Moral appraisals guide intuitive legal determinations
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2023 |
Outros Autores: | , , |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações do INSPER |
Texto Completo: | https://repositorio.insper.edu.br/handle/11224/6626 |
Resumo: | We sought to understand how basic competencies in moral reasoning influence the application of private, institutional, and legal rules. Hypotheses: We predicted that moral appraisals, implicating both outcome-based and mental state reasoning, would shape participants’ interpretation of rules and statutes—and asked whether these effects arise differentially under intuitive and reflective reasoning conditions. Method: In six vignette-based experiments (total N = 2,473; 293 university law students [67% women; age bracket mode: 18–22 years] and 2,180 online workers [60% women; mean age = 31.9 years]), participants considered a wide range of written rules and laws and determined whether a protagonist had violated the rule in question. We manipulated morally relevant aspects of each incident—including the valence of the rule’s purpose (Study 1) and of the outcomes that ensued (Studies 2 and 3), as well as the protagonist’s accompanying mental state (Studies 5 and 6). In two studies, we simultaneously varied whether participants decided under time pressure or following a forced delay (Studies 4 and 6). Results: Moral appraisals of the rule’s purpose, the agent’s extraneous blameworthiness, and the agent’s epistemic state impacted legal determinations and helped to explain participants’ departure from rules’ literal interpretation. Counter-literal verdicts were stronger under time pressure and were weakened by the opportunity to reflect. Conclusions: Under intuitive reasoning conditions, legal determinations draw on core competencies in moral cognition, such as outcome-based and mental state reasoning. In turn, cognitive reflection dampens these effects on statutory interpretation, allowing text to play a more influential role. |
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Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações do INSPER |
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Moral appraisals guide intuitive legal determinationsWe sought to understand how basic competencies in moral reasoning influence the application of private, institutional, and legal rules. Hypotheses: We predicted that moral appraisals, implicating both outcome-based and mental state reasoning, would shape participants’ interpretation of rules and statutes—and asked whether these effects arise differentially under intuitive and reflective reasoning conditions. Method: In six vignette-based experiments (total N = 2,473; 293 university law students [67% women; age bracket mode: 18–22 years] and 2,180 online workers [60% women; mean age = 31.9 years]), participants considered a wide range of written rules and laws and determined whether a protagonist had violated the rule in question. We manipulated morally relevant aspects of each incident—including the valence of the rule’s purpose (Study 1) and of the outcomes that ensued (Studies 2 and 3), as well as the protagonist’s accompanying mental state (Studies 5 and 6). In two studies, we simultaneously varied whether participants decided under time pressure or following a forced delay (Studies 4 and 6). Results: Moral appraisals of the rule’s purpose, the agent’s extraneous blameworthiness, and the agent’s epistemic state impacted legal determinations and helped to explain participants’ departure from rules’ literal interpretation. Counter-literal verdicts were stronger under time pressure and were weakened by the opportunity to reflect. Conclusions: Under intuitive reasoning conditions, legal determinations draw on core competencies in moral cognition, such as outcome-based and mental state reasoning. In turn, cognitive reflection dampens these effects on statutory interpretation, allowing text to play a more influential role.American Psychological Association2024-05-02T19:08:53Z2024-05-02T19:08:53Z2023Digitalp. 367–383image/png0147-73071573-661Xhttps://repositorio.insper.edu.br/handle/11224/662610.1037/lhb0000527Law and Human BehaviorFlanagan, BrianAlmeida, Guilherme F. C. F. deStruchiner, NoelHannikainen, Ivar R.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionengreponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações do INSPERinstname:Instituição de Ensino Superior e de Pesquisa (INSPER)instacron:INSPERinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2024-05-03T03:00:45Zoai:repositorio.insper.edu.br:11224/6626Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertaçõeshttps://www.insper.edu.br/biblioteca-telles/PRIhttps://repositorio.insper.edu.br/oai/requestbiblioteca@insper.edu.br ||opendoar:2024-05-03T03:00:45Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações do INSPER - Instituição de Ensino Superior e de Pesquisa (INSPER)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Moral appraisals guide intuitive legal determinations |
title |
Moral appraisals guide intuitive legal determinations |
spellingShingle |
Moral appraisals guide intuitive legal determinations Flanagan, Brian |
title_short |
Moral appraisals guide intuitive legal determinations |
title_full |
Moral appraisals guide intuitive legal determinations |
title_fullStr |
Moral appraisals guide intuitive legal determinations |
title_full_unstemmed |
Moral appraisals guide intuitive legal determinations |
title_sort |
Moral appraisals guide intuitive legal determinations |
author |
Flanagan, Brian |
author_facet |
Flanagan, Brian Almeida, Guilherme F. C. F. de Struchiner, Noel Hannikainen, Ivar R. |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Almeida, Guilherme F. C. F. de Struchiner, Noel Hannikainen, Ivar R. |
author2_role |
author author author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Flanagan, Brian Almeida, Guilherme F. C. F. de Struchiner, Noel Hannikainen, Ivar R. |
description |
We sought to understand how basic competencies in moral reasoning influence the application of private, institutional, and legal rules. Hypotheses: We predicted that moral appraisals, implicating both outcome-based and mental state reasoning, would shape participants’ interpretation of rules and statutes—and asked whether these effects arise differentially under intuitive and reflective reasoning conditions. Method: In six vignette-based experiments (total N = 2,473; 293 university law students [67% women; age bracket mode: 18–22 years] and 2,180 online workers [60% women; mean age = 31.9 years]), participants considered a wide range of written rules and laws and determined whether a protagonist had violated the rule in question. We manipulated morally relevant aspects of each incident—including the valence of the rule’s purpose (Study 1) and of the outcomes that ensued (Studies 2 and 3), as well as the protagonist’s accompanying mental state (Studies 5 and 6). In two studies, we simultaneously varied whether participants decided under time pressure or following a forced delay (Studies 4 and 6). Results: Moral appraisals of the rule’s purpose, the agent’s extraneous blameworthiness, and the agent’s epistemic state impacted legal determinations and helped to explain participants’ departure from rules’ literal interpretation. Counter-literal verdicts were stronger under time pressure and were weakened by the opportunity to reflect. Conclusions: Under intuitive reasoning conditions, legal determinations draw on core competencies in moral cognition, such as outcome-based and mental state reasoning. In turn, cognitive reflection dampens these effects on statutory interpretation, allowing text to play a more influential role. |
publishDate |
2023 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2023 2024-05-02T19:08:53Z 2024-05-02T19:08:53Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
0147-7307 1573-661X https://repositorio.insper.edu.br/handle/11224/6626 10.1037/lhb0000527 |
identifier_str_mv |
0147-7307 1573-661X 10.1037/lhb0000527 |
url |
https://repositorio.insper.edu.br/handle/11224/6626 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
Law and Human Behavior |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
Digital p. 367–383 image/png |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
American Psychological Association |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
American Psychological Association |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações do INSPER instname:Instituição de Ensino Superior e de Pesquisa (INSPER) instacron:INSPER |
instname_str |
Instituição de Ensino Superior e de Pesquisa (INSPER) |
instacron_str |
INSPER |
institution |
INSPER |
reponame_str |
Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações do INSPER |
collection |
Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações do INSPER |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações do INSPER - Instituição de Ensino Superior e de Pesquisa (INSPER) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
biblioteca@insper.edu.br || |
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