must be the case that this set of outcomes have, in fact, positive probability. This coordination assumption is called absolute continuity. For the case of finitely repeated games, the absolute continuity assumption is a quite innocuous assumption that just ensures that pIayers' can revise their priors by Bayes' Law. However, for the case of infinitely repeated games, the absolute continuity assumption is a stronger requirement because it also refers to events that can never be observed in finite time.engEscola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGVEnsaios Econômicos;256A comment on 'Rational learning lead to nash equilibrium' by professors Ehud Kalai and Ehud Lehrerinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleEconomiaKalai, Ehud. Rational learning lead to Nash equilibriumLehrer, Ehud. Rational learning lead to Nash equilibriumTeoria dos jogosEconomiareponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGVinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessORIGINAL000063212.pdf000063212.pdfapplication/pdf344063https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/df64b953-ed2a-49f8-80cc-a2f70f1df563/downloadef7f4fd1d9e59e9425c63481ffc1556eMD51TEXT000063212.pdf.txt000063212.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain16717https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/bfb30a18-d2d6-4264-8820-9dc8def08aaa/downloadd07437ef2347f14b000127ac231b67f0MD56THUMBNAIL000063212.pdf.jpg000063212.pdf.jpgGenerated Thumbnailimage/jpeg2374https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/dc471af9-d0f8-4a71-b0d6-ef8c724354ba/download6a02795da5eb0312b68a72eab71f61faMD5710438/9472023-11-09 00:43:54.497open.accessoai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/947https://repositorio.fgv.brRepositório InstitucionalPRIhttp://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/dspace-oai/requestopendoar:39742023-11-09T00:43:54Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)false |
dc.title.eng.fl_str_mv |
A comment on 'Rational learning lead to nash equilibrium' by professors Ehud Kalai and Ehud Lehrer |
title |
A comment on 'Rational learning lead to nash equilibrium' by professors Ehud Kalai and Ehud Lehrer |
spellingShingle |
A comment on 'Rational learning lead to nash equilibrium' by professors Ehud Kalai and Ehud Lehrer Sandroni, Alvaro Economia Kalai, Ehud. Rational learning lead to Nash equilibrium Lehrer, Ehud. Rational learning lead to Nash equilibrium Teoria dos jogos Economia |
title_short |
A comment on 'Rational learning lead to nash equilibrium' by professors Ehud Kalai and Ehud Lehrer |
title_full |
A comment on 'Rational learning lead to nash equilibrium' by professors Ehud Kalai and Ehud Lehrer |
title_fullStr |
A comment on 'Rational learning lead to nash equilibrium' by professors Ehud Kalai and Ehud Lehrer |
title_full_unstemmed |
A comment on 'Rational learning lead to nash equilibrium' by professors Ehud Kalai and Ehud Lehrer |
title_sort |
A comment on 'Rational learning lead to nash equilibrium' by professors Ehud Kalai and Ehud Lehrer |
author |
Sandroni, Alvaro |
author_facet |
Sandroni, Alvaro Werlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Werlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.unidadefgv.por.fl_str_mv |
Escolas::EPGE |
dc.contributor.affiliation.none.fl_str_mv |
FGV |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Sandroni, Alvaro Werlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa |
dc.subject.area.por.fl_str_mv |
Economia |
topic |
Economia Kalai, Ehud. Rational learning lead to Nash equilibrium Lehrer, Ehud. Rational learning lead to Nash equilibrium Teoria dos jogos Economia |
dc.subject.bibliodata.por.fl_str_mv |
Kalai, Ehud. Rational learning lead to Nash equilibrium Lehrer, Ehud. Rational learning lead to Nash equilibrium Teoria dos jogos Economia |
description |
Kalai and Lebrer (93a, b) have recently show that for the case of infinitely repeated games, a coordination assumption on beliefs and optimal strategies ensures convergence to Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we show that for the case of repeated games with long (but finite) horizon, their condition does not imply approximate Nash equilibrium play. Recently Kalai and Lehrer (93a, b) proved that a coordination assumption on beliefs and optimal strategies, ensures that pIayers of an infinitely repeated game eventually pIay 'E-close' to an E-Nash equilibrium. Their coordination assumption requires that if players believes that certain set of outcomes have positive probability then it must be the case that this set of outcomes have, in fact, positive probability. This coordination assumption is called absolute continuity. For the case of finitely repeated games, the absolute continuity assumption is a quite innocuous assumption that just ensures that pIayers' can revise their priors by Bayes' Law. However, for the case of infinitely repeated games, the absolute continuity assumption is a stronger requirement because it also refers to events that can never be observed in finite time. |
publishDate |
1995 |
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv |
1995-02 |
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv |
2008-05-13T15:42:40Z |
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv |
2008-05-13T15:42:40Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
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article |
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0104-8910 |
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0104-8910 |
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http://hdl.handle.net/10438/947 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
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eng |
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Ensaios Econômicos;256 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV |
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