The Relativist Threat: Pragmatism, Response-dependence and Protagoreanism
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2013 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13513 |
Resumo: | Pragmatism is famously difficult to define, especially when it extends from Peirce to its more modern forms. This threatens its consistency and gives room to a relativist reading where anything can count as a form of pragmatism. I intend here to examine arguments in favour of a rigorous definition referring to the original 1878 maxim. I show that, in its responsedependant readings, it secures both the specificity and the contemporary relevance of pragmatism. Some resemblance between the responsedependant reading of the pragmatist maxim and the Protagorean dictum resurrects relativist threat within pragmatism thus redefined. But contrary to the first threat, this second has something to it: it fairly recalls that historically, pragmatism was indeed a reaction for “Protagoras rather than Plato” and also considered as a form of anthropocentrism or “humanism”. Philosophically, it addresses a challenge to pragmatism: how can it refuse absolutism and metaphysical realism while not advocating a form of relativism? How can our conceptions both be defined in terms of our dispositions to act on them and have a form of objectivity? The rigidity of definition previously given to pragmatism helps here to distinguish between different kinds of relativist challenges, which deserve to be differently feared and addressed. |
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The Relativist Threat: Pragmatism, Response-dependence and ProtagoreanismA Ameaça Relativista: Pragmatismo, Resposta-dependência e ProtagorismoMeaningPragmatismPragmatist maximPeirceProtagorasRelativismResponse-dependenceSignificadoPragmatismoMáxima pragmáticaPeirceProtágorasRelativismoResposta-dependênciaPragmatism is famously difficult to define, especially when it extends from Peirce to its more modern forms. This threatens its consistency and gives room to a relativist reading where anything can count as a form of pragmatism. I intend here to examine arguments in favour of a rigorous definition referring to the original 1878 maxim. I show that, in its responsedependant readings, it secures both the specificity and the contemporary relevance of pragmatism. Some resemblance between the responsedependant reading of the pragmatist maxim and the Protagorean dictum resurrects relativist threat within pragmatism thus redefined. But contrary to the first threat, this second has something to it: it fairly recalls that historically, pragmatism was indeed a reaction for “Protagoras rather than Plato” and also considered as a form of anthropocentrism or “humanism”. Philosophically, it addresses a challenge to pragmatism: how can it refuse absolutism and metaphysical realism while not advocating a form of relativism? How can our conceptions both be defined in terms of our dispositions to act on them and have a form of objectivity? The rigidity of definition previously given to pragmatism helps here to distinguish between different kinds of relativist challenges, which deserve to be differently feared and addressed.O pragmatismo é notoriamente difícil de se definir, particularmente quando vai de Peirce até suas formas mais modernas. Isso ameaça sua coerência e deixa espaço para uma leitura relativista, na qual qualquer coisa pode ser uma forma de pragmatismo. Pretendo, aqui, examinar argumentos em favor de uma definição rigorosa da máxima original de 1878. Mostro que, nas suas leituras do tipo resposta-dependência, ela assegura tanto a especificidade quanto a relevância contemporânea do pragmatismo. Alguma semelhança entre a leitura do tipo resposta-dependência da máxima pragmática e a máxima de Protágoras reaviva a ameaça relativista dentro do pragmatismo assim redefinido. Mas, contrariamente à primeira ameaça, esta segunda é de certa maneira válida: ela justamente lembra que, historicamente, o pragmatismo foi uma forma de reação em favor de “Protágoras ao invés de Platão”, e também foi considerado como uma forma de antropocentrismo ou “humanismo”. Filosoficamente, ela põe um desafio ao pragmatismo: como ele pode recusar o absolutismo e o realismo metafísico sem defender uma forma de relativismo? Como nossas concepções podem ser tanto definidas em termos de nossas disposições para agir quanto ter uma forma objetiva? A rigidez da definição previamente dada ao pragmatismo ajuda, aqui, a diferenciar as espécies de desafios relativistas, que merecem ser temidos e atacados de maneiras diversas.Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo2013-01-30info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13513Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 8 No. 1 (2007); 69-92Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 8 n. 1 (2007); 69-922316-52781518-7187reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)instacron:PUC_SPenghttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13513/10020Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessDeroy, Ophelia O.2024-07-01T13:09:34Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/13513Revistahttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofiaPRIhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/oairevcognitio@gmail.com2316-52781518-7187opendoar:2024-07-01T13:09:34Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
The Relativist Threat: Pragmatism, Response-dependence and Protagoreanism A Ameaça Relativista: Pragmatismo, Resposta-dependência e Protagorismo |
title |
The Relativist Threat: Pragmatism, Response-dependence and Protagoreanism |
spellingShingle |
The Relativist Threat: Pragmatism, Response-dependence and Protagoreanism Deroy, Ophelia O. Meaning Pragmatism Pragmatist maxim Peirce Protagoras Relativism Response-dependence Significado Pragmatismo Máxima pragmática Peirce Protágoras Relativismo Resposta-dependência |
title_short |
The Relativist Threat: Pragmatism, Response-dependence and Protagoreanism |
title_full |
The Relativist Threat: Pragmatism, Response-dependence and Protagoreanism |
title_fullStr |
The Relativist Threat: Pragmatism, Response-dependence and Protagoreanism |
title_full_unstemmed |
The Relativist Threat: Pragmatism, Response-dependence and Protagoreanism |
title_sort |
The Relativist Threat: Pragmatism, Response-dependence and Protagoreanism |
author |
Deroy, Ophelia O. |
author_facet |
Deroy, Ophelia O. |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Deroy, Ophelia O. |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Meaning Pragmatism Pragmatist maxim Peirce Protagoras Relativism Response-dependence Significado Pragmatismo Máxima pragmática Peirce Protágoras Relativismo Resposta-dependência |
topic |
Meaning Pragmatism Pragmatist maxim Peirce Protagoras Relativism Response-dependence Significado Pragmatismo Máxima pragmática Peirce Protágoras Relativismo Resposta-dependência |
description |
Pragmatism is famously difficult to define, especially when it extends from Peirce to its more modern forms. This threatens its consistency and gives room to a relativist reading where anything can count as a form of pragmatism. I intend here to examine arguments in favour of a rigorous definition referring to the original 1878 maxim. I show that, in its responsedependant readings, it secures both the specificity and the contemporary relevance of pragmatism. Some resemblance between the responsedependant reading of the pragmatist maxim and the Protagorean dictum resurrects relativist threat within pragmatism thus redefined. But contrary to the first threat, this second has something to it: it fairly recalls that historically, pragmatism was indeed a reaction for “Protagoras rather than Plato” and also considered as a form of anthropocentrism or “humanism”. Philosophically, it addresses a challenge to pragmatism: how can it refuse absolutism and metaphysical realism while not advocating a form of relativism? How can our conceptions both be defined in terms of our dispositions to act on them and have a form of objectivity? The rigidity of definition previously given to pragmatism helps here to distinguish between different kinds of relativist challenges, which deserve to be differently feared and addressed. |
publishDate |
2013 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2013-01-30 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13513 |
url |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13513 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13513/10020 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 8 No. 1 (2007); 69-92 Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 8 n. 1 (2007); 69-92 2316-5278 1518-7187 reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) instacron:PUC_SP |
instname_str |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
instacron_str |
PUC_SP |
institution |
PUC_SP |
reponame_str |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
collection |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
revcognitio@gmail.com |
_version_ |
1803387420925755392 |