Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: Theory and experiment
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2019 |
Outros Autores: | , |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/25869 |
Resumo: | In the context of school choice, we experimentally study how behavior and outcomes are affected when, instead of submitting rankings in the student-proposing or school proposing deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism, students make decisions dynamically, going through the steps of the underlying algorithms. Our main results show that, contrary to theory, (a) in the dynamic student-proposing DA mechanism, students propose to schools respecting the order of their true preferences slightly more often than in its static version while, (b) in the dynamic school-proposing DA mechanism, students react to proposals by always respecting the order and not accepting schools in the tail of their true preferences more often than in the corresponding static version. As a consequence, the dynamic mechanisms outperform their static counterparts in what stability and average payoffs are concerned. In the aggregate, the dynamic school-proposing DA mechanism is the best performing mechanism. |
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Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: Theory and experimentDynamic School ChoiceDeferred AcceptanceStabilityEfficiencyIn the context of school choice, we experimentally study how behavior and outcomes are affected when, instead of submitting rankings in the student-proposing or school proposing deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism, students make decisions dynamically, going through the steps of the underlying algorithms. Our main results show that, contrary to theory, (a) in the dynamic student-proposing DA mechanism, students propose to schools respecting the order of their true preferences slightly more often than in its static version while, (b) in the dynamic school-proposing DA mechanism, students react to proposals by always respecting the order and not accepting schools in the tail of their true preferences more often than in the corresponding static version. As a consequence, the dynamic mechanisms outperform their static counterparts in what stability and average payoffs are concerned. In the aggregate, the dynamic school-proposing DA mechanism is the best performing mechanism.ElsevierRepositório da Universidade de LisboaKlijn, FlipPais, JoanaVorsatz, Marc2022-10-31T19:18:38Z20192019-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/25869engKlijn, Flip; Joana Pais, and Marc Vorsatz. (2019). "Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: Theory and experiment". Games and Economic Behavior, Vol.113: pp. 147-163. (Search PDF in 2022).0899-82510.1016/j.geb.2018.08.009info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-11-12T01:31:31Zoai:www.repository.utl.pt:10400.5/25869Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T17:09:36.718127Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: Theory and experiment |
title |
Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: Theory and experiment |
spellingShingle |
Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: Theory and experiment Klijn, Flip Dynamic School Choice Deferred Acceptance Stability Efficiency |
title_short |
Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: Theory and experiment |
title_full |
Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: Theory and experiment |
title_fullStr |
Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: Theory and experiment |
title_full_unstemmed |
Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: Theory and experiment |
title_sort |
Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: Theory and experiment |
author |
Klijn, Flip |
author_facet |
Klijn, Flip Pais, Joana Vorsatz, Marc |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Pais, Joana Vorsatz, Marc |
author2_role |
author author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Klijn, Flip Pais, Joana Vorsatz, Marc |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Dynamic School Choice Deferred Acceptance Stability Efficiency |
topic |
Dynamic School Choice Deferred Acceptance Stability Efficiency |
description |
In the context of school choice, we experimentally study how behavior and outcomes are affected when, instead of submitting rankings in the student-proposing or school proposing deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism, students make decisions dynamically, going through the steps of the underlying algorithms. Our main results show that, contrary to theory, (a) in the dynamic student-proposing DA mechanism, students propose to schools respecting the order of their true preferences slightly more often than in its static version while, (b) in the dynamic school-proposing DA mechanism, students react to proposals by always respecting the order and not accepting schools in the tail of their true preferences more often than in the corresponding static version. As a consequence, the dynamic mechanisms outperform their static counterparts in what stability and average payoffs are concerned. In the aggregate, the dynamic school-proposing DA mechanism is the best performing mechanism. |
publishDate |
2019 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2019 2019-01-01T00:00:00Z 2022-10-31T19:18:38Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/25869 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/25869 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
Klijn, Flip; Joana Pais, and Marc Vorsatz. (2019). "Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: Theory and experiment". Games and Economic Behavior, Vol.113: pp. 147-163. (Search PDF in 2022). 0899-825 10.1016/j.geb.2018.08.009 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Elsevier |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Elsevier |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
instname_str |
Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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RCAAP |
institution |
RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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1799131191737057280 |