Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty: breaking-down backward induction
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 1992 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10438/937 |
Resumo: | We present two alternative definitions of Nash equilibrium for two person games in the presence af uncertainty, in the sense of Knight. We use the formalization of uncertainty due to Schmeidler and Gilboa. We show that, with one of the definitions, prudent behaviour (maxmin) can be obtained as an outcome even when it is not rationalizable in the usual sense. Most striking is that with the Same definition we break down backward induction in the twice repeated prisoner's dilemma. We also link these results with the Kreps-Milgrom-Roberts-Wilson explanation of cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. |
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Dow, JamesWerlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da CostaEscolas::EPGEFGV2008-05-13T15:42:04Z2008-05-13T15:42:04Z1992-020104-8910http://hdl.handle.net/10438/937We present two alternative definitions of Nash equilibrium for two person games in the presence af uncertainty, in the sense of Knight. We use the formalization of uncertainty due to Schmeidler and Gilboa. We show that, with one of the definitions, prudent behaviour (maxmin) can be obtained as an outcome even when it is not rationalizable in the usual sense. Most striking is that with the Same definition we break down backward induction in the twice repeated prisoner's dilemma. We also link these results with the Kreps-Milgrom-Roberts-Wilson explanation of cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma.engEscola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGVEnsaios Econômicos;186Todo cuidado foi dispensado para respeitar os direitos autorais deste trabalho. Entretanto, caso esta obra aqui depositada seja protegida por direitos autorais externos a esta instituição, contamos com a compreensão do autor e solicitamos que o mesmo faça contato através do Fale Conosco para que possamos tomar as providências cabíveisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessNash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty: breaking-down backward inductioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleEconomiaEconomia matemáticaEconomiareponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGVORIGINAL000075401.pdf000075401.pdfapplication/pdf908255https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/7934df49-f676-4ef7-acab-4d124a3a0200/download9bd9d31ed2d63bb50561603b1723958bMD51TEXT000075401.pdf.txt000075401.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain42754https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/8129a4ed-7ffc-4d89-9c4e-b82e6f46f284/download77c93703d95b1e47e88d5d7dedeb7024MD56THUMBNAIL000075401.pdf.jpg000075401.pdf.jpgGenerated Thumbnailimage/jpeg2263https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/0b1bc497-99af-4e2b-a515-df64d0e7c043/download5197efbc66e318e56153792a19fa650cMD5710438/9372023-11-09 22:30:32.009open.accessoai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/937https://repositorio.fgv.brRepositório InstitucionalPRIhttp://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/dspace-oai/requestopendoar:39742023-11-09T22:30:32Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)false |
dc.title.eng.fl_str_mv |
Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty: breaking-down backward induction |
title |
Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty: breaking-down backward induction |
spellingShingle |
Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty: breaking-down backward induction Dow, James Economia Economia matemática Economia |
title_short |
Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty: breaking-down backward induction |
title_full |
Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty: breaking-down backward induction |
title_fullStr |
Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty: breaking-down backward induction |
title_full_unstemmed |
Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty: breaking-down backward induction |
title_sort |
Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty: breaking-down backward induction |
author |
Dow, James |
author_facet |
Dow, James Werlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Werlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.unidadefgv.por.fl_str_mv |
Escolas::EPGE |
dc.contributor.affiliation.none.fl_str_mv |
FGV |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Dow, James Werlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa |
dc.subject.area.por.fl_str_mv |
Economia |
topic |
Economia Economia matemática Economia |
dc.subject.bibliodata.por.fl_str_mv |
Economia matemática Economia |
description |
We present two alternative definitions of Nash equilibrium for two person games in the presence af uncertainty, in the sense of Knight. We use the formalization of uncertainty due to Schmeidler and Gilboa. We show that, with one of the definitions, prudent behaviour (maxmin) can be obtained as an outcome even when it is not rationalizable in the usual sense. Most striking is that with the Same definition we break down backward induction in the twice repeated prisoner's dilemma. We also link these results with the Kreps-Milgrom-Roberts-Wilson explanation of cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. |
publishDate |
1992 |
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv |
1992-02 |
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv |
2008-05-13T15:42:04Z |
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv |
2008-05-13T15:42:04Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10438/937 |
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv |
0104-8910 |
identifier_str_mv |
0104-8910 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10438/937 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.ispartofseries.por.fl_str_mv |
Ensaios Econômicos;186 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
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FGV |
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FGV |
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Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) |
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Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) |
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