New Directions in Pragmatic Ethics

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Liszka, James Jakób
Data de Publicação: 2013
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
Texto Completo: https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/16580
Resumo: It is well known that William James used Peirce´s pragmatic maxim to not only develop a theory of meaning, but also a theory of truth - an expansion of the maxim of which Peirce disapproved. Nonetheless, James takes the concept of truth in an interesting direction by claiming it to be "one species of the good." Consequently, the criteria he establishes for true beliefs are also his criteria for good actions and pratices. In doing so, James lays the groundwork for an ethic that is elaborated well by Dewey and consistent with many of Peirce´s ethical ideas. It is one that emphasizes the very practical characteristics of the good as that  which improves the human condition by means of practices that best facilitate problem-solving. The purpose of this paper is to draw out this idea and show how it takes pragmatic ethics in new directions, one that is picked up by neo-pragmatists such as Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam.
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spelling New Directions in Pragmatic EthicsNovas Direções na Ética PragmáticaÉticaPragmatismo.EthicsPragmatism.It is well known that William James used Peirce´s pragmatic maxim to not only develop a theory of meaning, but also a theory of truth - an expansion of the maxim of which Peirce disapproved. Nonetheless, James takes the concept of truth in an interesting direction by claiming it to be "one species of the good." Consequently, the criteria he establishes for true beliefs are also his criteria for good actions and pratices. In doing so, James lays the groundwork for an ethic that is elaborated well by Dewey and consistent with many of Peirce´s ethical ideas. It is one that emphasizes the very practical characteristics of the good as that  which improves the human condition by means of practices that best facilitate problem-solving. The purpose of this paper is to draw out this idea and show how it takes pragmatic ethics in new directions, one that is picked up by neo-pragmatists such as Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam.É notório que James usou a máxima pragmática de Peirce não apenas para desenvolver uma teoria do significado, mas também para uma teoria da verdade - uma expansão da máxima que Peirce não aprovou. Mesmo assim, James encaminha a conceção de verdade numa direção interessante ao afirmar que ela é "uma espécie do bem". Consequentemente, os critérios que ele estabelece para crenças verdadeiras são também seus critérios para práticas e ações boas. Ao fazer isso, James institui as bases para uma Ética que é bem elaborada por Dewey e consistente com muitas das ideias éticas de Peirce. Uma ética que enfatiza a mesma característica prática do bem como aquela que melhora a condição humana por meio de práticas que melhor facilitam a resolução de problemas. O propósito deste trabalho é extrair essa ideia e demonstrar como ela dá novas direções à ética pragmática, uma que é continuada por neo-pragmatistas como Richard Rorty e Hilary Putnam.Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo2013-09-11info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/16580Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 14 No. 1 (2013); 51-62Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 14 n. 1 (2013); 51-622316-52781518-7187reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)instacron:PUC_SPenghttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/16580/12447Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessLiszka, James Jakób2024-07-01T13:09:36Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/16580Revistahttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofiaPRIhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/oairevcognitio@gmail.com2316-52781518-7187opendoar:2024-07-01T13:09:36Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv New Directions in Pragmatic Ethics
Novas Direções na Ética Pragmática
title New Directions in Pragmatic Ethics
spellingShingle New Directions in Pragmatic Ethics
Liszka, James Jakób
Ética
Pragmatismo.
Ethics
Pragmatism.
title_short New Directions in Pragmatic Ethics
title_full New Directions in Pragmatic Ethics
title_fullStr New Directions in Pragmatic Ethics
title_full_unstemmed New Directions in Pragmatic Ethics
title_sort New Directions in Pragmatic Ethics
author Liszka, James Jakób
author_facet Liszka, James Jakób
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Liszka, James Jakób
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Ética
Pragmatismo.
Ethics
Pragmatism.
topic Ética
Pragmatismo.
Ethics
Pragmatism.
description It is well known that William James used Peirce´s pragmatic maxim to not only develop a theory of meaning, but also a theory of truth - an expansion of the maxim of which Peirce disapproved. Nonetheless, James takes the concept of truth in an interesting direction by claiming it to be "one species of the good." Consequently, the criteria he establishes for true beliefs are also his criteria for good actions and pratices. In doing so, James lays the groundwork for an ethic that is elaborated well by Dewey and consistent with many of Peirce´s ethical ideas. It is one that emphasizes the very practical characteristics of the good as that  which improves the human condition by means of practices that best facilitate problem-solving. The purpose of this paper is to draw out this idea and show how it takes pragmatic ethics in new directions, one that is picked up by neo-pragmatists such as Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam.
publishDate 2013
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2013-09-11
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/16580
url https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/16580
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/16580/12447
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 14 No. 1 (2013); 51-62
Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 14 n. 1 (2013); 51-62
2316-5278
1518-7187
reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
instacron:PUC_SP
instname_str Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
instacron_str PUC_SP
institution PUC_SP
reponame_str Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
collection Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv revcognitio@gmail.com
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