Common agency with informed principals

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Martimort, David
Data de Publicação: 2004
Outros Autores: Moreira, Humberto Ataíde
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10438/479
Resumo: We analyze a common agency game under asymmetric information on the preferences of the non-cooperating principals in a public good context. Asymmetric information introduces incentive compatibility constraints which rationalize the requirement of truthfulness made in the earlier literature on common agency games under complete information. There exists a large class of differentiable equilibria which are ex post inefficient and exhibit free-riding. We then characterize some interim efficient equilibria. Finally, there exists also a unique equilibrium allocation which is robust to random perturbations. This focal equilibrium is characterized for any distribution of types.
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spelling Martimort, DavidMoreira, Humberto AtaídeEscolas::EPGEFGV2008-05-13T15:24:54Z2008-05-13T15:24:54Z2004-06-010104-8910http://hdl.handle.net/10438/479We analyze a common agency game under asymmetric information on the preferences of the non-cooperating principals in a public good context. Asymmetric information introduces incentive compatibility constraints which rationalize the requirement of truthfulness made in the earlier literature on common agency games under complete information. There exists a large class of differentiable equilibria which are ex post inefficient and exhibit free-riding. We then characterize some interim efficient equilibria. Finally, there exists also a unique equilibrium allocation which is robust to random perturbations. This focal equilibrium is characterized for any distribution of types.engEscola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGVEnsaios Econômicos;551Common agencyPublic goodsIncentive mechanismsEconomiaInvestimentos - Modelos econométricosEconomiaCommon agency with informed principalsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlereponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGVinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessORIGINAL1637.pdfapplication/pdf424839https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/2430a951-61bc-4546-887a-fc6d395bb504/download0413dabb13b9e87961c7e4e3849fd7cdMD51TEXT1637.pdf.txt1637.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain94336https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/de1b76c9-f711-4cf9-887d-ac5d019e432c/downloadd27746ed4e5331960cb3de1db21aa682MD56THUMBNAIL1637.pdf.jpg1637.pdf.jpgGenerated Thumbnailimage/jpeg3161https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/cf2d7942-7f9f-4f54-843e-599e2d18aac7/download6497d07d77db801b74faa256b28beb94MD5710438/4792023-11-09 17:17:00.793open.accessoai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/479https://repositorio.fgv.brRepositório InstitucionalPRIhttp://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/dspace-oai/requestopendoar:39742023-11-09T17:17Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)false
dc.title.eng.fl_str_mv Common agency with informed principals
title Common agency with informed principals
spellingShingle Common agency with informed principals
Martimort, David
Common agency
Public goods
Incentive mechanisms
Economia
Investimentos - Modelos econométricos
Economia
title_short Common agency with informed principals
title_full Common agency with informed principals
title_fullStr Common agency with informed principals
title_full_unstemmed Common agency with informed principals
title_sort Common agency with informed principals
author Martimort, David
author_facet Martimort, David
Moreira, Humberto Ataíde
author_role author
author2 Moreira, Humberto Ataíde
author2_role author
dc.contributor.unidadefgv.por.fl_str_mv Escolas::EPGE
dc.contributor.affiliation.none.fl_str_mv FGV
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Martimort, David
Moreira, Humberto Ataíde
dc.subject.eng.fl_str_mv Common agency
Public goods
Incentive mechanisms
topic Common agency
Public goods
Incentive mechanisms
Economia
Investimentos - Modelos econométricos
Economia
dc.subject.area.por.fl_str_mv Economia
dc.subject.bibliodata.por.fl_str_mv Investimentos - Modelos econométricos
Economia
description We analyze a common agency game under asymmetric information on the preferences of the non-cooperating principals in a public good context. Asymmetric information introduces incentive compatibility constraints which rationalize the requirement of truthfulness made in the earlier literature on common agency games under complete information. There exists a large class of differentiable equilibria which are ex post inefficient and exhibit free-riding. We then characterize some interim efficient equilibria. Finally, there exists also a unique equilibrium allocation which is robust to random perturbations. This focal equilibrium is characterized for any distribution of types.
publishDate 2004
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv 2004-06-01
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv 2008-05-13T15:24:54Z
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv 2008-05-13T15:24:54Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
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dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10438/479
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv 0104-8910
identifier_str_mv 0104-8910
url http://hdl.handle.net/10438/479
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries.por.fl_str_mv Ensaios Econômicos;551
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV
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collection Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
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