Capacidades e performance dos Tribunais de Contas no Brasil
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2016 |
Tipo de documento: | Dissertação |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10438/16686 |
Resumo: | This study aims at analyzing the relationship between the capacity, as defined by Brinkerhoff (2010), and the performance of Brazilian Courts of Accounts (Cortes de Contas). Capacity, in the current study, refers to the number of employees of each Court (Tribunal de Contas, TC), their budget, percentage of servants from their active staff and compliance with the constitutional rules in terms of their training. Performance was measured by the following variables: 'Productivity,' or the number of cases tried or considered by the Justices or Councilmembers; 'Initiative,' or number of 'in loco' audits carried out; 'Amount of fines and debts charged,' understood as the propensity to punish the Auditors Courts; and 'Level of rejection of government accounts,' which is defined as the reason for the number of previous opinions rejecting government accounts by the total number of opinions issued. The current study departs from that of Melo, Pereira and Figueiredo (2009), which identifies various relationships between the structure of the Court of Auditors/Public Finance Courts and its performance - offering new variables for a broader and more realistic analysis of the Auditors Courts' performance. The hypotheses of the study were tested through regression analysis using the minimum squares using statistical method. The data were collected directly from the Courts of Accounts. The tests confirmed that the number of staff in each Court positively influences all the performance variables referred to before, and that the larger the budget of each Court, the greater its productivity, its initiative and amount of fines and credits charged. This study also demonstrated that the larger the percentage of servants in the working staff of the Auditors Court, the greater its productivity, corroborating the theories of Evans (2004). Based on the data collected, we were able to verify that the average percentage of working servants in the Auditors' Court is 69%, whereas in the Judicial Courts the percentage is 89%. This shows that there is plenty of room for increasing the productivity of the auditing bodies. The resulting conclusion is that the greater the financial resources and personnel are, and the greater the percentage of civil servants is, the more productive, proactive and sanctioning the Court of Audits/Public Finance Courts are. |
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Puccioni, Felipe GalvãoEscolas::EBAPEPeci, AlketaAccioly, Victor BelloPereira Filho, Carlos Eduardo Ferreira2016-07-25T18:32:00Z2016-07-25T18:32:00Z2016-07-15PUCCIONI, Felipe Galvão. Capacidades e performance dos Tribunais de Contas no Brasil. Dissertação (Mestrado Profissional em Administração Pública) - FGV - Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro, 2016.http://hdl.handle.net/10438/16686This study aims at analyzing the relationship between the capacity, as defined by Brinkerhoff (2010), and the performance of Brazilian Courts of Accounts (Cortes de Contas). Capacity, in the current study, refers to the number of employees of each Court (Tribunal de Contas, TC), their budget, percentage of servants from their active staff and compliance with the constitutional rules in terms of their training. Performance was measured by the following variables: 'Productivity,' or the number of cases tried or considered by the Justices or Councilmembers; 'Initiative,' or number of 'in loco' audits carried out; 'Amount of fines and debts charged,' understood as the propensity to punish the Auditors Courts; and 'Level of rejection of government accounts,' which is defined as the reason for the number of previous opinions rejecting government accounts by the total number of opinions issued. The current study departs from that of Melo, Pereira and Figueiredo (2009), which identifies various relationships between the structure of the Court of Auditors/Public Finance Courts and its performance - offering new variables for a broader and more realistic analysis of the Auditors Courts' performance. The hypotheses of the study were tested through regression analysis using the minimum squares using statistical method. The data were collected directly from the Courts of Accounts. The tests confirmed that the number of staff in each Court positively influences all the performance variables referred to before, and that the larger the budget of each Court, the greater its productivity, its initiative and amount of fines and credits charged. This study also demonstrated that the larger the percentage of servants in the working staff of the Auditors Court, the greater its productivity, corroborating the theories of Evans (2004). Based on the data collected, we were able to verify that the average percentage of working servants in the Auditors' Court is 69%, whereas in the Judicial Courts the percentage is 89%. This shows that there is plenty of room for increasing the productivity of the auditing bodies. The resulting conclusion is that the greater the financial resources and personnel are, and the greater the percentage of civil servants is, the more productive, proactive and sanctioning the Court of Audits/Public Finance Courts are.O presente estudo visa à análise da relação entre as capacidades, conforme definidas por Brinkerhoff (2010), e a performance das Cortes de Contas brasileiras. As capacidades no atual estudo se referem à quantidade de funcionários de cada Tribunal de Contas, seu orçamento, percentual de servidores do seu quadro efetivo e cumprimento das normas constitucionais quanto a sua formação. A performance foi medida pelas variáveis: 'Produtividade', ou o número de processos julgados ou apreciados pelos Ministros ou Conselheiros; 'Iniciativa', ou seja, quantidade de fiscalizações in loco realizadas; 'Valor das multas e débitos imputados', entendidas como a propensão a punir das Cortes de Contas; e 'Grau de rejeição das contas de governo', que é definida como a razão do número de pareceres prévios rejeitando as contas de governo pelo total de pareceres emitidos. A atual pesquisa parte do estudo de Melo, Pereira e Figueiredo (2009) - que identifica diversas relações entre a estrutura dos Tribunais de Contas e sua atuação - propondo novas variáveis para uma análise mais ampla e real da performance das Cortes de Contas. As hipóteses do estudo foram testadas por meio de regressão estatística utilizando o método de mínimos quadrados. Os dados foram coletados diretamente dos Tribunais de Contas. Os testes realizados confirmaram que a quantidade de recursos humanos de cada Corte influencia positivamente todas as variáveis de performance referidas anteriormente, e que quanto maior o orçamento de cada Tribunal maior sua produtividade, sua iniciativa e o valor das multas e débitos imputados. O presente estudo também comprovou que quanto maior o percentual de servidores do quadro efetivo da Corte de Contas, maior é sua produtividade, o que corrobora as teorias de Evans (2004). A partir dos dados coletados na pesquisa, foi possível verificar que o percentual médio de servidores efetivos nas Corte de Contas é de 69% enquanto nas Cortes Judiciárias esse percentual é de 89%. Isso mostra que há bastante margem para aumento da produtividade dos órgãos de contas. Conclui-se que quanto mais recursos financeiros e humanos disponíveis, e quanto maior o percentual de servidores concursados, mais os Tribunais de Contas são produtivos, sancionadores e proativos.porOrganizaçõesTribunais de contasAdministração públicaAdministração públicaTribunais de contasOrganização judiciáriaControle administrativoCapacidades e performance dos Tribunais de Contas no Brasilinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesisreponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGVinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessORIGINALDISSERTAÇÃO_PUCCIONI_F.pdfDISSERTAÇÃO_PUCCIONI_F.pdfDissertação de Mestradoapplication/pdf1888104https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/a52bbc49-ccbf-4bbb-89c0-2ae5799432af/download832131413ef3e30102a4b45696334cecMD51LICENSElicense.txtlicense.txttext/plain; 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|
dc.title.por.fl_str_mv |
Capacidades e performance dos Tribunais de Contas no Brasil |
title |
Capacidades e performance dos Tribunais de Contas no Brasil |
spellingShingle |
Capacidades e performance dos Tribunais de Contas no Brasil Puccioni, Felipe Galvão Organizações Tribunais de contas Administração pública Administração pública Tribunais de contas Organização judiciária Controle administrativo |
title_short |
Capacidades e performance dos Tribunais de Contas no Brasil |
title_full |
Capacidades e performance dos Tribunais de Contas no Brasil |
title_fullStr |
Capacidades e performance dos Tribunais de Contas no Brasil |
title_full_unstemmed |
Capacidades e performance dos Tribunais de Contas no Brasil |
title_sort |
Capacidades e performance dos Tribunais de Contas no Brasil |
author |
Puccioni, Felipe Galvão |
author_facet |
Puccioni, Felipe Galvão |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.unidadefgv.por.fl_str_mv |
Escolas::EBAPE |
dc.contributor.member.none.fl_str_mv |
Peci, Alketa Accioly, Victor Bello |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Puccioni, Felipe Galvão |
dc.contributor.advisor1.fl_str_mv |
Pereira Filho, Carlos Eduardo Ferreira |
contributor_str_mv |
Pereira Filho, Carlos Eduardo Ferreira |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Organizações Tribunais de contas |
topic |
Organizações Tribunais de contas Administração pública Administração pública Tribunais de contas Organização judiciária Controle administrativo |
dc.subject.area.por.fl_str_mv |
Administração pública |
dc.subject.bibliodata.por.fl_str_mv |
Administração pública Tribunais de contas Organização judiciária Controle administrativo |
description |
This study aims at analyzing the relationship between the capacity, as defined by Brinkerhoff (2010), and the performance of Brazilian Courts of Accounts (Cortes de Contas). Capacity, in the current study, refers to the number of employees of each Court (Tribunal de Contas, TC), their budget, percentage of servants from their active staff and compliance with the constitutional rules in terms of their training. Performance was measured by the following variables: 'Productivity,' or the number of cases tried or considered by the Justices or Councilmembers; 'Initiative,' or number of 'in loco' audits carried out; 'Amount of fines and debts charged,' understood as the propensity to punish the Auditors Courts; and 'Level of rejection of government accounts,' which is defined as the reason for the number of previous opinions rejecting government accounts by the total number of opinions issued. The current study departs from that of Melo, Pereira and Figueiredo (2009), which identifies various relationships between the structure of the Court of Auditors/Public Finance Courts and its performance - offering new variables for a broader and more realistic analysis of the Auditors Courts' performance. The hypotheses of the study were tested through regression analysis using the minimum squares using statistical method. The data were collected directly from the Courts of Accounts. The tests confirmed that the number of staff in each Court positively influences all the performance variables referred to before, and that the larger the budget of each Court, the greater its productivity, its initiative and amount of fines and credits charged. This study also demonstrated that the larger the percentage of servants in the working staff of the Auditors Court, the greater its productivity, corroborating the theories of Evans (2004). Based on the data collected, we were able to verify that the average percentage of working servants in the Auditors' Court is 69%, whereas in the Judicial Courts the percentage is 89%. This shows that there is plenty of room for increasing the productivity of the auditing bodies. The resulting conclusion is that the greater the financial resources and personnel are, and the greater the percentage of civil servants is, the more productive, proactive and sanctioning the Court of Audits/Public Finance Courts are. |
publishDate |
2016 |
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv |
2016-07-25T18:32:00Z |
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv |
2016-07-25T18:32:00Z |
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv |
2016-07-15 |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis |
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masterThesis |
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publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.citation.fl_str_mv |
PUCCIONI, Felipe Galvão. Capacidades e performance dos Tribunais de Contas no Brasil. Dissertação (Mestrado Profissional em Administração Pública) - FGV - Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro, 2016. |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10438/16686 |
identifier_str_mv |
PUCCIONI, Felipe Galvão. Capacidades e performance dos Tribunais de Contas no Brasil. Dissertação (Mestrado Profissional em Administração Pública) - FGV - Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro, 2016. |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10438/16686 |
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por |
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por |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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openAccess |
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Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) |
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FGV |
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FGV |
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Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) |
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Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) |
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