On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in large games
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2008 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10362/11577 |
Resumo: | Over the years, several formalizations and existence results for games with a continuum of players have been given. These include those of Schmeidler (1973), Rashid (1983), Mas-Colell (1984), Khan and Sun (1999) and Podczeck (2007a). The level of generality of each of these existence results is typically regarded as a criterion to evaluate how appropriate is the corresponding formalization of large games. In contrast, we argue that such evaluation is pointless. In fact, we show that, in a precise sense, all the above existence results are equivalent. Thus, all of them are equally strong and therefore cannot rank the different formalizations of large games. |
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On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in large gamesNash equilibriumPure strategiesApproximationEquilibrium distributionsOver the years, several formalizations and existence results for games with a continuum of players have been given. These include those of Schmeidler (1973), Rashid (1983), Mas-Colell (1984), Khan and Sun (1999) and Podczeck (2007a). The level of generality of each of these existence results is typically regarded as a criterion to evaluate how appropriate is the corresponding formalization of large games. In contrast, we argue that such evaluation is pointless. In fact, we show that, in a precise sense, all the above existence results are equivalent. Thus, all of them are equally strong and therefore cannot rank the different formalizations of large games.Nova SBERUNCarmona, GuilhermePodczeck, Konrad2014-03-13T11:35:36Z2008-032008-03-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10362/11577enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2024-03-11T03:46:07Zoai:run.unl.pt:10362/11577Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-20T03:20:23.862425Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in large games |
title |
On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in large games |
spellingShingle |
On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in large games Carmona, Guilherme Nash equilibrium Pure strategies Approximation Equilibrium distributions |
title_short |
On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in large games |
title_full |
On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in large games |
title_fullStr |
On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in large games |
title_full_unstemmed |
On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in large games |
title_sort |
On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in large games |
author |
Carmona, Guilherme |
author_facet |
Carmona, Guilherme Podczeck, Konrad |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Podczeck, Konrad |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
RUN |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Carmona, Guilherme Podczeck, Konrad |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Nash equilibrium Pure strategies Approximation Equilibrium distributions |
topic |
Nash equilibrium Pure strategies Approximation Equilibrium distributions |
description |
Over the years, several formalizations and existence results for games with a continuum of players have been given. These include those of Schmeidler (1973), Rashid (1983), Mas-Colell (1984), Khan and Sun (1999) and Podczeck (2007a). The level of generality of each of these existence results is typically regarded as a criterion to evaluate how appropriate is the corresponding formalization of large games. In contrast, we argue that such evaluation is pointless. In fact, we show that, in a precise sense, all the above existence results are equivalent. Thus, all of them are equally strong and therefore cannot rank the different formalizations of large games. |
publishDate |
2008 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2008-03 2008-03-01T00:00:00Z 2014-03-13T11:35:36Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10362/11577 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10362/11577 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Nova SBE |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Nova SBE |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
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Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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RCAAP |
institution |
RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
collection |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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