Conflito de agência no consórcio DPVAT: uma análise à luz da nova economia institucional sob a perspectiva da teoria da agência

• Autor(a) principal: Duarte, Danielle Cavalcante
• Data de Publicação: 2015
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
• Texto Completo: https://hdl.handle.net/10438/15229
• topic: Agency theory; Motor third-party liability insurance; DPVAT insurance; Regulation; Insurance regulation; DPVAT Consortium; Conflicts of interest; Regulação; Regulação de seguros; Consórcio do seguro DPVAT; Conflitos de interesses; Teoria da agência; Seguro obrigatório de trânsito; Seguro DPVAT; Direito; Seguro de automóveis; Responsabilidade em relação aos acidentes de trânsito; Indenização por acidentes; Consórcios; Economia institucional; Mandato (Direito)

Different institutional arrangements result in different incentives for performing economic exchanges. Indeed, regulatory frameworks implemented in a particular historical and economic background may produce results different from those originally intended, therefore imposing to the regulator the need for constant monitoring and intervention in order to diagnose and correct or minimize possible distortions in the relationships among actors. Thus, this dissertation is proposed to analyze the operation of the DPVAT Consortium as a connecting mechanism between its various stakeholders. The goal is to check potential conflicts of interest that may arise from the various relationships between these stakeholders – set up by the institutional framework established to the management of the premiums paid by motor vehicle owners for their mandatory motor third-party liability insurance (known as DPVAT insurance in Brazil) – that may foster regulatory intervention in order to avoid such conflicts or, at least, to mitigate them. The survey is based on identifying the expected behavior of economic agents in their own interest, according to the assumptions of the New Institutional Economics from the perspective of the Agency Theory, and on the examination of the main legislative changes in mandatory motor third-party liability insurance in Brazil over the last 50 years. Subsequently, three agency conflicts between DPVAT Consortium stakeholders were identified and analyzed based on theoretical and empirical evidence, arising from: (1) the relationship between the managing body of the DPVAT Consortium (agent) and the insurance companies that are an integral part of the Consortium (principal); (2) the relationship between the managing body of the DPVAT Consortium (agent) and the regulatory body (principal); and (3) the relationship between the insurance company that operates the DPVAT Consortium (agent) and the motor vehicle owners (principal).