The Problem of Deviant Casual Chains

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Amen, Miguel
Data de Publicação: 2005
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: https://doi.org/10.26537/rebules.v0i5.808
Resumo: In the following article I identify the source of Davidson's failure to provide an analysis of intentional action. It is shown that this failure should be seen as an instance of consistency within his overall theory of mind and action.In Actions, Reason and Causes (1963) Davidson defended the causal theory of action, according to which the intentions for which a person acts are the reasons for which he acts and those reasons cause the action.According to Davidson, a reason for an action A consists in the agent having a pro-attitude toward actions of a certain kind along with a belief that Aing is an action of that kind. Pro-attitudes can be seen as desires and wantings, giving goals and motives for action. 
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spelling The Problem of Deviant Casual ChainsThe Problem of Deviant Casual ChainsIn the following article I identify the source of Davidson's failure to provide an analysis of intentional action. It is shown that this failure should be seen as an instance of consistency within his overall theory of mind and action.In Actions, Reason and Causes (1963) Davidson defended the causal theory of action, according to which the intentions for which a person acts are the reasons for which he acts and those reasons cause the action.According to Davidson, a reason for an action A consists in the agent having a pro-attitude toward actions of a certain kind along with a belief that Aing is an action of that kind. Pro-attitudes can be seen as desires and wantings, giving goals and motives for action. In the following article I identify the source of Davidson's failure to provide an analysis of intentional action. It is shown that this failure should be seen as an instance of consistency within his overall theory of mind and action.In Actions, Reason and Causes (1963) Davidson defended the causal theory of action, according to which the intentions for which a person acts are the reasons for which he acts and those reasons cause the action.According to Davidson, a reason for an action A consists in the agent having a pro-attitude toward actions of a certain kind along with a belief that Aing is an action of that kind. Pro-attitudes can be seen as desires and wantings, giving goals and motives for action. CEOS.PP / School of Accounting and Administration of Porto, Polytechnic of Porto2005-07-05info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttps://doi.org/10.26537/rebules.v0i5.808https://doi.org/10.26537/rebules.v0i5.808Journal of Business and Legal Sciences / Revista de Ciências Empresariais e Jurídicas; No. 5 (2005): Revista de Ciências Empresariais e Jurídicas / Review of Business and Legal Sciences; 271- 278Revista de Ciências Empresariais e Jurídicas / Journal of Business and Legal Sciences; Núm. 5 (2005): Revista de Ciências Empresariais e Jurídicas / Review of Business and Legal Sciences; 271- 278Revista de Ciências Empresariais e Jurídicas / Journal of Business and Legal Sciences; N.º 5 (2005): Revista de Ciências Empresariais e Jurídicas / Review of Business and Legal Sciences; 271- 2781646-102910.26537/rcej.v0i5reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAPporhttps://parc.ipp.pt/index.php/rebules/article/view/808https://parc.ipp.pt/index.php/rebules/article/view/808/287Copyright (c) 2017 Review of Business and Legal Sciencesinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessAmen, Miguel2024-02-07T10:03:37Zoai:oai.parc.ipp.pt:article/808Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T15:56:51.923056Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The Problem of Deviant Casual Chains
The Problem of Deviant Casual Chains
title The Problem of Deviant Casual Chains
spellingShingle The Problem of Deviant Casual Chains
Amen, Miguel
title_short The Problem of Deviant Casual Chains
title_full The Problem of Deviant Casual Chains
title_fullStr The Problem of Deviant Casual Chains
title_full_unstemmed The Problem of Deviant Casual Chains
title_sort The Problem of Deviant Casual Chains
author Amen, Miguel
author_facet Amen, Miguel
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Amen, Miguel
description In the following article I identify the source of Davidson's failure to provide an analysis of intentional action. It is shown that this failure should be seen as an instance of consistency within his overall theory of mind and action.In Actions, Reason and Causes (1963) Davidson defended the causal theory of action, according to which the intentions for which a person acts are the reasons for which he acts and those reasons cause the action.According to Davidson, a reason for an action A consists in the agent having a pro-attitude toward actions of a certain kind along with a belief that Aing is an action of that kind. Pro-attitudes can be seen as desires and wantings, giving goals and motives for action. 
publishDate 2005
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2005-07-05
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://doi.org/10.26537/rebules.v0i5.808
https://doi.org/10.26537/rebules.v0i5.808
url https://doi.org/10.26537/rebules.v0i5.808
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://parc.ipp.pt/index.php/rebules/article/view/808
https://parc.ipp.pt/index.php/rebules/article/view/808/287
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2017 Review of Business and Legal Sciences
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2017 Review of Business and Legal Sciences
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv CEOS.PP / School of Accounting and Administration of Porto, Polytechnic of Porto
publisher.none.fl_str_mv CEOS.PP / School of Accounting and Administration of Porto, Polytechnic of Porto
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Journal of Business and Legal Sciences / Revista de Ciências Empresariais e Jurídicas; No. 5 (2005): Revista de Ciências Empresariais e Jurídicas / Review of Business and Legal Sciences; 271- 278
Revista de Ciências Empresariais e Jurídicas / Journal of Business and Legal Sciences; Núm. 5 (2005): Revista de Ciências Empresariais e Jurídicas / Review of Business and Legal Sciences; 271- 278
Revista de Ciências Empresariais e Jurídicas / Journal of Business and Legal Sciences; N.º 5 (2005): Revista de Ciências Empresariais e Jurídicas / Review of Business and Legal Sciences; 271- 278
1646-1029
10.26537/rcej.v0i5
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
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instname_str Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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reponame_str Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
collection Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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