Peirce and Ancient Scepticism

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Deroy, Ophelia
Data de Publicação: 2013
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
Texto Completo: https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13601
Resumo: The marking of problematic relationships between Peircean pragmatism and scepticism, noted by his contemporaries as by ours, is all the more complicated than the label of scepticism remains vague. The task doesn’t first appear simpler once the label is restricted to its understanding to the Ancient versions: differences vanish as emerges a common agreement on the therapeutic role of philosophy, the infinitely inferential character of thought and on the indubitability of perceptions. The parallelism can be drawn up to the end aimed at by the two paths, both pretending to assure a rational self-control. It highlights then the point on which they diverge, as the sceptic decides for suspension while the pragmatist chooses to keep on inquiry with the hope of infinite growth, which he has then to rescue from sceptical doubts.
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spelling Peirce and Ancient ScepticismPeirce e o Ceticismo AntigoDúvidaPeircePragmatismoCeticismoAutocontroleDoubtPeircePragmatismScepticismSelf-controlThe marking of problematic relationships between Peircean pragmatism and scepticism, noted by his contemporaries as by ours, is all the more complicated than the label of scepticism remains vague. The task doesn’t first appear simpler once the label is restricted to its understanding to the Ancient versions: differences vanish as emerges a common agreement on the therapeutic role of philosophy, the infinitely inferential character of thought and on the indubitability of perceptions. The parallelism can be drawn up to the end aimed at by the two paths, both pretending to assure a rational self-control. It highlights then the point on which they diverge, as the sceptic decides for suspension while the pragmatist chooses to keep on inquiry with the hope of infinite growth, which he has then to rescue from sceptical doubts.A demarcação de relações problemáticas entre o ceticismo e o pragmatismo de Peirce, notadas tanto por seus contemporâneos quanto pelos nossos, é ainda mais complicada do que o quão vago permanece o rótulo de ceticismo. A tarefa não parece ser mais simples, num primeiro momento, uma vez que o rótulo se restringe ao seu entendimento nas versões antigas: as diferenças desaparecem à medida que emerge um acordo comum acerca do papel terapêutico da filosofia, do caráter infinitamente inferencial do pensamento e da indubitabilidade das percepções. O paralelismo pode ser traçado até o fim almejado pelos dois caminhos, ambos os quais pretendem assegurar um autocontrole racional. Esse paralelismo realça, então, o ponto em que divergem, já que o cético decide pela suspensão do juízo e o pragmatista escolhe continuar a inquirição com a esperança de crescimento infinito, que ele tem, portanto, de recuperar das dúvidas céticas.Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo2013-02-08info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13601Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 6 No. 2 (2005); 135-147Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 6 n. 2 (2005); 135-1472316-52781518-7187reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)instacron:PUC_SPenghttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13601/10107Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessDeroy, Ophelia2024-07-01T13:09:36Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/13601Revistahttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofiaPRIhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/oairevcognitio@gmail.com2316-52781518-7187opendoar:2024-07-01T13:09:36Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Peirce and Ancient Scepticism
Peirce e o Ceticismo Antigo
title Peirce and Ancient Scepticism
spellingShingle Peirce and Ancient Scepticism
Deroy, Ophelia
Dúvida
Peirce
Pragmatismo
Ceticismo
Autocontrole
Doubt
Peirce
Pragmatism
Scepticism
Self-control
title_short Peirce and Ancient Scepticism
title_full Peirce and Ancient Scepticism
title_fullStr Peirce and Ancient Scepticism
title_full_unstemmed Peirce and Ancient Scepticism
title_sort Peirce and Ancient Scepticism
author Deroy, Ophelia
author_facet Deroy, Ophelia
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Deroy, Ophelia
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Dúvida
Peirce
Pragmatismo
Ceticismo
Autocontrole
Doubt
Peirce
Pragmatism
Scepticism
Self-control
topic Dúvida
Peirce
Pragmatismo
Ceticismo
Autocontrole
Doubt
Peirce
Pragmatism
Scepticism
Self-control
description The marking of problematic relationships between Peircean pragmatism and scepticism, noted by his contemporaries as by ours, is all the more complicated than the label of scepticism remains vague. The task doesn’t first appear simpler once the label is restricted to its understanding to the Ancient versions: differences vanish as emerges a common agreement on the therapeutic role of philosophy, the infinitely inferential character of thought and on the indubitability of perceptions. The parallelism can be drawn up to the end aimed at by the two paths, both pretending to assure a rational self-control. It highlights then the point on which they diverge, as the sceptic decides for suspension while the pragmatist chooses to keep on inquiry with the hope of infinite growth, which he has then to rescue from sceptical doubts.
publishDate 2013
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2013-02-08
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13601
url https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13601
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13601/10107
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 6 No. 2 (2005); 135-147
Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 6 n. 2 (2005); 135-147
2316-5278
1518-7187
reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
instacron:PUC_SP
instname_str Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
instacron_str PUC_SP
institution PUC_SP
reponame_str Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
collection Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv revcognitio@gmail.com
_version_ 1803387421271785472

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