The Pragmatist Maxim and the Proof of Pragmatism

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Hookway, Christopher
Data de Publicação: 2013
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
Texto Completo: https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13620
Resumo: Peirce’s pragmatic maxim has been very influential in the development of the pragmatist tradition. He claimed that his version of pragmatism was better than others because it could receive a strict proof. The paper compares some different accounts of the content of the maxim, showing that Peirce thinks we won’t know its exact content until we know how it can be proved. Against this background, I shall explore some of the ways in which he tried to argue for its correctness, including some (“seductive persuasions” and “scientific proofs”) which, although useful, did not meet his needs. I then try to explain why he thought that a strict and rigorous proof was required.
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spelling The Pragmatist Maxim and the Proof of PragmatismA Máxima Pragmatista e a Prova do PragmatismoPragmatismPragmatist maximVerificationismScientific proofPragmatismoMáxima pragmatistaVerificacionismoProva científicaPeirce’s pragmatic maxim has been very influential in the development of the pragmatist tradition. He claimed that his version of pragmatism was better than others because it could receive a strict proof. The paper compares some different accounts of the content of the maxim, showing that Peirce thinks we won’t know its exact content until we know how it can be proved. Against this background, I shall explore some of the ways in which he tried to argue for its correctness, including some (“seductive persuasions” and “scientific proofs”) which, although useful, did not meet his needs. I then try to explain why he thought that a strict and rigorous proof was required.A máxima pragmática de Peirce tem sido extremamente influente no desenvolvimento da tradição pragmatista. Ele sustentou que sua versão de pragmatismo era melhor que as outras porque podia ser submetida a uma prova rigorosa. Este trabalho compara alguns relatos diferentes do conteúdo da máxima, mostrando que, segundo Peirce, não conheceremos seu conteúdo exato até que saibamos como poderá ser provado. Contra esse pano de fundo, explorarei algumas das formas pelas quais ele tentou defender sua justeza, inclusive algumas (“persuasões sedutoras” e “provas científicas”) que, embora úteis, não atenderam às suas necessidades. Tento, então, explicar por que ele acreditava na necessidade de uma prova rigorosa e perfeita.Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo2013-02-14info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13620Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 6 No. 1 (2005); 25-42Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 6 n. 1 (2005); 25-422316-52781518-7187reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)instacron:PUC_SPenghttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13620/10130Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessHookway, Christopher2024-07-01T13:09:36Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/13620Revistahttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofiaPRIhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/oairevcognitio@gmail.com2316-52781518-7187opendoar:2024-07-01T13:09:36Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The Pragmatist Maxim and the Proof of Pragmatism
A Máxima Pragmatista e a Prova do Pragmatismo
title The Pragmatist Maxim and the Proof of Pragmatism
spellingShingle The Pragmatist Maxim and the Proof of Pragmatism
Hookway, Christopher
Pragmatism
Pragmatist maxim
Verificationism
Scientific proof
Pragmatismo
Máxima pragmatista
Verificacionismo
Prova científica
title_short The Pragmatist Maxim and the Proof of Pragmatism
title_full The Pragmatist Maxim and the Proof of Pragmatism
title_fullStr The Pragmatist Maxim and the Proof of Pragmatism
title_full_unstemmed The Pragmatist Maxim and the Proof of Pragmatism
title_sort The Pragmatist Maxim and the Proof of Pragmatism
author Hookway, Christopher
author_facet Hookway, Christopher
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Hookway, Christopher
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Pragmatism
Pragmatist maxim
Verificationism
Scientific proof
Pragmatismo
Máxima pragmatista
Verificacionismo
Prova científica
topic Pragmatism
Pragmatist maxim
Verificationism
Scientific proof
Pragmatismo
Máxima pragmatista
Verificacionismo
Prova científica
description Peirce’s pragmatic maxim has been very influential in the development of the pragmatist tradition. He claimed that his version of pragmatism was better than others because it could receive a strict proof. The paper compares some different accounts of the content of the maxim, showing that Peirce thinks we won’t know its exact content until we know how it can be proved. Against this background, I shall explore some of the ways in which he tried to argue for its correctness, including some (“seductive persuasions” and “scientific proofs”) which, although useful, did not meet his needs. I then try to explain why he thought that a strict and rigorous proof was required.
publishDate 2013
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2013-02-14
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13620
url https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13620
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13620/10130
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 6 No. 1 (2005); 25-42
Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 6 n. 1 (2005); 25-42
2316-5278
1518-7187
reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
instacron:PUC_SP
instname_str Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
instacron_str PUC_SP
institution PUC_SP
reponame_str Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
collection Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv revcognitio@gmail.com
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