NASH AND SOCIAL WELFARE IMPACT IN AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE MODEL

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Zubelli,JP
Data de Publicação: 2017
Outros Autores: Alberto Pinto, Luís Filipe Martins
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://repositorio.inesctec.pt/handle/123456789/4602
http://dx.doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2017009
Resumo: We study a classic international trade model consisting of a strategic game in the tariffs of the governments. The model is a two-stage game where, at the first stage, governments of each country use their welfare functions to choose their tariffs either (i) competitively (Nash equilibrium) or (ii) cooperatively (social optimum). In the second stage, firms choose competitively (Nash) their home and export quantities. We compare the competitive (Nash) tariffs with the cooperative (social) tariffs and we classify the game type according to the coincidence or not of these equilibria as a social equilibrium, a prisoner's dilemma or a lose-win dilemma.
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spelling NASH AND SOCIAL WELFARE IMPACT IN AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE MODELWe study a classic international trade model consisting of a strategic game in the tariffs of the governments. The model is a two-stage game where, at the first stage, governments of each country use their welfare functions to choose their tariffs either (i) competitively (Nash equilibrium) or (ii) cooperatively (social optimum). In the second stage, firms choose competitively (Nash) their home and export quantities. We compare the competitive (Nash) tariffs with the cooperative (social) tariffs and we classify the game type according to the coincidence or not of these equilibria as a social equilibrium, a prisoner's dilemma or a lose-win dilemma.2017-12-21T11:28:46Z2017-01-01T00:00:00Z2017info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://repositorio.inesctec.pt/handle/123456789/4602http://dx.doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2017009engZubelli,JPAlberto PintoLuís Filipe Martinsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-05-15T10:19:53Zoai:repositorio.inesctec.pt:123456789/4602Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T17:52:23.182124Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv NASH AND SOCIAL WELFARE IMPACT IN AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE MODEL
title NASH AND SOCIAL WELFARE IMPACT IN AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE MODEL
spellingShingle NASH AND SOCIAL WELFARE IMPACT IN AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE MODEL
Zubelli,JP
title_short NASH AND SOCIAL WELFARE IMPACT IN AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE MODEL
title_full NASH AND SOCIAL WELFARE IMPACT IN AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE MODEL
title_fullStr NASH AND SOCIAL WELFARE IMPACT IN AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE MODEL
title_full_unstemmed NASH AND SOCIAL WELFARE IMPACT IN AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE MODEL
title_sort NASH AND SOCIAL WELFARE IMPACT IN AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE MODEL
author Zubelli,JP
author_facet Zubelli,JP
Alberto Pinto
Luís Filipe Martins
author_role author
author2 Alberto Pinto
Luís Filipe Martins
author2_role author
author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Zubelli,JP
Alberto Pinto
Luís Filipe Martins
description We study a classic international trade model consisting of a strategic game in the tariffs of the governments. The model is a two-stage game where, at the first stage, governments of each country use their welfare functions to choose their tariffs either (i) competitively (Nash equilibrium) or (ii) cooperatively (social optimum). In the second stage, firms choose competitively (Nash) their home and export quantities. We compare the competitive (Nash) tariffs with the cooperative (social) tariffs and we classify the game type according to the coincidence or not of these equilibria as a social equilibrium, a prisoner's dilemma or a lose-win dilemma.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2017-12-21T11:28:46Z
2017-01-01T00:00:00Z
2017
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://repositorio.inesctec.pt/handle/123456789/4602
http://dx.doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2017009
url http://repositorio.inesctec.pt/handle/123456789/4602
http://dx.doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2017009
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
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instacron:RCAAP
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collection Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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