The lurking thing about the thing

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Mladenov, Ivan
Data de Publicação: 2017
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
Texto Completo: https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/33441
Resumo: A thing might be anything and nothing; it is impossible to frame any research on it. Any propositional approach seems hopelessly predestined; thinking of the thing turns the latter into an object. The object is either “real” or, “unreal” and this is obviously a trap. Who can talk on such а topic exhaustively? It is also a question of “universalia” and “particularia;” of name and naming; a nominalist and a phenomenological problem; of semiotic and representation—a boundless area. This article tries to slip out of “the cage” of propositions by tracing three philosophical doctrines that seem to reach farther than to the “solving word”. The approaches of Peirce, Husserl, and Wittgenstein tackle the abilities of relating, abstracting and comprehending how the thing is seen correctly in non-limited surroundings.
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spelling The lurking thing about the thingA coisa à espreita sobre a coisaCoisaPeirceHusserlWittgensteinSubstânciaMatériaObjetoRelaçãoThingPeirceHusserlWittgensteinSubstanceMatterObjectRelationA thing might be anything and nothing; it is impossible to frame any research on it. Any propositional approach seems hopelessly predestined; thinking of the thing turns the latter into an object. The object is either “real” or, “unreal” and this is obviously a trap. Who can talk on such а topic exhaustively? It is also a question of “universalia” and “particularia;” of name and naming; a nominalist and a phenomenological problem; of semiotic and representation—a boundless area. This article tries to slip out of “the cage” of propositions by tracing three philosophical doctrines that seem to reach farther than to the “solving word”. The approaches of Peirce, Husserl, and Wittgenstein tackle the abilities of relating, abstracting and comprehending how the thing is seen correctly in non-limited surroundings.Uma coisa pode ser qualquer coisa e nada; é impossível estruturar qualquer pesquisa sobre isso. Qualquer abordagem proposicional parece irremediavelmente predeterminada; pensar-se em uma coisa a transforma em um objeto. O objeto é “real” ou “irreal” e isto é, obviamente, uma armadilha. Quem pode discorrer exaustivamente sobre esse tema? É também uma questão de “universalia” e “particularia”; de nome e designação; um problema nominalista e fenomenológico; de semiótica e representação – uma área sem limites. Este artigo tenta escapar da “gaiola” de proposições, identificando três doutrinas filosóficas que parecem ir além da “palavra resolutiva”. As abordagens de Peirce, Husserl e Wittgenstein lidam com as capacidades de relacionar, abstrair e compreender como a coisa é vista corretamente em um ambiente ilimitado.Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo2017-07-10info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/3344110.23925/2316-5278.2017v18i1p99-110Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 18 No. 1 (2017); 99-110Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 18 n. 1 (2017); 99-1102316-52781518-7187reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)instacron:PUC_SPenghttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/33441/23145Copyright (c) 2017 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessMladenov, Ivan2017-08-17T16:53:31Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/33441Revistahttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofiaPRIhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/oairevcognitio@gmail.com2316-52781518-7187opendoar:2017-08-17T16:53:31Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The lurking thing about the thing
A coisa à espreita sobre a coisa
title The lurking thing about the thing
spellingShingle The lurking thing about the thing
Mladenov, Ivan
Coisa
Peirce
Husserl
Wittgenstein
Substância
Matéria
Objeto
Relação
Thing
Peirce
Husserl
Wittgenstein
Substance
Matter
Object
Relation
title_short The lurking thing about the thing
title_full The lurking thing about the thing
title_fullStr The lurking thing about the thing
title_full_unstemmed The lurking thing about the thing
title_sort The lurking thing about the thing
author Mladenov, Ivan
author_facet Mladenov, Ivan
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Mladenov, Ivan
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Coisa
Peirce
Husserl
Wittgenstein
Substância
Matéria
Objeto
Relação
Thing
Peirce
Husserl
Wittgenstein
Substance
Matter
Object
Relation
topic Coisa
Peirce
Husserl
Wittgenstein
Substância
Matéria
Objeto
Relação
Thing
Peirce
Husserl
Wittgenstein
Substance
Matter
Object
Relation
description A thing might be anything and nothing; it is impossible to frame any research on it. Any propositional approach seems hopelessly predestined; thinking of the thing turns the latter into an object. The object is either “real” or, “unreal” and this is obviously a trap. Who can talk on such а topic exhaustively? It is also a question of “universalia” and “particularia;” of name and naming; a nominalist and a phenomenological problem; of semiotic and representation—a boundless area. This article tries to slip out of “the cage” of propositions by tracing three philosophical doctrines that seem to reach farther than to the “solving word”. The approaches of Peirce, Husserl, and Wittgenstein tackle the abilities of relating, abstracting and comprehending how the thing is seen correctly in non-limited surroundings.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2017-07-10
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/33441
10.23925/2316-5278.2017v18i1p99-110
url https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/33441
identifier_str_mv 10.23925/2316-5278.2017v18i1p99-110
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/33441/23145
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2017 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2017 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 18 No. 1 (2017); 99-110
Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 18 n. 1 (2017); 99-110
2316-5278
1518-7187
reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
instacron:PUC_SP
instname_str Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
instacron_str PUC_SP
institution PUC_SP
reponame_str Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
collection Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv revcognitio@gmail.com
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