Reconstructing the Normative Sciences

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Parker, Kelly A.
Data de Publicação: 2013
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
Texto Completo: https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13238
Resumo: From 1902 onward, Peirce viewed esthetics, ethics, and logic as “normative sciences,” interconnected spheres of philosophical inquiry that constitute his main work in value theory. The normative sciences provide the basis for a theoretical investigation of questions of value detached from practical interests. Because the normative sciences maintain Peirce’s well-known insistence on realism, they set his pragmaticism apart from the more “nominalistic” pragmatism of James and Dewey. The paper aims to clarify Peirce’s idea of the normative sciences, to show how his realism applies in the sphere of value, and to explore his views on the proper relation between theory and practice. The concluding section suggests examples of how we might understand Peirce’s rich and innovative concept of normative esthetics.
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spelling Reconstructing the Normative SciencesReconstruindo as Ciências NormativasPeircepragmatismpragmaticismvalue theorynormative scienceestheticsethicslogicsPeircepragmatismopragmaticismoteoria do valorciência normativaestéticaéticalógicaFrom 1902 onward, Peirce viewed esthetics, ethics, and logic as “normative sciences,” interconnected spheres of philosophical inquiry that constitute his main work in value theory. The normative sciences provide the basis for a theoretical investigation of questions of value detached from practical interests. Because the normative sciences maintain Peirce’s well-known insistence on realism, they set his pragmaticism apart from the more “nominalistic” pragmatism of James and Dewey. The paper aims to clarify Peirce’s idea of the normative sciences, to show how his realism applies in the sphere of value, and to explore his views on the proper relation between theory and practice. The concluding section suggests examples of how we might understand Peirce’s rich and innovative concept of normative esthetics.De 1902 em diante, Peirce considerava a estética, a ética e a lógica como “ciências normativas”, esferas interconexas de inquirição filosófica que constituem seu principal trabalho em teoria do valor. As ciências normativas fornecem a base para uma investigação teorética de questões sobre valor, independentes de interesses práticos. Porque as ciências normativas mantêm a notória insistência de Peirce no realismo, elas colocam seu pragmaticismo à parte do pragmatismo mais “nominalista” de James e Dewey. O artigo almeja esclarecer a idéia de Peirce das ciências normativas, mostrar como seu realismo se aplica à esfera do valor, e explorar suas visões da própria relação entre ciência e prática. A seção concludente sugere exemplos de como podemos entender o rico e inovador conceito peirciano de estética normativa.Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo2013-01-09info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13238Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 4 No. 1 (2003); 27-45Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 4 n. 1 (2003); 27-452316-52781518-7187reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)instacron:PUC_SPenghttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13238/9752Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessParker, Kelly A.2024-07-01T13:09:31Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/13238Revistahttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofiaPRIhttps://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/oairevcognitio@gmail.com2316-52781518-7187opendoar:2024-07-01T13:09:31Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Reconstructing the Normative Sciences
Reconstruindo as Ciências Normativas
title Reconstructing the Normative Sciences
spellingShingle Reconstructing the Normative Sciences
Parker, Kelly A.
Peirce
pragmatism
pragmaticism
value theory
normative science
esthetics
ethics
logics
Peirce
pragmatismo
pragmaticismo
teoria do valor
ciência normativa
estética
ética
lógica
title_short Reconstructing the Normative Sciences
title_full Reconstructing the Normative Sciences
title_fullStr Reconstructing the Normative Sciences
title_full_unstemmed Reconstructing the Normative Sciences
title_sort Reconstructing the Normative Sciences
author Parker, Kelly A.
author_facet Parker, Kelly A.
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Parker, Kelly A.
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Peirce
pragmatism
pragmaticism
value theory
normative science
esthetics
ethics
logics
Peirce
pragmatismo
pragmaticismo
teoria do valor
ciência normativa
estética
ética
lógica
topic Peirce
pragmatism
pragmaticism
value theory
normative science
esthetics
ethics
logics
Peirce
pragmatismo
pragmaticismo
teoria do valor
ciência normativa
estética
ética
lógica
description From 1902 onward, Peirce viewed esthetics, ethics, and logic as “normative sciences,” interconnected spheres of philosophical inquiry that constitute his main work in value theory. The normative sciences provide the basis for a theoretical investigation of questions of value detached from practical interests. Because the normative sciences maintain Peirce’s well-known insistence on realism, they set his pragmaticism apart from the more “nominalistic” pragmatism of James and Dewey. The paper aims to clarify Peirce’s idea of the normative sciences, to show how his realism applies in the sphere of value, and to explore his views on the proper relation between theory and practice. The concluding section suggests examples of how we might understand Peirce’s rich and innovative concept of normative esthetics.
publishDate 2013
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2013-01-09
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13238
url https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13238
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/13238/9752
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 4 No. 1 (2003); 27-45
Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia; v. 4 n. 1 (2003); 27-45
2316-5278
1518-7187
reponame:Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
instname:Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
instacron:PUC_SP
instname_str Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
instacron_str PUC_SP
institution PUC_SP
reponame_str Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
collection Cognitio (São Paulo. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Cognitio (São Paulo. Online) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv revcognitio@gmail.com
_version_ 1803387420493742080

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