Knowability, the end of inquiry, and epistemic hope: Outline for a Peircean response to Fitch’s paradox

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Dabay, Thomas
Data de Publicação: 2017
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
Texto Completo: https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/31233
Resumo: Fitch’s paradox establishes the claim that if all truths are knowable, then all truths are known. Peirce’s pragmatist epistemology is committed to the antecedent claim, and so it entails the unintuitive consequent, a conclusion that can be seen as a decisive objection against Peirce’s epistemology. In this paper, I argue that, by modifying Peirce’s finitist account of inquiry into an infinitist account, key aspects of his epistemology can be saved from this objection, including Peirce’s epistemic theory of truth, his anti-skeptical fallibilism, his anti-foundationalism, and his reliance on epistemic hope.
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spelling Knowability, the end of inquiry, and epistemic hope: Outline for a Peircean response to Fitch’s paradoxCognoscibilidade, o fim da investigação e esperança epistêmica: Delineamento para uma resposta peirciana ao paradoxo de FitchFitchPeirceCognoscibilidadeParadoxoFim da inquiriçãoCeticismoEsperançaFitchPeirceKnowabilityParadoxEnd of inquirySkepticismHopeFitch’s paradox establishes the claim that if all truths are knowable, then all truths are known. Peirce’s pragmatist epistemology is committed to the antecedent claim, and so it entails the unintuitive consequent, a conclusion that can be seen as a decisive objection against Peirce’s epistemology. In this paper, I argue that, by modifying Peirce’s finitist account of inquiry into an infinitist account, key aspects of his epistemology can be saved from this objection, including Peirce’s epistemic theory of truth, his anti-skeptical fallibilism, his anti-foundationalism, and his reliance on epistemic hope.O paradoxo de Fitch determina a alegação que se todas as verdades são cognoscíveis, então, todas as verdades são conhecidas. A epistemologia pragmatista de Peirce está comprometida com a alegação antecedente e, assim, envolve o consequente não intuitivo, uma conclusão que pode ser considerada como uma objeção decisiva contra a epistemologia de Peirce. Neste artigo argumento que, ao modificar a explicação finitista da investigação para uma explicação infinitista, aspectos-chave de sua epistemologia podem ser resgatados dessa objeção, inclusive a teoria epistêmica de verdade de Peirce, seu falibilismo anticético, seu antifundacionalismo e sua dependência na esperança epistêmica.Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo2017-02-04info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/31233Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 17 No. 2 (2016); 237-252Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 17 n. 2 (2016); 237-2522316-52781518-7187reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)instacron:PUC_SPenghttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/31233/22059Copyright (c) 2017 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessDabay, Thomas2017-02-04T19:39:25Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/31233Revistahttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofiaPRIhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/oairevcognitio@gmail.com2316-52781518-7187opendoar:2017-02-04T19:39:25Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Knowability, the end of inquiry, and epistemic hope: Outline for a Peircean response to Fitch’s paradox
Cognoscibilidade, o fim da investigação e esperança epistêmica: Delineamento para uma resposta peirciana ao paradoxo de Fitch
title Knowability, the end of inquiry, and epistemic hope: Outline for a Peircean response to Fitch’s paradox
spellingShingle Knowability, the end of inquiry, and epistemic hope: Outline for a Peircean response to Fitch’s paradox
Dabay, Thomas
Fitch
Peirce
Cognoscibilidade
Paradoxo
Fim da inquirição
Ceticismo
Esperança
Fitch
Peirce
Knowability
Paradox
End of inquiry
Skepticism
Hope
title_short Knowability, the end of inquiry, and epistemic hope: Outline for a Peircean response to Fitch’s paradox
title_full Knowability, the end of inquiry, and epistemic hope: Outline for a Peircean response to Fitch’s paradox
title_fullStr Knowability, the end of inquiry, and epistemic hope: Outline for a Peircean response to Fitch’s paradox
title_full_unstemmed Knowability, the end of inquiry, and epistemic hope: Outline for a Peircean response to Fitch’s paradox
title_sort Knowability, the end of inquiry, and epistemic hope: Outline for a Peircean response to Fitch’s paradox
author Dabay, Thomas
author_facet Dabay, Thomas
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Dabay, Thomas
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Fitch
Peirce
Cognoscibilidade
Paradoxo
Fim da inquirição
Ceticismo
Esperança
Fitch
Peirce
Knowability
Paradox
End of inquiry
Skepticism
Hope
topic Fitch
Peirce
Cognoscibilidade
Paradoxo
Fim da inquirição
Ceticismo
Esperança
Fitch
Peirce
Knowability
Paradox
End of inquiry
Skepticism
Hope
description Fitch’s paradox establishes the claim that if all truths are knowable, then all truths are known. Peirce’s pragmatist epistemology is committed to the antecedent claim, and so it entails the unintuitive consequent, a conclusion that can be seen as a decisive objection against Peirce’s epistemology. In this paper, I argue that, by modifying Peirce’s finitist account of inquiry into an infinitist account, key aspects of his epistemology can be saved from this objection, including Peirce’s epistemic theory of truth, his anti-skeptical fallibilism, his anti-foundationalism, and his reliance on epistemic hope.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2017-02-04
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/31233
url https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/31233
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/31233/22059
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2017 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2017 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 17 No. 2 (2016); 237-252
Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 17 n. 2 (2016); 237-252
2316-5278
1518-7187
reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
instacron:PUC_SP
instname_str Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
instacron_str PUC_SP
institution PUC_SP
reponame_str Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
collection Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv revcognitio@gmail.com
_version_ 1803387421747838976

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