The Induction as the Process of the Progressive Determination of the Concepts: a study of case

• Autor(a) principal: Silveira, Lauro Frederico Barbosa da
• Data de Publicação: 2012
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
• Texto Completo: https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/11610
• topic: Máxima pragmática; Espécies de raciocínio; Vagueza e generalidade dos conceitos; Sujeitos de atribuição; Realidade de Deus; Pragmatic Maxim; Types of Reasoning; Vagueness and generality of the concepts; Subjects of attribution; Reality of God

Science, in Peirce's conception, considering it as the determination of conduct before objects that are presented to it with goals to be achieved over time, leads him to a progressive refinement of the so-called pragmatic maxim, and to the articulation of the three fundamental types of reasoning. The articulation of abductive and deductive reasoning, devising possible hypotheses from which to draw conceivable experimental conclusions, will require, through an inductive process and over time, the verification of the degree of adequacy of these hypotheses to the phenomena intended to be known. It is only through the inductive process that the concepts produced will be tested in light of experience, progressively acquiring a determinate character in terms of truth and falsehood. However, the indetermination that remains attributable to the concepts hypothetically presented allows the preservation of the freshness of ideas and forms, so that mathematics may extend toward the frontiers of the phenomenical universe, and even the transcendental may be represented, conjecturally and poetically.