Decentralized matching markets with(out) frictions : a laboratory experiment
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2017 |
Outros Autores: | , |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/15970 |
Resumo: | In a series of laboratory experiments, we explore the impact of different market features (the level of information, search costs, and the level of commitment) on agents’ behaviour and on the outcome of decentralized matching markets. In our experiments, subjects on each side of the market actively search for a partner, make proposals, and are free to accept or reject any proposal received at any time throughout the game. Our results suggest that a low information level boosts market activity but does not affect stability or efficiency of the final outcome, unless coupled with search costs. Search costs have a significant negative impact on market activity, and on both stability and efficiency. Finally, commitment harms stability slightly but acts as a disciplinary device to market activity and is associated with higher efficiency levels of the final outcome. |
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Decentralized matching markets with(out) frictions : a laboratory experimentdecentralized marketstwo-sided matchingstabilityefficiencylaboratory experimentsIn a series of laboratory experiments, we explore the impact of different market features (the level of information, search costs, and the level of commitment) on agents’ behaviour and on the outcome of decentralized matching markets. In our experiments, subjects on each side of the market actively search for a partner, make proposals, and are free to accept or reject any proposal received at any time throughout the game. Our results suggest that a low information level boosts market activity but does not affect stability or efficiency of the final outcome, unless coupled with search costs. Search costs have a significant negative impact on market activity, and on both stability and efficiency. Finally, commitment harms stability slightly but acts as a disciplinary device to market activity and is associated with higher efficiency levels of the final outcome.ISEG - REM - Research in Economics and MathematicsRepositório da Universidade de LisboaPais, JoanaPintér, ÁgnesVeszteg, Róbert F.2018-09-26T14:56:51Z2017-092017-09-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/15970engPais, Joana, Ágnes Pintér e Róbert F. Veszteg (2017). "Decentralized matching markets with(out) frictions : a laboratory experiment". Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão – REM Working paper nº 003 - 20172184-108Xinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-03-06T14:45:50Zoai:www.repository.utl.pt:10400.5/15970Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T17:01:29.597896Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Decentralized matching markets with(out) frictions : a laboratory experiment |
title |
Decentralized matching markets with(out) frictions : a laboratory experiment |
spellingShingle |
Decentralized matching markets with(out) frictions : a laboratory experiment Pais, Joana decentralized markets two-sided matching stability efficiency laboratory experiments |
title_short |
Decentralized matching markets with(out) frictions : a laboratory experiment |
title_full |
Decentralized matching markets with(out) frictions : a laboratory experiment |
title_fullStr |
Decentralized matching markets with(out) frictions : a laboratory experiment |
title_full_unstemmed |
Decentralized matching markets with(out) frictions : a laboratory experiment |
title_sort |
Decentralized matching markets with(out) frictions : a laboratory experiment |
author |
Pais, Joana |
author_facet |
Pais, Joana Pintér, Ágnes Veszteg, Róbert F. |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Pintér, Ágnes Veszteg, Róbert F. |
author2_role |
author author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Pais, Joana Pintér, Ágnes Veszteg, Róbert F. |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
decentralized markets two-sided matching stability efficiency laboratory experiments |
topic |
decentralized markets two-sided matching stability efficiency laboratory experiments |
description |
In a series of laboratory experiments, we explore the impact of different market features (the level of information, search costs, and the level of commitment) on agents’ behaviour and on the outcome of decentralized matching markets. In our experiments, subjects on each side of the market actively search for a partner, make proposals, and are free to accept or reject any proposal received at any time throughout the game. Our results suggest that a low information level boosts market activity but does not affect stability or efficiency of the final outcome, unless coupled with search costs. Search costs have a significant negative impact on market activity, and on both stability and efficiency. Finally, commitment harms stability slightly but acts as a disciplinary device to market activity and is associated with higher efficiency levels of the final outcome. |
publishDate |
2017 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2017-09 2017-09-01T00:00:00Z 2018-09-26T14:56:51Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/15970 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/15970 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
Pais, Joana, Ágnes Pintér e Róbert F. Veszteg (2017). "Decentralized matching markets with(out) frictions : a laboratory experiment". Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão – REM Working paper nº 003 - 2017 2184-108X |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
ISEG - REM - Research in Economics and Mathematics |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
ISEG - REM - Research in Economics and Mathematics |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
instname_str |
Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
instacron_str |
RCAAP |
institution |
RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
collection |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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1799131103999557632 |