The lurking thing about the thing
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2017 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/33441 |
Resumo: | A thing might be anything and nothing; it is impossible to frame any research on it. Any propositional approach seems hopelessly predestined; thinking of the thing turns the latter into an object. The object is either “real” or, “unreal” and this is obviously a trap. Who can talk on such а topic exhaustively? It is also a question of “universalia” and “particularia;” of name and naming; a nominalist and a phenomenological problem; of semiotic and representation—a boundless area. This article tries to slip out of “the cage” of propositions by tracing three philosophical doctrines that seem to reach farther than to the “solving word”. The approaches of Peirce, Husserl, and Wittgenstein tackle the abilities of relating, abstracting and comprehending how the thing is seen correctly in non-limited surroundings. |
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The lurking thing about the thingA coisa à espreita sobre a coisaCoisaPeirceHusserlWittgensteinSubstânciaMatériaObjetoRelaçãoThingPeirceHusserlWittgensteinSubstanceMatterObjectRelationA thing might be anything and nothing; it is impossible to frame any research on it. Any propositional approach seems hopelessly predestined; thinking of the thing turns the latter into an object. The object is either “real” or, “unreal” and this is obviously a trap. Who can talk on such а topic exhaustively? It is also a question of “universalia” and “particularia;” of name and naming; a nominalist and a phenomenological problem; of semiotic and representation—a boundless area. This article tries to slip out of “the cage” of propositions by tracing three philosophical doctrines that seem to reach farther than to the “solving word”. The approaches of Peirce, Husserl, and Wittgenstein tackle the abilities of relating, abstracting and comprehending how the thing is seen correctly in non-limited surroundings.Uma coisa pode ser qualquer coisa e nada; é impossível estruturar qualquer pesquisa sobre isso. Qualquer abordagem proposicional parece irremediavelmente predeterminada; pensar-se em uma coisa a transforma em um objeto. O objeto é “real” ou “irreal” e isto é, obviamente, uma armadilha. Quem pode discorrer exaustivamente sobre esse tema? É também uma questão de “universalia” e “particularia”; de nome e designação; um problema nominalista e fenomenológico; de semiótica e representação – uma área sem limites. Este artigo tenta escapar da “gaiola” de proposições, identificando três doutrinas filosóficas que parecem ir além da “palavra resolutiva”. As abordagens de Peirce, Husserl e Wittgenstein lidam com as capacidades de relacionar, abstrair e compreender como a coisa é vista corretamente em um ambiente ilimitado.Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo2017-07-10info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/3344110.23925/2316-5278.2017v18i1p99-110Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 18 No. 1 (2017); 99-110Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 18 n. 1 (2017); 99-1102316-52781518-7187reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)instacron:PUC_SPenghttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/33441/23145Copyright (c) 2017 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessMladenov, Ivan2017-08-17T16:53:31Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/33441Revistahttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofiaPRIhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/oairevcognitio@gmail.com2316-52781518-7187opendoar:2017-08-17T16:53:31Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
The lurking thing about the thing A coisa à espreita sobre a coisa |
title |
The lurking thing about the thing |
spellingShingle |
The lurking thing about the thing Mladenov, Ivan Coisa Peirce Husserl Wittgenstein Substância Matéria Objeto Relação Thing Peirce Husserl Wittgenstein Substance Matter Object Relation |
title_short |
The lurking thing about the thing |
title_full |
The lurking thing about the thing |
title_fullStr |
The lurking thing about the thing |
title_full_unstemmed |
The lurking thing about the thing |
title_sort |
The lurking thing about the thing |
author |
Mladenov, Ivan |
author_facet |
Mladenov, Ivan |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Mladenov, Ivan |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Coisa Peirce Husserl Wittgenstein Substância Matéria Objeto Relação Thing Peirce Husserl Wittgenstein Substance Matter Object Relation |
topic |
Coisa Peirce Husserl Wittgenstein Substância Matéria Objeto Relação Thing Peirce Husserl Wittgenstein Substance Matter Object Relation |
description |
A thing might be anything and nothing; it is impossible to frame any research on it. Any propositional approach seems hopelessly predestined; thinking of the thing turns the latter into an object. The object is either “real” or, “unreal” and this is obviously a trap. Who can talk on such а topic exhaustively? It is also a question of “universalia” and “particularia;” of name and naming; a nominalist and a phenomenological problem; of semiotic and representation—a boundless area. This article tries to slip out of “the cage” of propositions by tracing three philosophical doctrines that seem to reach farther than to the “solving word”. The approaches of Peirce, Husserl, and Wittgenstein tackle the abilities of relating, abstracting and comprehending how the thing is seen correctly in non-limited surroundings. |
publishDate |
2017 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2017-07-10 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/33441 10.23925/2316-5278.2017v18i1p99-110 |
url |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/33441 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.23925/2316-5278.2017v18i1p99-110 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/33441/23145 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2017 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2017 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 18 No. 1 (2017); 99-110 Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 18 n. 1 (2017); 99-110 2316-5278 1518-7187 reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) instacron:PUC_SP |
instname_str |
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
instacron_str |
PUC_SP |
institution |
PUC_SP |
reponame_str |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
collection |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
revcognitio@gmail.com |
_version_ |
1803387421778247680 |