Outsourcing in contests

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Straume, Odd Rune
Data de Publicação: 2007
Outros Autores: Meland, Frode
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/1822/6838
Resumo: We study ex post outsourcing of production in an imperfectly discriminating contest, interpreted here as a research tournament or a procurement contest for being awarded some production contract. We find that the possibility of outsourcing increases competition between the contestants, leading to higher total contest effort, if the contest winner is expected to obtain a sufficiently large share of ex post outsourcing rents. Under reasonable assumptions, outsourcing tends also to increase the number of active contestants, strengthening the case for outsourcing to increase total contest effort. If such effort is socially wasteful, outsourcing creates a welfare trade-off between ex ante and ex post efficiency.
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spelling Outsourcing in contestsContestsNon-price competitionOutsourcingSocial SciencesWe study ex post outsourcing of production in an imperfectly discriminating contest, interpreted here as a research tournament or a procurement contest for being awarded some production contract. We find that the possibility of outsourcing increases competition between the contestants, leading to higher total contest effort, if the contest winner is expected to obtain a sufficiently large share of ex post outsourcing rents. Under reasonable assumptions, outsourcing tends also to increase the number of active contestants, strengthening the case for outsourcing to increase total contest effort. If such effort is socially wasteful, outsourcing creates a welfare trade-off between ex ante and ex post efficiency.SpringerUniversidade do MinhoStraume, Odd RuneMeland, Frode20072007-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/1822/6838eng"Public Choice". ISSN 0048-5829. 131:3-4 (2007) 315-331.0048-582910.1007/s11127-006-9117-xhttp://www.springerlink.com/content/100332/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-07-21T12:00:40Zoai:repositorium.sdum.uminho.pt:1822/6838Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T18:50:32.474366Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Outsourcing in contests
title Outsourcing in contests
spellingShingle Outsourcing in contests
Straume, Odd Rune
Contests
Non-price competition
Outsourcing
Social Sciences
title_short Outsourcing in contests
title_full Outsourcing in contests
title_fullStr Outsourcing in contests
title_full_unstemmed Outsourcing in contests
title_sort Outsourcing in contests
author Straume, Odd Rune
author_facet Straume, Odd Rune
Meland, Frode
author_role author
author2 Meland, Frode
author2_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Universidade do Minho
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Straume, Odd Rune
Meland, Frode
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Contests
Non-price competition
Outsourcing
Social Sciences
topic Contests
Non-price competition
Outsourcing
Social Sciences
description We study ex post outsourcing of production in an imperfectly discriminating contest, interpreted here as a research tournament or a procurement contest for being awarded some production contract. We find that the possibility of outsourcing increases competition between the contestants, leading to higher total contest effort, if the contest winner is expected to obtain a sufficiently large share of ex post outsourcing rents. Under reasonable assumptions, outsourcing tends also to increase the number of active contestants, strengthening the case for outsourcing to increase total contest effort. If such effort is socially wasteful, outsourcing creates a welfare trade-off between ex ante and ex post efficiency.
publishDate 2007
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2007
2007-01-01T00:00:00Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/1822/6838
url http://hdl.handle.net/1822/6838
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv "Public Choice". ISSN 0048-5829. 131:3-4 (2007) 315-331.
0048-5829
10.1007/s11127-006-9117-x
http://www.springerlink.com/content/100332/
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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